Doctoral Thesis

Bringing Emotions Back In:

A Study on the Relationship between Power and Emotions in International Relations

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Bringing Emotions back in: A Study on the Relationship between Power and Emotions in International Relations

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Abstract

The discipline of International Relations (IR) has seen a growing interest in emotions during the past two decades. But whereas ontological questions, methodological issues and the effects of specific emotions have come into focus, the link between emotions and one of the discipline's fundamental concepts – power – has received next to no attention. This is a curiosity as emotions are not merely a force of nature. They are also products of social interaction and can be manipulated for the purpose of exercising power.

This study therefore pursues the question of what role the manipulation of emotions can play in the exercise of power in international relations. Answering this question is meant to achieve three goals: to theoretically connect the discipline's literature on power with that on emotions; to provide a framework for thinking about the link between power and emotions in international relations; and to illustrate through several case studies how power has been exercised through the manipulation of emotions throughout history.

The first part of this study is theoretical in nature and consists of three steps. First, it defines power as a process through which one actor intentionally makes another actor behave in accordance with the first actor's preferences. This process can take a variety of forms and rely on various power mechanisms. Secondly, this study defines emotions as action tendencies that influence human cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. Emotions can be manipulated and can have a social dimension when they are based on social instead of individual identities. Power, thus, can be exercised over individuals as well as groups of individuals by creating, stirring or alleviating emotions. In the context of international relations, collective actors such as states can be said to have emotions when a significant number of their members experience emotions based on their shared social identity.

The second part of this study consists of six case studies that illustrate how states have exercised power over other states by manipulating their emotions. The first of these case studies focuses on the emotion of shock and its deliberate creation by the United States through the two nuclear bombs dropped on Japan in 1945. The following three case studies center on the fear of abandonment and how the United States utilized it throughout the Cold War to exercise power over its allies. It stirred the West German fear of abandonment to halt the country's nuclear ambitions during the 1950s and 1960s; it alleviated the South Korean fear of abandonment to overcome its opposition to American troop withdrawals during the Nixon era; and it used a combination of both approaches to get South Korea to abandon its nuclear program in the 1970s. Lastly, two case studies look at the manipulation of anger. The first one illustrates how Prussia in 1870 stirred the anger of the French government and public to provoke war. And the final case study showcases how Japan has been failing throughout the past decades to alleviate South Korean anger about the Japanese treatment of and attitudes towards the two country's colonial history.

In its conclusion, this study outlines the limitations of its approach to power, emotions and the selection of case studies as well as its contribution to IR scholarship. Lastly, it presents some further thoughts on the interplay of power and emotions in contemporary politics and the need for a theoretical toolkit to think about this link.

Keywords: International Relations, Power, Emotions
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I. Introduction

In the summer of 1870, the territory of today's Germany was occupied by a multitude of small states, the biggest one of which was Prussia. Its chancellor Otto von Bismarck plotted their unification by provoking a French attack on Prussia which would unite the German states against their common enemy. His intent: to play on the "Gallic overweening and touchiness" and to provide a "red rag upon the Gallic bull" (1898, 101), as he himself described it in his memoirs.

To that purpose, Bismarck publicized minutes from a meeting between the Prussian King and the French ambassador to Prussia. The encounter was courteous, yet Bismarck's notes depicted the king's behavior as offensive towards the ambassador and as a diplomatic affront. Indeed: the French public as well as the government took the bait and called for revenge as well as military retaliation. And as Bismarck had planned, the prospect of a French attack on Prussia brought together the German states. The outcome was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 that was declared by France but overwhelmingly won by Prussia and its allies. It resulted in the fall of the French Empire and the formation of a unified German Empire, and thereby in a major shift of power in Europe.

This historic episode is only one of many examples in which emotions and their manipulation are utilized to change the behavior of an actor – or, in other words, to exercise power. This link between power and emotions can take the shape of perfidious manipulation, as is the case in the above-given example. It can unfold through the brute creation of emotions, for example fear in the face of violence, or through subtler means, such as the shaping of norms about the expression of emotions in a society. Power and emotions not only come together where emotions are created, but also where already existing emotions are stoked

or alleviated. Again, there is a plentitude of examples, from states fueling the fear of abandonment of an alliance partner to one nation trying to calm the anger of another nation.

Emotions and power have therefore been labeled as "conceptual twins" (Heaney 2011). The field of International Relations (IR) has examined both concepts in their own right – yet it has given little attention to both emotions and power at the same time, and to the manifold ways in which both interact in international affairs.

This observation stands in the context of an "emotional turn" in IR and the increasingly popular idea that attention to emotions is of relevance for understanding world politics[1]. A variety of authors have examined the influence of specific emotions, written on methodological issues concerning the research on emotions, and linked emotions to established concepts from within the discipline. Yet only few references have been made to the notion of power. This is a curiosity in the face of the common assumptions that "all politics involves power" (Baldwin 2013, 274) and that power is "fundamental to the study of world politics" (Mattern Bially 2008, 691). In the same vein, the IR literature on power has given scant attention to emotions and continues to emphasize material factors, first and foremost of which are military capabilities and economic capacity (Berenskoetter 2007, 1; Schmidt 2007, 61). This study therefore aims to explore how emotions and power interact in international relations and how power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions.

[1] The discipline of IR is certainly not alone in experiencing this growing popularity and quantity of research on emotions. Various authors therefore speak of a similar trend in the wider field of political studies as well as the social sciences in general (Clough and Halley 2007; S. Thompson and Hoggett 2012). Whether it still appropriate to speak of an ongoing "turn" is furthermore up for debate. While IR scholarship may have paid relatively little attention to emotions in the past, prominent articles on the subject began to appear two decades ago already. Since then, many more have found their way into the field's most prestigious journals and various books on emotions in IR have been published by university presses. That research on emotions is not a niche topic anymore is furthermore visible in the forums that some of the field's foremost journals have organized on the topic (for examples see Bleiker et al. 2014; Koschut et al. 2017).

In doing so, this project rests on three established assumptions about emotions. First, that emotions affect cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. Second, that emotions not only appear naturally, but that they can be intentionally manipulated. And third, that these effects of emotions as well as their manipulation can take place on the individual as well as the collective level. With this in mind, the guiding assumption of this project is that manipulating others' emotion can be a form of exercising power. In other words: power over the behavior of others can be exercised by manipulating their emotions. On the international stage, this process can be utilized by states as well as non-state actors, by individuals as well as collectives, can be intentional or unintentional, can rely on positive as well as negative emotions, and can involve the creation of emotions that didn't exist before as well as the shaping, stoking and the alleviation of existing emotions.

Power and Emotions through the Ages

This idea that emotions can be manipulated in order to exercise power and further one's goals is not new and can be found in the writings intellectuals, scholars, strategists and leaders throughout the ages. The Greek philosopher Gorgias argued more than two millennia ago that rhetoric can produce emotions that influence the soul just like drugs influence the body (Asmis 1992, 341). For his contemporary Aristotle, the manipulation of emotions trough *pathos* was one of the three ways through which persuasion can take place, aside from authority (or *ethos*) and logic (or *logos*). As he wrote:

> The orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion by his speech; for the judgements we deliver are not the same when we are influenced by joy or sorrow, love or hate; and it is to this alone that, as we have said, the present-day writers of treatises endeavor to devote their attention. (Aristotle 1926)

Two thousand years later, John Locke continued this train of thought and arrived at a largely negative conclusion. He saw rhetoric as a "powerful instrument of error and deceit" because of its potential to "move the passions" (Locke 1997, 452). Another century down the road, Immanuel Kant also saw rhetoric as a perfidious tool of manipulation. As he wrote, its effect on the emotions has the capacity to "move people, like machines, to a judgment in important matters which must lose all weight for them in calm reflection" (Kant 2000, 205). Both Locke and Kant therefore derided the use of rhetoric for the purpose of persuasion as problematic: where emotions are manipulated, sound reasoning and free decisions are hardly possible, and deceit is never far.

Not only those who wrote on rhetoric and persuasion saw the link between power and emotions; the same is true for those who wrote about the military exercise of power. Sun Tzu argued in the 5th century B.C. that military prowess involves the management of emotions: "in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger" (Sun Tzu 2010, 7). Not long after, Thucydides described in his account of the Peloponnesian War how exceptional leaders manage fear in themselves as well as their followers and manipulate and exploit that of their enemies (Desmond 2006, 375–76). Carl von Clausewitz, too, paid attention to the role of emotions and their management in combat. He wrote that war is the product as well as the producer of emotions, that "emotion can easily overwhelm intellectual conviction" (Clausewitz 2007, 54, 86), and that the successful exercise of military power requires the management of these emotions by commanders.

The same argument has been made by some of history's most influential leaders and agitators. Consider Adolf Hitler: in 1926, during a speech in Hamburg, he argued that the masses are "primitive in attitude" and cannot be reliably mobilized via an objective and even-handed presentation of facts. Understanding and intellectual insight, thus, make for a shaky foundation of mass mobilization. "What is stable is emotion: hatred" (as quoted in

Kershaw 2008, 179). Effective propaganda has to utilize this emotion to create faith and fanaticism in the masses. A similar quote about the necessity of emotions for the exercise of power has been attributed to Joseph Stalin. Asked in 1931 whether he prefers his followers to be loyal out of conviction or out of fear, he reportedly chose the latter, explaining that "convictions can change; fear remains" (as quoted in Kuromiya 2013, 207).

The link between power and emotions has also been explored by IR scholars, and in particular during the past two decades. One of the first papers on the role of emotions in international politics argued that "political actors constantly evoke and manipulate emotions" (Crawford 2000, 149). Maor and Gross wrote that this sort of "emotion regulation profoundly changes the contours of political and public policy contests and therefore creates politics and policies" (Maor and Gross 2015, 10). Other examples are the arguments that soft power can "inspire followers through the careful management of emotion" (Nye 2008, 92) or that terrorism works through the "personal, group, social and political power of emotion" (McDonald et al. 2015, 87). Yet the linkage between emotions and power has received scant systematic attention in IR beyond such general statements.

This is not to say that the link between power and emotions hasn't been a persistent undercurrent of IR scholarship. The influence of emotions stands at the start of what is commonly seen as IR literature: for Thucydides in the *History of the Peloponnesian War* it is, first and foremost, emotion that motivates the participants and determines their decisions (MacMullen 2003, 2–13). This assumption is still visible in the Realist tradition of IR theory and its contemporary writings. Realism may focus on the international system and material forces, yet the driving force behind concepts such as the security dilemma and the balance of power is "emotional insecurity" (Rösch and Lebow 2018, 9). Fear has therefore been described as "absolutely central" (Lebow 2008, 158) to the Realist tradition. But while it frequently

refers to or implies this connection between power and emotions, it hardly ever dwells on, explores and studies it (Pashakhanlou 2017, 2–7).

This implicit reliance on the link between power and emotions without any explicit theorizing is prevalent throughout the discipline's literature and many of its standard works. Schelling's work on strategic bargaining in *Arms and Influence*, for example, states that the essence of coercive power is "the very exploitation of enemy wants and fears" (Schelling 1966, 3). Nye (2011b, x) introduces his concept of soft power as fundamentally reliant on emotions and processes such as attraction and persuasion. Jervis writes in a newly published edition of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* that "I missed what now looks obvious" (Jervis 2017, Ixix): the explanatory power of emotions for cognition and decision making. And Wendt (1999, 132) in *Social Theory of International Politics* stipulates that emotions and their social construction determine the interests that human beings have in order to fulfill their fundamental needs. Yet these authors hardly engage with emotions in their own right and go beyond short references to them.

Research Question & Structure

Against this backdrop, this study strives to achieve two goals. First, it aims to theoretically connect the recent attention given to emotions in IR with the existing literature on power, and thereby with one of the discipline's foundational concepts. As Hutchison and Bleiker argue, this offers "an ideal way to enter into a dialogue with more established international relations theories" (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 508).

Second, this study aims to provide a framework to organize thinking about how emotions and power interact in international relations. The underlying ambition is to emphasize that the exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions plays a significant role in international relations and that many of the emotions we can observe in world politics are the

result of power processes and interests that drive them. In this sense, the goal of this study is to "bring emotions back in", both into the discipline in general as well as its discourse on and understanding of power in particular.

Third, this study aims to illustrate how power is exercised by manipulating emotions and how this matters in world politics through a number of case studies. One goal of these case studies is to show that the link between power and emotions is worth paying attention to, not only in theory but also for understanding significant events in international relations. Case in point is the example of the Franco-Prussian War: without attention to how power was exercised through the manipulation of emotions, it is difficult to understand how the events in 1870 and 1871 unfolded and led to a significant power shift in Europe.

With all this in mind, the research question driving this study is:

> **How is power exercised through the manipulation of emotions in international relations?**

The search for an answer to this question is split into two parts. The first part is theoretical in nature and seeks to provide a framework for analyzing how power is exercised through the manipulation of emotions. The second part consists of a number of case studies that attempt to illustrate how this framework can be applied and how the link between power and emotions has repeatedly become relevant in international relations.

What this study is not meant to provide is a parsimonious theory about power and emotions that stipulates universal principles and allows for predictions. The text is more modest in its ambition. It strives to draw attention to a phenomenon that has received little – and as is argued here: not enough – attention in recent IR scholarship. And, for this purpose, it strives to provide the instruments necessary to bring emotions back into the IR discourse, and to show why doing so matters.

The following pages outline the structure of this study and briefly introduce the content of the following seven chapters.

As was mentioned before, the link between power and emotions has received scant attention in IR. The literature review in chapter II outlines how the discipline's work on power makes few references to emotions and how its growing literature on emotions makes few references to power. This is remarkable, especially because the existence and relevance of the connection between these two concepts are an implicit assumption in many IR writings. In addition, the literature review will show that a number of other disciplines, for example sociology and psychology, have explored this link between emotions and power in ways that are instructive for any efforts to do so in the context of IR. Against this backdrop, this study positions itself between the largely separate bodies of IR literature on power and emotions and draws from the literature in other fields that has brought together the two concepts in the past.

Chapter III introduces and operationalizes the two terms at the core of this study: "power" and "emotions". While most of us have an intuitive understanding of the two concepts, their definition is notoriously difficult and elusive. The academic literature knows a variety of meanings for both terms, many of which overlap, some of which contradict each other. Emotion has therefore been labeled as a "keyword in crisis […] from a definitional and conceptual point of view" (Dixon 2012, 338), and the meaning of power has been described as "essentially contested" (Lukes 2005, 9). To live up to the complexity of the two concepts, the definition of the two terms is a necessary and important prerequisite. Chapter III therefore explains how power and emotions are understood here, how these understandings relate to alternative conceptions of the terms, and how power and emotions are assumed to interact with each other in international relations.

The understandings of power and emotions that underpin this study are based on pre-existing conceptions, were chosen to fit the purposes of this study and make no claim to universal validity. Power is understood as a process through which an actor intentionally makes another actor behave in a way that suits the first actor's preferences and would otherwise not occur. This study is therefore built on the idea of *power over* and an understanding of power as a process. This conception does not take into account that power can also be understood as a resource or capacity (and therefore as *power to*) and differs from many other definitions, for example those that assume that power can be exercised unintentionally or through social structures (and not only by actors). To highlight how different forms of power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions, a number of mechanisms will be discussed that illustrate the many forms that *power over* can take.

Emotion is understood as a process that produces propensities to act in certain ways. This process takes place in reaction to stimuli and depending on the meaning of these stimuli for what is important to an individual. Through these assumptions, this study utilizes an *appraisal approach* to emotions and relies heavily on the work of Nico S. Frijda. The emotion process can be manipulated by intrinsic as well as extrinsic factors. While emotions take place on the level of the individual, they can be based on group identities and have a collective dimension. Although an event has little importance for an individual, it can therefore cause emotions if it matters to a group that the individual considers itself part of. This conception assigns little relevance to the physical dimension of emotions and does not concern itself with truly collective emotions that transcend the individual.

Taken together, these conceptions of power and emotion underpin the basic assumption of this study: that the manipulation of emotions can be a form of exercising power. In the context of international relations, this matters as emotions shape the behavior of nation states, which are understood here as large groups of individuals. A state itself may not be

able to experience emotions, but if a significant number of its members do experience emotions, these emotions affect the state's behavior. As a consequence, states can exercise power over other states by manipulating the emotions of their members, may it be a large share of the public or a small group of influential decision makers.

Chapter IV outlines the methodological approach taken for the case studies that make up the second part of this study. These case studies illustrate how an exercise of power of one state over another state took place through the manipulation of several different emotions in a number of historical episodes. The analysis of these cases was undertaken in a descriptive-interpretive manner and relies on both primary and secondary sources. It is obviously difficult to access, analyze and interpret the emotions of others – and especially so if these emotions occurred decades or centuries ago and were shaped by the contemporary circumstances and culture. The case studies, like all interpretative research, are therefore intended to produce accounts that are rooted in evidence, follow understandable reasoning and are convincingly written up. Yet they are not meant to provide an objective, positivist account that is beyond questioning.

Chapter V is dedicated to the emotion of shock and its utilization to exercise power. This is illustrated through the example of America's use of two nuclear bombs against Japan in 1945. These weapons were not only meant to cause physical devastation, but to shock Japan into surrender through a display of overwhelming power. When the nuclear bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this was therefore done with the intention to maximize their emotional effect and shock. This plan worked: the Japanese leadership was caught off guard, had to admit the inevitability of defeat and decided to surrender. Beyond this case study, the concept of "shock and awe" is briefly introduced to further showcase how the creation of shock is utilized as a means of exercising power in conflicts.

Chapter VI centers on the emotion of fear. To illustrate how power can be exercised on the basis of fear, the relations between the United States and West Germany during the 1950s to 1960s will be looked at in a first step. The West German government saw its national security under constant threat at the time and therefore had an interest and plans to develop nuclear weapons together with its European partners. In order to prevent this, decision makers in Washington, D. C. threatened to withdraw their troops from Germany and stoked the German fear of abandonment. In the context of the shared military alliance, America thereby intentionally induced fear on the German side – and, eventually, was able to prevent its German ally from following through on its ambitions.

Two further case studies illuminate other facets of the exercise of power through the manipulation of fear. Both focus on the relations of the United States with South Korea during the 1960s and 1970s. The first one illustrates how fear can not only be stoked for the purpose of exercising power, but also alleviated. This was visible in relations between the two countries after the Nixon administration announced its intention to withdraw troops from South Korea and subsequently tried to alleviate the growing fears of abandonment in Seoul. Lastly, the third case study in this chapter shows how the stoking and the alleviation of the fear of abandonment can also take place in tandem. This approach was visible in America's diplomatic conduct with South Korea during the 1970s and after it became clear that the country was pursuing a nuclear weapons program of its own, against the strategic interest and explicit demands of the United States.

Chapter VII is dedicated to the emotion of anger. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, which was already referred to on the first pages of this study, will serve as an example to illustrate how the provocation of anger has been utilized to exercise power. At the time, the Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck staged a diplomatic incident in order to create anger and the desire for revenge across the border in France. The result was a declaration of war

against Prussia – which, in turn, was able to portray itself as the victim of French aggression, unite the German states behind itself and instigate a war that it was likely to win. For Prussia, the provocation of anger on the French side was therefore a means to exercise power and shape French behavior in accordance with its own interests.

A different facet of how power and anger can interact is illustrated in a sixth case study. It showcases how attempts at alleviating anger can fail. The case utilized here is that of Japan's government attempting to placate the South Korean anger over injustices from the colonial era and Japanese attitudes towards them. While the government in Tokyo repeatedly apologized for them, and especially so through official statements since the 1990s, these apologies were undermined on various occasions by contradictory statements and behavior, thereby failing to create any sense of reconciliation. This case thereby illustrates how attempts at exercising power through the manipulation of emotions can be futile.

Chapter VIII concludes this study and looks beyond it. In a first step, it looks at the study's limitations, for example the focus on the conception of power as *power over* (and not as *power to* or another alternative), on the nation state (to the exclusion of other actors), and in particular on powerful states (to the exclusion of weaker ones), on the exercise of power through negative emotions (to the exclusion of positive emotions), and on a behaviorist as well as actor-centric understanding of power (to the exclusion of structural forms of power).

In a second step, the chapter summarizes the contribution this study makes to IR. Most importantly, it builds a bridge between the discipline's literature on power and its literature on emotions, thereby "bringing emotions back in" to the IR discourse on power. It does so by providing a framework that engages with both power and emotions more seriously than the existing literature and by illustrating the value and relevance of this approach through case studies. Beyond that, this study furthers the efforts within the discipline to go beyond

the rationalist mainstream and provides a novel perspective on the social construction of preferences, here through the interplay of power and emotions.

On the last pages of this study, some concluding thoughts on the link between power and emotions and its relevance for contemporary politics are presented.

II. Literature Review

This study is situated between three bodies of previous research: (1) the IR literature on emotions, which contains few references to power; (2) the IR literature on power, which contains few references to emotions; and (3) the literature from other academic fields that – explicitly or implicitly – connects emotions and power. In answering its research question, this study attempts build a bridge between the first two bodies of literature, and to draw from the third body's concepts and insights for that purpose.

1. IR Literature on Emotions

Much of the first group of work on emotions in IR was published over the course of the past two decades. It sprung from critical approaches to the discipline's mainstream, for example Crawford's seminal analysis of how emotions play a role in existing IR frameworks and are yet under-theorized. She concluded that they "deserve more systematic attention by scholars of world politics" (Crawford 2000, 155) - which was subsequently echoed by a variety of other scholars. Jervis labeled the past disregard of emotions a "major blunder" (Balzacq and Jervis 2004, 564–65); Lebow emphasizes in his cultural theory of international relations that humans are "emotional beings, not computers" (Lebow 2008, 514); and Coicaud argues that the field's dominant theories have been "misled and misleading" (Coicaud 2014, 493) when it comes to emotions. The assumption that unites these scholars is that emotions are an essential part of human and social life, and that they are of inescapable relevance for understanding politics (M. George 2000, 231; Hutchison 2016, xi; McDermott 2004, 691; Mercer 2013, 247).

Where the mainstream of IR has dealt with emotions, this was usually done in an implicit fashion. Emotions such as fear and trust have long been considered as important, yet they have received little dedicated and systematic attention. Where the discipline engages with

emotions, it does so usually on the basis of simplistic and narrow assumptions. In part, this is the result of Realism's dominant role in the field. Emotions were long understood as biological impulses that are a product of an unchanging human nature. Little attention was given to the social construction of emotions. Realism also came with a focus on negative emotions, such as mistrust and fear, that undermine trust and impede cooperation. On top of that, the field has sorted emotions into dichotomies such as those between body and mind as well as rational and irrational thought. These biases in IR's approach to emotions went together with assumptions such as that emotions are largely inaccessible for scientific inquiry and that they can explain deviations from rational decision making but are otherwise of little relevance (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008, 117; Crawford 2014, 536; Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 494; Ross 2006, 199).

On this foundation, and increasingly in opposition to it, a variety of scholars have written on emotions and their role for international politics. Much of their work either attempts to provide theoretical foundations for further thought about emotions in IR or analyzes and illustrates the role of specific emotions, for example through case studies[2].

(1) Theoretical Foundations

A number of authors have introduced emotions into IR by connecting them with the discipline's existing conceptual toolkit. One example for this approach are Mercer's writings. In an influential article he introduced the concept of emotional beliefs, a term he defines as any belief that is constituted or strengthened by the influence of emotions. Based on research that indicates that rationality is dependent on emotions and that beliefs are based on both cognition and emotion, Mercer concludes that all beliefs are emotional beliefs (and,

[2] Similar categories were employed by Hutchison and Bleiker (2014) who speak of macro and micro approaches in the existing research on emotions in IR.

at the same time, rational). Many of the basic concepts of IR, such as credibility, trust and nationalism, rely therefore on emotions (Mercer 2010). Another of his arguments is that social identities go together with and depend on social emotions. These are different from individual emotions in that they are the result of identifying with a group. An example is "feeling like a state" through which individuals experience emotions and develop attitudes, such as shame or anger, that they would not have without this group identity (Mercer 2014).

The role of emotions in identities has been explored by a number of other authors. Koschut has described the construction of emotional communities, and in particular of emotional security communities such as NATO, whose members follow certain norms about the expression of emotions, both towards the inside as well as the outside. These emotional norms provide an "affective glue" (Koschut 2014, 538) that stabilizes the community and ties its members together. A similar argument was made by Hutchison to show how shared meaning can be found in experiences of collective trauma. Where the emotions associated with trauma become part of social representations, they can give rise to affective communities, may it be in response to memories of colonialism or traumatic events such as natural disasters (Hutchison 2016, 2010).

Beyond beliefs and identities, the role of emotions in institutions and the institutionalization of emotions have been explored by Crawford. Similar to how dominant beliefs become entrenched in interactions, practices and organizations, so can emotions become institutions in their own right. As a result, they become normalized, reproduced and self-reinforcing, oftentimes without much explicit attention. Among the examples she uses is the fear that became institutionalized in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for example through alarmist rhetoric, the extensive gathering of intelligence and even preventive warfare. Another example is the institutionalization of empathy. Crawford (2014) illustrates this process with the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa where negotiations

took place in an atmosphere of violence and mistrust, yet were successful through the conscious promotion of empathy, understanding and concessions.

Other authors have illuminated the emotional underpinnings of a variety of other IR concepts. Michel has, similar to Mercer, taken into focus the concept of trust and argues that many scholars conflate it with the concept of reliance. Whereas the latter is driven by rational and instrumentalist reasoning, trust is of an "intrinsically emotive nature" (Michel 2012, 887). In a similar vein, Solomon has explored the emotional foundations of soft power. The concept relies on the idea that attractiveness can be a source of power. As he argues, it insufficient to explain attractiveness through culture, policies or identities; it requires emotions and the affective investment they create to fully conceptualize soft power (T. Solomon 2014). Even the idea of diplomacy itself has received an emotional twist: Hall (2015) has introduced the notion of emotional diplomacy through which states pursue their objectives by displaying certain emotions, for example anger.

Other scholars have taken the research on emotions in the field of psychology as their starting point and drawn implications for IR. McDermott has done so with a focus on the role of emotions in decision making and outlined how they affect the cognition, thinking and judgment of leaders. In line with Mercer, she argues that emotions are an inescapable part of rationality and can therefore not be discounted in the study of international affairs. They determine, among other things, how memories are accessed, information is selected, risk judged and bias produced (McDermott 2004). Beyond that, she has argued that emotions are part of how leaders communicate their intentions and motivations, for example through speeches and facial expressions (McDermott 2013).

Beyond these general insights about emotions, frameworks from the field of psychology have been used to engage with emotions in IR. One example is the adaption of Intergroup

Emotions Theory by Sasley. In an effort to neither treat the state as a unitary, anthropomorphic actor with emotions nor to focus exclusively on the emotions of individual decision makers, he conceptualizes the state as a group of individuals who can experience emotions as a function of their self-identification as group members (instead of only as individuals). As a result, they feel and think in similar ways as their emotions converge to what can be labeled state emotions (Sasley 2011).

Among the authors who attempt to provide theoretical foundations for IR research on emotions are also those who write on epistemological issues and approaches. A common refrain in this context is that research on emotions inevitably has to overcome the field's persistent assumption that they are merely a deviation from rationality. As Mercer criticizes: "Political scientists generally treat emotion as distinct from, and ideally subordinate to, rationality" (Mercer 2005, 92). Crawford, too, explained in her seminal article that "the rational actor paradigm became dominant" and that we see a "hegemony of rationalist approaches" (Crawford 2000, 122) in IR that leaves little space for the consideration of emotions. With this in mind, numerous authors call for an engagement with emotions that takes them serious as a fact of social life and a foundation of rational thought, not merely as a deviation from it and as a source of irrational behavior and mistakes (see also McDermott 2004; Mercer 2006).

A crucial question in the literature is furthermore how emotions can be approached as an object of inquiry in the first place. As Crawford wrote about this problem:

> [T]here are methodological concerns: emotions seem ephemeral and deeply internal; valid measures of emotions are not obvious; and it may be difficult to distinguish "genuine" emotions from their instrumental display. The ways that psychologists study emotion are not likely to be replicated anytime soon in foreign policy decision settings, nor is it easy to use archives to determine

> how actors felt versus what they argued. Further, there is wariness about generalizing from individual to group behavior and the attributes of organizations, including states. (Crawford 2000, 118–19)

This results in enormous methodological challenges. Numerous authors have therefore called for a more systematic and rigorous study of emotions, for example by drawing from the toolkit of psychology, by utilizing proxy measures, such as opinion polls and statements by decision makers, and by being creative and flexible in the search for sources to work with (Crawford 2000, 155; Sasley 2013; Saurette 2006, 504). Other authors propose to take a step away from the methods of the social sciences that the IR field usually relies on. As Hutchison and Bleiker argue, these methods are "limited in their ability to understand the nature, role and impact of phenomena as ephemeral as emotions" (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008, 125). Instead, they propose to expand the spectrum of methodologies with which IR engages emotions. They see as particularly promising approaches from the humanities that focus, for example, on visual and aesthetic representations. From researchers this requires openness and the willingness to accept that even the study of ephemeral phenomena such as emotions can yield valid and useful knowledge.

One of the few contributions to the IR literature on emotions that strives to provide tangible methodological guidance is a forum article in the *International Studies Review* on research on emotions via the analysis of discourses. In its contributions, a number of authors outline how language can be approached to gain knowledge about emotions. For example, Koschut points out that emotions can become visible in various forms: through explicit references, through the use of terms with emotional connotations (such as "terrorist" or "genocide"), or through metaphors, comparisons and analogies (such as "floods of refugees") (Koschut 2017). And Hall presents a number of ways in which discourses can be emotional, for example as expressions of the author's emotions, as attempts to construct emotions in the

audience, and as examinations of the purposes and consequences of emotions in a particular situation (Hall 2017b)[3].

(2) Specific Emotions in Practice

Beyond these writings that attempt to create the theoretical foundations for IR research on emotions, a variety of authors have written on particular emotions, how they relate to the discipline's core concepts and how they matter in international affairs. As the name of one of the first IR book dedicated to emotions - *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* by Ross (2014) – indicates, attention has so far been given especially to the meaning and role of fear, anger and hatred in international relations.

In the case of fear, a number of authors have analyzed it not so much as an emotion but as a theoretical concept. Pashakhanlou points out that fear in IR theory is generally associated with the discipline's Realist tradition, even though this literature has little to say about the nature of fear. It is central to the theories of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer, yet they do not even provide a definition of the term. As Pashakhanlou (2017) argues, the role of fear in Realism should therefore be questioned. For the theories of the tradition's three principal authors, the concept is not necessary, therefore redundant and even counterproductive. With the same focus on the Realist tradition in IR, Tang has pointed out that it showcases two basic stances towards fear: offensive Realist approaches argue that states assume the worst about each other's intentions in order to cope with their fear; the non-offensive Realist approaches are less fatalistic and see the potential to reduce fear and uncertainty (Tang 2008).

[3] Beyond the works referenced here, a recent book edited by Clément and Sangar (2018) is dedicated to the methodology of research on emotions in IR. Unfortunately, I was not able to access the book before the completion of this study.

Beyond the role of fear for Realist theories, the concept has received particular attention in the context of securitization. Van Rythoven has argued that securitization works "by eliciting culturally specific fears" (Van Rythoven 2015, 466) and, thereby, through the social construction of fear. Similar arguments have been made by other authors for particular contexts in which fear is utilized for the purpose of securitization. Among them are the "the fear of 'anarchy' itself […] as a red herring" (Karatzogianni and Robinson 2017, 283) that modern states use for the purpose of securitization. A more practical example is Abrahamsen's analysis of the political discourse about Africa during Tony Blair's governance in the United Kingdom. This discourse became increasingly securitized, first and foremost through references to security risks and the elicitation of fear, thereby moving away from a pre-existing focus on development issues and humanitarian questions (Abrahamsen 2005).

Anger, too, and a number of related emotions and phenomena have been analyzed from a variety of perspectives. As was mentioned above, Hall has conceptualized a diplomacy of anger through which states express the sensitivity of an issue and the perception of a violation. This form of emotional diplomacy was illustrated by Hall (2011, 2015) through the Chinese expressions of anger during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 and 1996. Hall furthermore wrote about the politics of outrage which, similar to anger, describe a response to a perceived violation. Yet outrage goes beyond the communication of anger. It leads to aggressive and reckless responses, as Hall (2017a) illustrated with the case of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and 1871.

Elsewhere, the feeling of humiliation has come into focus as a source of anger. The link between humiliation, feelings of betrayal and anger has been interpreted as a foundation of radical Islam's rise in the Middle East. The region's political violence is an outcome of humiliation – and radical Islam as well as the War on Terror further exacerbate this problematic process (Fattah and Fierke 2009). The War on Terror itself and the publicity-laden

hunt for Osama bin Laden have also been interpreted through this lens: as a form of counter-humiliation in response to the terrorist attacks in September 2011. The driving force behind this American reaction: "a deep anger which strains to reassert national pride and self-respect in the face of this humiliation" (Saurette 2006, 518). A similar argument about the link between humiliation and anger was also made by Löwenheim and Heimann (2008) who approached this phenomenon by conceptualizing revenge.

The IR literature on emotions has also taken into account more positive phenomena, beyond fear and anger. The need for this has been emphasized by Penttinen: because much of the field's research concerns itself exclusively with negative events, it loses track of the positive dimensions of international affairs and helps to reproduce this negativity. She has detailed this in her writings about the role of joy, other positive emotions and resilience under terrible circumstances, for example war, genocide and trauma (Penttinen 2013b, 2013a). Other venues in which the positive dimensions of emotions have been explored are the foundations of friendships and security communities among states (Eznack and Koschut 2014; Koschut 2014) as well as of transnational affective communities that lead to behavior such as humanitarian relief in response to disasters (Hutchison 2016, 183–210).

(3) Emotions and Power

What the IR literature on emotions has paid relatively little attention to is the interplay of emotions and power, and even less to the possibility of exercising power through the manipulation of emotions. From the beginning of the "emotional turn" onwards, a variety of authors have recognized this and pointed out that the connection of the two concepts is in need of further exploration. Crawford, in her paper from 2000, already proposed that emotions and their manipulation underpin many of the processes in international relations that are usually analyzed from a rationalist point of view, for example persuasion, deterrence, peacebuilding and the enforcement of norms. She thereby insinuates the power *of* emotions

as well as the power *over* emotions, but they are not made explicit or linked to existing conceptions of power in her text (Crawford 2000, 145).

Little research has been done that goes beyond Crawford's initial propositions. As Hutchison and Bleiker wrote almost fifteen years later: "Surprisingly, few scholars in international relations have so far taken on […] the links between emotions and power" (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 507). They, too, argue that emotions and power underpin many of foundational concepts of IR scholarship, such as institutions, regimes, identities and nationalism. As they emphasize, analyzing the linkages between emotions and power has the potential to unmask how phenomena on the level of the individual become of collective relevance, and how seemingly unpolitical or even invisible processes shape international affairs and how we think about them. Nevertheless, the issue of emotions and power – and, in particular, the exercise of power through emotions - has been taken up by a number of authors. Yet most of these writings suffer from shortcomings.

Hutchison and Bleiker themselves explored the link between power and emotions as part of a forum article in the *International Studies Review* on emotions and discourse in IR. They see discourses as a determinant of acceptable emotions and what is acceptable to say about emotions; and they locate the influence of emotions in how they define "the boundaries of what is visible and invisible, thinkable and unthinkable, seemingly rational and irrational" (Hutchison and Bleiker 2017, 502). Emotions are therefore a product as well as an instrument of social discourses that constitute as well as shape agency, behavior, social interactions and normative expectations.

Solomon, in another contribution to the aforementioned forum in the *International Studies Review*, equally links emotions to the power that constitutes and shapes social relations, identities and meanings. For this purpose, he utilizes the concept of "productive power" as it was outlined by Barnett and Duval (2005). Language is commonly cast as the primary

means through which these discourses disseminate. Yet it remains an open question "how some discourses gain legitimacy, and hence hegemony, over others" (T. Solomon 2017, 499) – which is, according to Solomon, where emotions can provide an answer. Discourses consist not only of language, but also of affective elements, and become powerful because they produce an emotional investment on the side of their audiences. Productive power, therefore, may take the *form* of language but also relies on the *force* of emotion to achieve its effect (T. Solomon 2017, 499).

Essentially the same argument was made by Solomon (2014) in a previous article which focused on the concept of soft power. As argued by Nye, the author commonly associated with the concept, soft power works through attraction. This sets it apart from hard power which usually works through coercion and incentives. Solomon argues that the foundations of attraction, which were left largely unspecified by Nye, lie in dominant discourses as well as the creation of an emotional investment in particular identities. As is the case for productive power, so can soft power take the *form* of linguistic discourses but requires the *force* of emotional attachment to be effective. Solomon illustrates this with the American effort to attract international support for its War on Terror by producing affective investments into identities of America as being on the right side of a "good-evil binary" (T. Solomon 2014, 726).

The role of emotions in discourses, socialization and the establishment of identities and norms also comes up in the writings of Koschut and Hutchison. The former argues in his article on emotional security communities that the acquisition of emotional knowledge and processes of emotional socialization are the foundation of power differences, both within the community as well as towards the outside (Koschut 2014, 540–42). Hutchison makes a similar argument about affective communities: emotions and the emotions that are deemed appropriate within a community are the product of discourses that underpin socialization,

rules and norms, and identities. Emotions, therefore, can be the product of entrenched interests and power relations (Hutchison 2016, 286–91).

What unites the articles by Hutchison and Bleiker as well as by Solomon and Koschut is that they connect emotions to a particular form of power that is exercised through discourses and constitutes meanings, identities and norms. As was mentioned above, this approach can be labeled as productive power, following Barnett and Duval. But as their framework for understanding power shows, productive power is only one among multiple forms that power can take; they also speak of compulsory power, institutional power and structural power (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 48). Accordingly, there are at least three other ways of conceptualizing power – which emphasizes that the above-mentioned writings on power and emotions rest on a particular understanding of what power is. The term, after all, does not only describe discourses that produce meanings and identities, but also more straightforward social relationships and attributes.

Part of the IR literature on power and emotions therefore falls short in that is based on a particular and narrow understanding of power. In the terminology of Barnett and Duvall, it is mostly the social constitution of subjects through diffuse processes that is taken into account by the existing literature. Left out are conceptions of power that consist of the direct influence of actors. As will be argued here, emotions can play a role not only in the conception of power that Hutchison, Bleiker and Solomon (as well as to some extent Koschut) utilize, but also beyond that.

Another author who wrote about the link between power and emotions is Petersen in his book on "the strategic use of emotion in conflict" (Petersen 2011). Based case studies taken from the context of the Balkan conflicts during the 1990s, he focuses on emotions that result from the experience of lengthy conflict, for example fear, anger and resentment. Alongside structural resources, such as money and weapons, actors utilized them to achieve

strategic goals – and especially so if they are weaker than their opponent in terms of structural resources. Thus: "like weapons and money, emotions can be a strategic tool" (Petersen 2011, 23). Whereas the Western interventions on the Balkans largely followed a rational approach, those trying to spoil these interventions and their public reception did so on the basis of the available emotion resources. This determined their courses of action, from inflammatory speeches to attacks against property and indiscriminate bombings.

To show this, Petersen follows a highly structured approach. He provides a logic for the origin of the emotions that characterize a situation: the experience of violence result in anger and fear, the experience of status reversal results in resentment, and so on. On this basis, he provides several matrixes through which the dominant emotion in a given situation can be determined based on the degree of violence, the degree of stigma, and the presence of resentment. Actors can either attempt to mobilize these emotions or to transform them, first and foremost through violence. For example, a situation characterized by low violence and high stigma usually produces contempt. By escalating the degree of violence, this contempt can be turned first into anger and then into hatred (Petersen 2011, 53). And as Petersen (2011, 197) argues, in a situation characterized by the emotion of hatred even ethnic cleansings can find widespread support.

Petersen thereby analyzes the interplay of emotions and power through a rationalist, behaviorist and game theoretical framework, even referring to interventions as "games". As a result, he treats the creation of specific emotions as distinct choices and assumes a simplistic relationship between action, emotion and reaction. These restrictions of a formalized model ignore that emotions commonly occur not in pure forms and that they can influence each other in a variety of ways (for similar criticism, see Wertheim 2012). In addition, Petersen's book does not rely on any particular definition of what power is or present its argument in the vocabulary of power. Where others would refer to the exercise of power,

he refers to the influencing of motivations, thereby implying a particular understanding of power: as a process through which preferences and action tendencies are shaped. The book is therefore about power and emotions, but only in an implicit and narrow fashion.

In the context of bringing emotions and power together, Petersen's approach therefore falls short in two regards. First, it treats emotions in a simplistic way and forces them into a game theoretical framework that may provide straightforward and parsimonious analyses but struggles to capture the complexity of the phenomena it describes. And secondly, the book does not engage with power on a theoretical level and implicitly follows a narrow understanding of what power is (similar to the works of Hutchison, Bleiker and Solomon). This may limit its utility measured against the purposes of this study, but does not undermine its value. After all, the book's stated goals focus on explaining the successes and failures of Western interventions and the utilization of emotions in this context, not on theorizing about power and emotions.

A final author who has written on the link between emotions and power in international affairs is Hall. In his book *Emotional Diplomacy* he describes "the politics of officially expressed emotion on the international stage" through which actors attempt "to influence an audience for the purpose of achieving desired ends" (Hall 2015, 3, 18). He illustrates this process through three case studies about the displaying of different emotions: the display of anger towards the United States by the Chinese government during the Taiwan Strait Crisis during the 1990s; the display of sympathy among the same actors during the aftermath of 9/11; and the display of guilt by West Germany towards Israel in the decades after the Second World War. In all these cases, governments communicated attitudes and pursued strategic objectives through displays of emotions in ways that would hardly be possible via non-emotional means only.

Hall thereby makes an argument about how the exercise of power and can rely on emotions, as does this study. But, similar to Petersen, he does not write in the language of power. That emotional diplomacy is a form of exercising power remains implicit in the book. In addition, Hall's focus lies on the display of emotions by the actor that exercises power. What he is not interested in is the manipulation of emotions on the side of the actors over whom power is exercised. Hall therefore looks at emotions on one side of the power process (the side where power is exercised from), whereas this study as well as the writings by Hutchison, Bleiker, Solomon and Petersen look at the other side (the side where power has its effect).

In another article, Hall did focus on this other side in the context of provocations in international affairs. He defines provocations as "actions or incidents that state actors perceive as intentionally and wrongfully challenging or violating their values and goals, thereby eliciting outraged reactions that spur rash, aggressive responses" (Hall 2017a, 2). The outrage that results from provocations is described as an inherently emotional experience and can take multiple forms: personal, performative and popular. Hall illustrates this phenomenon through an example that is also used in this study: the Prussian provocation of French outrage that led to a transformation of preferences in Paris and, ultimately, the declaration of war against Prussia in 1870.

This example of the Franco-Prussian War shows that provocation, as conceptualized by Hall, can be a form of exercising power through emotions. Yet this work, too, is of limited value for exploring the links between emotions and power. For one, and just like the previously mentioned texts, it establishes the connection to power only implicitly. Secondly, it focusses only on a particular form of power that changes preferences, similar to Petersen's work. And thirdly, it treats exercises of power as a possible source of provocations

– but certainly not the only one. Hall, after all, defines provocations through their consequences, irrespective of whether this result was intentional or not (Hall 2017a, 4). Following this logic, the run-up to the Franco-Prussian War may be an example for how power was exercised over emotions in order to provoke. Yet one can imagine countless other acts of provocation and the influence on emotions that this implies which can hardly be described as an exercise of power, for example because they came about unintentionally.

In summary, much of the existing IR literature on emotions does not engage with the concept of power, important as it may be to the field. Where emotions and power are brought together, this usually happens without explicit references to or theorizing about power. In addition, the existing literature on emotions and power usually conceptualized the former in a simplistic fashion, by fitting emotions into a game-theoretical framework, or by understanding latter term in a narrow way, for example by looking only at specific forms of power. A dedicated and comprehensive effort to explore how emotions are connected to power has therefore been absent from the field's growing literature on emotions and their role in international affairs.

2. IR Literature on Power

The IR literature on power generally agrees on two points. One is that power is among the discipline's most fundamental and important theoretical pillars. It is frequently described as "central to international relations" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 39) and as "fundamental to the study of world politics" (Mattern Bially 2008, 691). For Morgenthau, "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power" (Morgenthau 1978, 29) and the acquisition of power always an aim of political behavior. In the words of Mearsheimer: "What money is to economics, power is to international relations" (Mearsheimer 2001, 17), which is why calculations about power occupy a dominant position in the minds of states. References to

power therefore permeate the IR vocabulary, from great powers and the balance of power to power politics and the struggle for power.

The second point of agreement in the IR literature on power is that, despite its importance, the concept remains elusive and lacks a widely accepted definition. Morgenthau already described power as "one of most difficult and controversial problems of political science" (Morgenthau 1978, 29). And because Realists in particular emphasize the role of power, their inability to provide a convincing definition of the term has been labeled as "the conceptual Achilles' heel of realist theory" (Baldwin 2016, 129). The same argument can be made for the IR discipline as a whole. The concept of power may be at the center of its theoretical toolkit, yet there is no agreement on what the term actually means. Critical voices like Bially Mattern go so far as to argue that this lack of consensus contributes to the fragmentation of IR research, turning the discipline into an "(un)discipline" (Mattern Bially 2008). The lack of agreement is not confined to the definition of power; it also extends to other terms that relate to it, such as influence, coercion, control and persuasion (Baldwin 2016, 2).

As if to further complicate the picture, scholars keep on churning out labels for particular forms of power, many of which lead into additional disputes about their meanings and how they relate to each other. During the past decades, the field has thus produced (and continues to produce) a billowing number of conceptions, such as soft power (Nye 2004), smart power (Nye 2009), normative power (Manners 2002), just power (Al-Rodhan 2009, 139–71), civilian power (Bull 1982), meta power (Krasner 1981), sharp power (Walker and Ludwig 2017), bargaining power (Schelling 1966), cosmopolitan power (Gallarotti 2010) and go-it-alone power (Gruber 2000).

That power can refer to a great many things in IR is evident in the variety of major approaches to the concept in the literature, as outlined by Baldwin. He speaks of six different

perspectives on power: (1) power as an identity, for example when referring to states as "great powers"; (2) power as a goal, as implied by the "struggle for power"; (3) power as a means, first and foremost in the form of military capabilities; (4) power as a mechanism, for example in the balance of power; (5) power as competition, whereby power is assumed to be a zero-sum game and always relative to the power of others; and (6) power as capability. Most – if not all – of these perspectives suffer from conceptual and theoretical problems, vagueness and contradictions, as Baldwin (2016, 102–22) argues.

Decades earlier, Holsti already outlined three similar perspectives on power that he saw in the literature: (1) power as a "struggle for power"; (2) power as "power politics", which stands in opposition to more benign and better ways of doing politics; and (3) power as a capability, which is usually equated with the physical assets of a state (Holsti 1964, 179–80).

Barnett and Duval, too, attempted to create a taxonomy which can integrate the various forms of power that they consider of relevance in IR. But whereas authors like Baldwin and Holsti also include conceptions of power as a form of capability in their frameworks, Barnett and Duval focus on power as a form of causation between social actors. They differentiate these forms of power along two dimensions: specificity (diffuse or direct) and the channel through which power works (interactions of actors or social relations of constitution). This results in four distinct forms of power: compulsory power, institutional power, structural power and productive power (Barnett and Duvall 2005).

Going beyond this variety of approaches, it has also been argued that the field's approach to power is increasingly characterized by an absence of debate, a separation of scholars into various niches and a lack of communication among them. As Bially Mattern concluded:

> The result is that international relations not only lacks a common conception of power; it also lacks a common framework in which to situate the various conceptions and their expressions. In a peculiar twist, then, as international relations has broadened, power has gone from an essentially contested concept to a concept about which, for lack of a shared vocabulary, international relations scholars cannot even have a discussion. (Mattern Bially 2008, 695)

On the one hand, power therefore plays a central role for IR; on the other hand, there is an absence in the discipline of a widely accepted understanding of what power actually is. Nevertheless, and following Baldwin (2013), much of the IR literature can be categorized as belonging in one of two camps regarding its approach to and understanding of power.

One is the *elements of national power* approach which was a hallmark of the discipline from the 19th century until the middle of the 20th century. It perceives power as a property of states and locates it in material factors, and in particularly those that help states to prevail in conflict. Central to this idea of power are therefore factors such as financial resources, military capacities and geographical location. Throughout the history of the discipline, this approach has been "deeply embedded in the international relations literature" (Baldwin 2013, 277), first and foremost through the works of scholars like Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer. Realist voices have ever since been highly influential in shaping how IR thinks about power, even though their understandings of the term vary and have received much criticism (Baldwin 2016, 123–38; Schmidt 2007).

The dominance of this approach was challenged during the past decades by a conception of power as a relational concept. It perceives power as a sort of causation within a social relationship that results in changes of behavior. This approach was further developed by the debate on the "three faces of power" in which multiple authors highlighted different dimensions of power. The idea of relational power was thereby expanded from one that

takes a coercive form towards power that works through the setting of agendas and the limiting of alternatives, the manipulation of preferences and the social constitution of actors (Mattern Bially 2008). On this foundation, the discipline found power not only in situations of observable conflict, but also in the influence of institutions and regimes, and of structures in general, and in situations of consensus, concepts such as normality, and practices such as socialization (Berenskoetter 2007, 7–15).

The degree to which this relational understanding of power has infringed upon the dominance of the Realist perspective is up for debate. For example, Berenskoetter still argues that Realists have "successfully monopolised" (Berenskoetter 2007, 1) the discourse on power. A few pages further into the same edited collection, Schmidt argues that "Realists, of course, do not monopolise the study of power" (Schmidt 2007, 43). Yet there is general agreement that the Realist understanding of power has been highly influential in the discipline.

On this foundation, it stands to reason that the prominence the Realist approach to power also shaped how the field as a whole engages with the link between power and emotions. Realism comes with a rationalist, materialist and cognitive bias that has contributed to the absence of emotions in the discipline's mainstream. Although emotions such as fear play a role in the Realist world view, they have received little attention as such and usually been approached through a rational choice framework. Even when states pursue goals that are the results of emotions, they are assumed to do so in ways that follow rational calculations (Crawford 2000, 116–19; Mercer 2005, 97; Wolf 2012, 607). These hallmarks of the Realist view of international relations also characterize its approach to power. Noteworthily, this approach is visible even where power and emotions meet in Realist though.

Mearsheimer's writings exemplify this: he locates fear, self-help and power maximization as the mechanisms at the center of his offensive Realist theory (Mearsheimer 2001, 31).

The fear of one state is a function of the power of other states, and in particular of the weapons at their disposal, their geographic distance and the distribution of power in the international system (Mearsheimer 2001, 41–45). Mearsheimer thereby links power and fear, yet he does to in a strictly rationalist fashion and without taking fear seriously as an emotion. His writings, just like those of Morgenthau and Waltz, do not define what fear is, how and whether it operates at the level of the individual and the state, and provide "very little insight on the nature of fear" (Pashakhanlou 2017, 119). The Realist conception of power as a property of states, and the prominence of this conception in the discipline as a whole, goes therefore hand in hand with a superficial approach to the interplay of power and emotions.

In the same vein, much of the discipline's mainstream literature has little to say about the link between power and emotions. This is exemplified by numerous works that attempt to provide an overview of the field's understanding of power and are frequently cited in writings on the subject. Holsti's article on *The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations* does not mention emotions or any related term at all. In the edited collection *Power in World Politics* by Berenskoetter and Williams, only one of fifteen chapters links IR's understandings of power to emotions. And Baldwin's *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach* has been described by one reviewer as "the culmination of a long and distinguished career thinking about the subject" (Schuessler 2017, 743), yet its author does not devote any space to emotions.

This is not to say that emotions do not feature in the field's conceptions of power at all. The most prominent exception are Nye's writings on soft power which refer repeatedly to an "emotional attraction for followers" (Nye 2008, 55), the "careful management of emotion" (Nye 2008, 92) and "emotional appeal" (Nye 2008, 142). For him, emotional intelligence is among the crucial skills necessary to create attraction in a target and, thereby, to

exercise soft power (Nye 2008, 69). Other authors have taken up this link between soft power and emotions and expanded on it. Solomon, as was summarized in the previous section, has further developed the argument that soft power relies on emotions. Following his argument, soft power has its foundations not only in the form it takes, for example the linguistic contents of a discourse, but also in the emotional investment on the side of the audience which results in an attachment to particular identities (T. Solomon 2014).

Yet the concept of soft power is not particularly useful to explore how power and emotions interact. This is largely due to Nye's inability (or unwillingness) to provide a coherent and precise definition of what soft power is and how it works. As his critics have pointed out, soft power is "a highly problematic concept" and little more than "an ambiguous signifier with a nebulous theoretical core" (Kearn 2011, 66). Although the concept has been part of the academic as well as public discourse for several decades, a clear understanding of and agreement on soft power's foundations is missing: whether soft power is a way of conducting statecraft or a resource on which statecraft can be based; how soft and hard power relate; and how attraction is assumed to result in behavioral changes. Soft power has therefore been labeled a buzzword that can mean whatever suits the interests of a particular actor, that has been diluted to the point that it is simply a synonym for prudent policy making, and that is of questionable analytical value (Baldwin 2016, 164–71; Hall 2010; Kearn 2011; G. Lee 2009; Lukes 2007).

As a result of this fuzziness, it is anything but clear how soft power and the manipulation of emotions relate. In *The Powers to Lead*, which was first published in 2008, Nye frequently refers to emotional attraction, emotional intelligence and emotional maturity as sources of soft power in the context of personal leadership skills (see, for example, Nye 2008, 83). Yet his preceding book on soft power, *The Means to Success in World Politics*, as well as the succeeding book on the topic, *The Future of Power*, barely make references

to emotions. It therefore stands to reason that the link between soft power and emotions is not as close as insinuated at times. And even when Nye does actually write about soft power and the role that emotions play in the context of attraction, he does not go beyond superficial assertions. As Hall concludes: "Nye's writings present attraction as a psychological mechanism, but the psychology behind it is missing" (Hall 2010, 206).

In proximity to the literature on soft power, the concept of Public Diplomacy has also been linked to the interplay of power and emotions. Similar to what others have pointed out about soft power, Graham argues that the existing research on Public Diplomacy has produced insufficient answers about how it works and exercises power. This leads her to call for an increased focus on emotions, and in particular on the emotions that states display, convey and manipulate through the ways in which they represent themselves. As emotions play an integral role in persuasion and reasoning as well as for discourses that negotiate values and identities, a focus on them has the potential to substantiate Public Diplomacy as a concept (Graham 2014).

In summary, the IR literature on power has barely taken emotions into consideration. One reason can be found in the mainstream conception of power as an attribute or resource and rooted in material factors. This understanding leaves little space for emotions. Even where the IR literature brought together power and emotions, for example in the Realist assumptions about fear being a product of power as well as in Nye's writings on soft power, this engagement has remained on a superficial and vague level. Beyond that, and similar to how the IR literature on emotions has taken into consideration only particular forms of power, links between power and emotions were so far established only based on a rather narrow understanding of what emotions are. The vast literature on power, and thereby one of IR's most important concepts, has therefore taken very few steps to seriously engage with the role of emotions in international affairs.

3. Literature on Emotions and Power from Other Fields

As is the case within IR, so has the link between emotions and power received little explicit attention outside of it. As Heaney argues, the mainstream power literature "is mostly silent about the emotions" (Heaney 2013, 355) just as the literature on emotions has treated power "in a restrictive and cursory manner" (Heaney 2013, 356). Nevertheless, a variety of authors have brought together both concepts in ways that are instructive for IR's approach to power and emotions. Much of this literature does not deal with this connection in explicit ways, as a form of theorizing about power and emotions, and in the vocabulary of power and emotions. Nevertheless, this link between the two is implicit in writings from various disciplines, in particular sociology and psychology.

Power and Emotions in Sociology

Most prominent is the work done in field of sociology, and in particular by scholars doing research on the sociology of emotions. Since the 1970s, they have been following the basic assumption that emotions are not merely naturalistic and intrinsic reactions but also "social objects" and "products of human activity and interaction" (McCarthy 1989, 54–55)[4]. Subsequently, they can be the products of power processes in social interactions and represent "yet another site where power [is] surreptitiously exercised over us" (Reddy 2001, 318). Research in this area has therefore sought the exercise of power in practices and discourses that produce, regulate and control the emotions we experience and the ways we interact with emotions.

[4] In contrast to this constructivist understanding of emotions, the naturalist conception is based on the assumption that "emotions are products of natural processes which are independent of social norms and conscious interpretation" and that they "result from hormones, neuro-muscular feedback from facial expressions, and genetic mechanisms" (Ratner 1989).

Among the most prominent approaches within the sociology of emotions are those that deal with the management of emotions and the rules that govern feeling (Olson, McKenzie, and Patulny 2017, 807). These concepts are oftentimes traced back to the work of Hochschild (although usually not exclusively to her) who examined occupations in which employees are expected to express certain emotions. These expressions go beyond mere surface acting; they oftentimes involve the regulation of personal feelings. Emotions, thus, become part of a service on sale. Hochschild illustrated this through the example of flight attendants in the 1960s who were taught and expected to provide a personal, friendly, helpful and even flirty service at all times. This represents an extension of corporate power from determining what gets done to the way in which it gets done. Employees perform not only physical and mental work, but also what Hochschild (2012, 119) calls emotional labor.

Hochschild's work has sparked a plethora of research that utilizes the concepts and the vocabulary introduced by her. Among the subjects of these studies are occupations and their requirements for emotional labor ranging from clerks in convenience stores (Sutton and Rafaeli 1988), female attorneys in corporate law firms (Pierce 1995), employees in call centers (van Jaarsveld and Poster 2013), librarians (Matteson and Miller 2013), teachers (Zembylas 2005) to workers in fast food restaurants and insurances salesmen (Leidner 1991). The feeling rules at work in these contexts represent a form of power, even though the sociological research usually does not directly refer to conceptions or power or use their vocabulary. Hochschild (2012) speaks of social control through feeling rules and emphasizes that scholars like Goffman have underestimated "the power of the social" (Hochschild 1979, 558) as a determinant of the emotions that individuals experience.

Beyond studies of particular occupations and individual behavior, the idea that emotions are socially constructed and the product of power processes is also visible in research on forms of social and political organization. Prominent in this area is the study of social

movements: activists fighting the sexual abuse of children utilize strategic displays of emotions, for example by victims, to produce "oppositional emotions" like anger in audiences; and animal rights activists in an American college town legitimize anger as a driving force of protest by framing it as an appropriate, rational reaction to grievances (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, chaps. 12, 13)[5]. These ideas were also applied to politics in general where, as Ost argues, especially anger is utilized for the purpose of gaining and maintaining support. His conclusion: "elite politics need anger and emotions every bit as much as social movements do" (Ost 2004, 242).

Similar arguments with implicit references to emotions and power have been made in closer proximity to international affairs. Examples are research on the role of emotions in the success of international policing (Hughes 2009), the targeting of enemy morale through displays of air power in military campaigns (Anderson 2010) and the effects of emotional regimes in the context of global human rights movements (Flam 2013). In the general field of political science, emotions and power have been brought together in works on emotional appeals in political campaigns (Brader 2006; Kühne et al. 2011; Wettergrena and Jansson 2013), the intentional creation of certain emotions through the media (Altheide 2006) and the interplay of power and emotions in political organizations (Simpson, Clegg, and Freeder 2013). Yet few of these works are explicit about the linkage between power and emotion, and those that are make little effort to connect emotions with existing frameworks for the analysis of power and lie in fields distant to that of IR.

Apart from this social-constructivist approach, the field of sociology has examined the link between power and emotions from several other perspectives. The most prominent of these

[5] At the same time, it is noteworthy that the research on social movements, too, has been criticized for not giving much attention to emotions, their role in social mobilization and – implicitly – in the power processes at work there (R. Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 14–18).

alternatives is, arguably, the structural perspective. It is less interested in the interplay of power and emotions in particular situations but rather the structural dimension of social relations. The seminal work in this area was done by Kemper who analyzed social relationships with a focus on the relative power and status of participants. As he argues, changes of these two factors can account for most emotions. For example, a feeling of safety is a product of one's own power increasing and that of someone else decreasing; fear is the product of one's own power decreasing and that of someone else increasing; pride if the result of being given a certain status; anger that of having a status withdrawn; and so on (Kemper 2006, 2001, 66).

Power and Emotions in Psychology

The link between power and emotions is also visible in the field of psychology, although the vocabulary of power is commonly not used there. A prime example is the concept of emotion regulation (Gross 2013a, 2013b). While much of the work in this context has focused on the intrinsic management of emotions in individuals, a number of recent works have connected it to the regulation of emotion in others, collective psychology (Goldenberg et al. 2016) and to leadership-relevant concepts such as emotional intelligence (M. George 2000; Peña-Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, and Gross 2015). Against this backdrop, numerous experiments have been undertaken and studies written about the potential of emotion regulation in the context of conflict resolution (E. Halperin 2013). Some of these are based on domestic conflicts, for example in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cehajić-Clancy et al. 2011; Paluck 2009); others on international conflicts, for example between Israel and Palestine as well between the two states on the island of Cyprus (Cehajić-Clancy et al. 2011; E. Halperin et al. 2012, 2013; E. Halperin and Gross 2011).

As these examples show, the link between power and its exercise through the manipulation of emotions has informed research in numerous fields. Much of this work was done in

sociology and psychology, where traditions such as the sociology of emotions as well as concepts such as emotion regulation frequently imply a link between power and emotions. Beyond that, research in the fields of political science, anthropology and marketing studies has engaged with the topic. But as is the case in IR, little of the literature in these fields is explicit about how power and emotions interact, even when this linkage is oftentimes implied. Even when power is explicitly referred to, this is usually done without even defining the term or utilizing any of the established frameworks for understanding the concept.

Nevertheless, this research from other fields offers useful insights for how IR engages with power and emotions. First and foremost is the social-constructivist perspective on emotions. It stands in contrast to the idea that emotions are the product of biological, intrinsic processes and has great potential for IR. As Ross has argued, emotions have so far been monopolized within the discipline by Realist approaches that imagine them as impulses, not as socially constructed phenomena. At the same time, the constructivist tradition in IR has so far struggled to incorporate emotions into its analyses. It has yet to overcome "conventional models of intentionality" in order to understand "modes of belief and identity that are inspired and absorbed before being chosen" (Ross 2006, 199) – for example through the influence of emotions.

Equally useful is the concept of emotion regulation. While some IR research, such as Nye's writings on soft power, refers to the manipulation of emotions, these ideas are usually underdeveloped and lack psychological backing. As Maor and Gross have demonstrated, the concept of emotion regulation has the potential to help overcome this hurdle. For example, they show how different political practices can be classified as particular ways of regulating emotions in the political arena. *Situation selection* exposes audiences to specific emotional appeals, for example on television or through rhetoric. *Cognitive change* aims at the reinterpretation of political promises and policies, oftentimes with the goal of weakening or

inversing negative emotions created by them. And *response modulation* spreads norms and rules for the expression of certain emotions, for example in political movements (Maor and Gross 2015, 11–17).

Altogether, this leads to three conclusions about the existing literature in IR and beyond about power and emotions. First, the IR literature on emotions has so far given only cursory attention to power and the exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions. Second, the IR literature on power has so far barely taken emotions and their role in the exercise of power into account. In both bodies of literature, the mainstream is largely silent on how emotions and power come together. Where both concepts together receive attention, this usually takes place in a superficial or narrow manner. And third, numerous other disciplines have explored how power and emotions relate, in particular sociology and psychology. While the link between power and emotions is usually only implicit there, traditions such as social-constructivist approaches to the sociology of emotions and concepts like emotion regulation offer helpful pointers for IR.

This study intends to locate itself between these three bodies of literature. It strives to continue on the path of IR's "emotional turn" and to connect it with power, one of IR's foundational concepts. For this purpose, it utilizes concepts from several other disciplines that have already done work, even if only implicitly, on the interplay of power and emotions.

In this process, it connects with several currents in the existing research. In the context of the IR literature on emotions, this study follows the call for more attention to the links between emotions and power as well as the few works that have explored how power can be dependent on and utilize emotions. In the context of the IR literature on power, this study utilizes the conception of power as a relational concept and follows in the footsteps of the few authors who have devoted attention to the role that the manipulation of emotions

can play there. And against the backdrop of research from other disciplines, this study borrows from sociology's social-constructivist approach to emotions and some of the work done on emotions and power in the field of psychology.

III. Theoretical Framework: Power and Emotions

The goal of this study is to illustrate how power in international relations can be exercised by manipulating emotions. But as the preceding chapters have already shown, it is neither obvious not generally agreed upon what power and emotions actually are. Both refer to essential components of the human experience, social life and the social sciences, yet there is no consensus about what power and emotions actually refer to, neither among academics nor among people who speak of them in more casual terms. It is therefore important to clearly outline what power and emotions are understood as here and what the two terms refer to in the context of this study. This chapter introduces the two concepts and lays the theoretical groundwork that is necessary to answer the research question of this study.

This is done in three steps. First, the concept of power is introduced. This is done by showcasing the most prominent approaches to defining power in the social sciences, and by outlining the specific definition of the term that is employed here. Secondly, the concept of emotions is introduced. This is done against the backdrop of the prominent approaches from the field of psychology and with a specific definition for the purpose of this study. In addition, the collective dimension of emotions is introduced in order to take into account that IR usually does not concern itself with individuals but rather collective actors. This study, on this basis, settles on specific definitions of both terms that have no claims to universal validity or general acceptability; they are merely meant to serve the purposes of this study. Naturally, this approach comes with a number of limitations on how power and emotions are understood here. The conclusion of this study, thus, devotes some space to clarifying these limitations and pointing out how other understandings of power and emotions could open up new venues for research.

The third step of this chapter brings together power and emotions. It thereby represents the theoretical core and the most important contribution of this study. To outline how power and emotions are assumed to interact in international relations, their interplay is illustrated in schematic form and detailed through the introduction of the concept of power mechanisms. This concept is then further elaborated on by outlining several power mechanisms that are prominent in the literature on power, by illustrating how they feature in the IR literature, and by explaining the role that emotions can play for them.

1. Power and the Power over Others

At the center of this study stands the concept of power[6]. As Bertrand Russell wrote, power is the most fundamental concept of the social sciences, just like physics finds its fundamental concept in energy (B. Russell 2004, 4). At the same time, power has been described as "the most disputed and contested of all concepts in the sociological lexicon" (Scott 1994, vol. 1, sec. General Commentary) and no single definition of the concept has been able to establish itself in the social sciences. Some therefore consider it as essentially contested: what power is and how it works will forever be a matter of dispute and disagreement (Lukes 2005, 30). This study, in its approach to the concept of power, therefore cannot rely on any authoritative definition of the term. Instead, it introduces and picks from a number of categories and ideas that are well-established in the social sciences and allow for a reasonably comprehensive and yet parsimonious approach towards power. Key among these categories that order the established literature on power in the social sciences is the distinction between *power to* and *power over*.

[6] While potentially obvious, it shall be clarified here that this study understands power exclusively in the sense of social power. Power, in the context of this study, therefore relates to two or more social actors and refers to a phenomenon that originates and produces its consequences, first and foremost, in the social world.

Power to and Power over

On the most basic level, conceptions of power can be categorized along the differentiation between *power to* and *power over*. These two categories are usually traced back to Pitkin (1993, 276) and have become prominent over the past decades in order to structure the manifold definitions in the social sciences of what power is and how it works. Many prominent definitions of power can therefore be seen as fitting into either of these two categories. Because of this sweeping approach, the distinction between *power to* and *power over* has received criticism for being simplistic, misleading, ambiguous and unable to integrate certain definitions of power (Göhler 2009; Lukes 2005, 69). Nevertheless, these categories will be employed in this study as they have been the foundation for a variety of writings and discussions on power.

This is not to imply that no other categorizations of power concepts have been proposed. Other authors distinguish between actor-based and system-based forms of power; between instrumental, structuralist and discursive forms of power; between innovative, constitutive, transformative and systemic forms of power; between transitive and intransitive forms of power, and between various other categories through which ideas about power can be organized (Göhler 2009, 35; Peter Meusburger 2015, 29–30). There have also been attempts to further develop Pitkin's binary understanding of power conceptions, for example by Allen (1998) who introduces the concept of *power with* alongside of *power to* and *power over* as a principally feminist approach. For the sake of parsimony, these alternative categorizations of power will not be taken into account here[7].

[7] Elsewhere, the principal distinction between *power to* and *power over* has been kept yet the labels of these categories have been changed. Dowding, for example, speaks of "outcome power" instead of *power to* and "social power" instead of *power over*, even though these concepts are otherwise similar (Dowding 1991; see also Bosworth 2011, 616).

In Pitkin's framework, the *power to* describes an ability to act and produce an outcome – or, simply put, the power to do something. The *power over* describes a social relation in which one actor influences another actor to produce an outcome – or, in other words, the power over someone else. The *power to* has therefore been described as "outcome power". It refers to the latent potential or ability to produce an outcome, not the act of actually exercising power, and is not necessarily related to other actors. In contrast to that, the *power over* has been described as "social power" as it inevitably involves more than one actor and their interaction. It refers to the process of one actor influencing another actor, not merely the potential or the ability to do so (Dowding 1991, 48; Pansardi 2011, 521).

The *power over* can furthermore take a structural form when it is not one actor exercising power over another actor but structural factors exercising power over an actor. As this conception received comparatively little attention in the discourse on the basic distinction between power to and power over, the definitions provided at this point speak exclusively of actors and do not mention structures. Yet this is not meant to deny that there is a long-ranging debate about whether social structures should actually be included in any conception of power (as will be described further down).

The differences between these basic categories of power conceptions have been expressed in different terms by a variety of authors. For example, following the words of Dowding, every successful exercise of *power over* changes the incentive structure of another actor whereas the *power to* does not involve changing the incentives of another actor (Dowding 1991, 55). But as is common in the literature on power, there is little agreement on whether this terminology is adequate to truly capture the meaning of power in all its complexities. Case in point are Lukes and Haglund who reject Dowding's focus on changing incentive structures as overtly narrow and restrictive (Lukes and Haglund 2005).

The *power over* has oftentimes received a negative connotation as it involves one actor making another actor behave in a way they otherwise would not[8]. This has been interpreted as one actor limiting the freedom of another actor. Especially feminist authors have linked *power over* to conflictual social relations, domination and illegitimacy. Elsewhere, this negative connotation of *power over* has been called into question. Some authors argue that the moral evaluation of power is only possibly on a case-by-case basis. Even though *power over* implies that one person has a greater degree of control than another person, this degree of control is not necessarily negative. After all, what sometimes receives a negative interpretation is precisely the act of losing control instead of having it (Morriss 2012, 95; Pansardi 2012, 74). In contrast to that, *power to* usually receives a positive connotation as it implies the empowerment of an actor, which usually makes it a consensual and legitimate phenomenon (Baldwin 2016, 8; Göhler 2009, 28–29).

Various prominent definitions of power can be located within these two categories. Among those that fall under the conception of *power to* are the definition of power by Hobbes as the "present means, *[sic]* to obtain some future apparent Good *[sic]*" (Hobbes 1968, 150), Bierstedt's definition as "the ability to employ force, not its actual employment" (Bierstedt 1994, 8), Lukes argument that power is "a capacity not the exercise of that capacity" (Lukes 2005, 12), and Arendt's definition of power as "the human ability not just to act but to act in concert" (Arendt 1972, 143). Within this category, a number of authors emphasize that this understanding of power as a capacity should not be equated with the idea of power as a resource. Just because one has the resources necessary to exercise power does not mean that one is able to successfully deploy these resources for the exercise of power, after all (Lukes 2005, 70; Morriss 2002, 19).

[8] Throughout this study, the hypothetical actors used to illustrate what power is and how it works are referred to with the gender-neutral "they", "their" and "them", even when in singular.

In contrast to that stand understandings of power that fit the concept of *power over* and understand the term as describing a relationship and a process. Among the examples for this category are Russel's statement that power is "the production of intended effects" (B. Russell 2004, 23). The same is true for Dahl's (1957, 202–3) prominent argument that power is at its most basic a relation among people in which one actor gets another actor to do something that the latter actor would otherwise not do. This focus on social relations is also present in Foucault's writings which "suppose that certain persons exercise power over others" and that power thus "designates relationships between partners" (Foucault 1983, 217). What unites these definitions is that they refer to power as a process that actually takes place, not to a latent potential, an attribute, an ability or a resource.

The relationship between the *power to* and the *power over* has been debated extensively. Ringmar argues that, "more than anything, power is a matter of capabilities" and that "what really matters is the 'power to' rather than the 'power over'" (Ringmar 2007, 90). Various other authors have furthermore pointed out that *power to* is "the more basic notion" (Morriss 2009, 55) as any *power over* requires the *power to*. Where the *power to* is absent, the *power over* cannot be exercised. Following this logic, the *power over* is a subset of the *power to*. The former denotes the production of an outcome based on the ability to do so; the later denotes this ability to produce a desired outcome by influencing another actor (Dowding 1991, 4, 2016, 113; Isaac 1987, 5; Lukes 2005, 69, 74).

Other authors have pointed out that the relationships of these two understandings of power might be less straightforward. For example, it is not quite clear whether the *power to* of one actor does not in itself influence other actors or that the *power over* always depends on the *power to*. The line between the two concepts can be difficult to draw: military capabilities, for example, represent a *power to* that does not have to be exercised in order to influence

other actors, for example by deterring them from attacking. And while it is commonly assumed that the *power to* underpins the *power over*, one can also imagine this relationship the other way around. The *power to* of a group of people, for example, might be dependent on the group's *power over* itself and its members (Göhler 2009, 34).

Pansardi even goes so far as to argue that these two conceptions of power should not be seen as clearly distinct but rather as two aspects of a unitary concept of power. She rejects the common perception that the main difference lies in the relational nature of *power over* and the non-relational nature of *power to*. As the points out, *power to* also makes a reference to the relational context of an actor but does so in an implicit fashion. Power, accordingly, is always social and the two concepts usually refer "to the same social facts" (Pansardi 2012, 86). In this sense, the *power to* of one actor does not describe an attribute or a capability that can be spoken of without any reference to another actor. This may be possible for the height, weight and hair color of a person – but the *power to* that derives from owning a weapon already implies a relation to another actor (Baldwin 2016, 50)[9].

As the literature review already outlined, the focus of IR's understanding of power shifted during the second half of the 20th century from a dominance of *power to* towards the idea of *power over*, and thereby "from a property concept of power to a relational one" (Baldwin 2013, 275). The former conception is most clearly embodied in the *elements of national power*-approach, and thereby in the idea that the possession of certain resources and capabilities itself equates power. Yet this understanding of power suffers from various problems: it is difficult to imagine how the mere possession of resources can translate into power if the utilization of these resources fails; and whereas resources such as nuclear bombs might

[9] This argument was largely rejected in a response by Moriss who still perceives *power to* and *power over* as distinct and each of them useful in its own right. Even in a situation where they refer to the same social facts, they do so in different ways, as he argues (Morriss 2012, 93).

be enormously powerful in some situations, they are largely useless in many other situations (Baldwin 2013, 277–78; Ringmar 2007, 191–92).

Today, the conception of power as *power over* therefore plays an important role in IR, just as the social sciences as a whole emphasize this conception (Kreisberg 1992, 35; Morriss 2002, 34). At the same time this focus on *power over* has been criticized and is being rejected for a variety of reasons. As was mentioned above, the principal criticism against this understanding is that *power to* has to logically precede any *power over*, and that any analysis with an exclusive focus on the latter is therefore problematic. But even within the realm of the *power over* there are a number of disagreements among scholars, chiefly about whether the exercise of this form of power is necessarily deliberate[10] and whether it describes only the power relations among actors or also among structures and actors.

The first of these points of dispute is linked to the criticism that the concept of *power over* tends to understand power as a mere causal influence. To pick but one example for this problem: if one follows Dahl's (1957, 202–3) influential definition that power is exercised when one actor gets another actor to do something that this actor would otherwise not do, then many acts would be considered as exercises of power that we usually would merely describe as an influence. If actor A buys the last ticket for a theater performance, which is why actor B is unable to see the performance and has to make other plans for the evening, then – according to Dahl's definition – actor A exercised power over actor B. Yet we would usually not describe this production of collateral effects as an exercise of power; we would rather label it an influence (Baldwin 2016, 74; Morriss 2002, 34; J. B. Murphy 2011, 88, 92; Ringmar 2007, 190) or simply as luck (Dowding 2016, 70).

[10] The terms "deliberate" and "intentional" are used as synonyms for each other here

For this reason, Dowding (1991, 48) adds to his definition of *power over* that its exercise takes place in a deliberate way and serves to bring about a particular outcome. The same is implied by Russel who defines power as "the production of intended effects" (B. Russell 2004, 23).

In the afore-mentioned example, actor A's influence over actor B's evening plans would therefore not be considered an exercise of power as actor A did not deliberately strive to change actor B's evening plans. Other authors, too, make intentions part of their definition of power. Weber, for example, stipulates that power describes the probability that one actor comes into "a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber 1964, 152). Others again question or reject the inclusion of intentions: Lukes raises the question whether one can "exercise power without deliberatively seeking to do so, in routine or unconsidered ways" (Lukes 1986, 1). The question whether intentionality should be part of how power is defined remains therefore unresolved.

The second point of dispute concerns the role that structures (and other forces that cannot be characterized as actors) play in the exercise of *power over*. As Lukes argues, power is not only exercised by actors with a discernible behavior, it also the product of the "the bias of the system" and "the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions" (Lukes 2005, 26)[11]. To an even greater degree, Foucault does ascribe the exercise of *power over* not to the actions of individuals but to "permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance", to "a faceless gaze" (Foucault 1995, 214) and the "great anonymous" (Foucault 1978, 95). This disciplinary power, as he calls it, influences

[11] Although Lukes criticized the behavioral focus of other conceptions of power, his own approach has equally been criticized for not giving the appropriate attention to structural forces. As Groarke concluded, he provides "a useful critique of those who have come before him in the power debate" but does "fail to develop a concept of power with room for institutional and structural power" (Groarke 1993, 31–32).

each and every individual through subtle means, for example processes of socialization and shared conceptions of what counts as truth. Power is therefore not only the result of individual behavior; it is also the result of structures to which one can hardly ascribe agency.

In contrast to that, Dowden rejects the approaches of Lukes and Foucault and their inclusion of structural (or disciplinary) forces into the concept of *power over*. As he argues, by doing so power "simply becomes a term that denotes the fact that we respond to our environment" (Dowding 2016, 9). These environmental influences can be sufficiently well described without references to power, as he argues. Structural forces differ from what we usually understand as a wielder of power in that they cannot choose to *not* exercise power. Dowding therefore bases his understanding of power on the assumption that "Only actors can have power. Structures cannot have power" (Dowding 2003, 306, see also 1991, 48). Thus, just like different authors come to different conclusions about whether the *power over* describes only deliberate processes or not, so do they disagree about whether structural forces can exercise the *power over*.

In summary, the power literature therefore distinguishes between the *power to* and the *power over*, with numerous authors arguing that the latter is a subset of the former. Within the concept of the *power over*, there is disagreement about whether this form of power should be understood as deliberate, and whether it can be exercised only by actors or also by structures (as well as about numerous other issues which are not taken into account here). In the face of these disagreements, ambiguities and contradictions, the notion of *power over* and its wide-spread adaption have therefore been depicted as the reason for "much sloppy thinking in the social and human sciences" (J. B. Murphy 2011, 95), "academic confusion" and even "pernicious political consequences" (Morriss 2002, 33). What is power to one observer is merely an influence or even luck to another observer; and where one observer

sees complex webs of structural power, another observer does not see anything at all that deserves to be labeled as power.

Nevertheless, this study concerns itself primarily with *power over*. This choice was made for two principal reasons. First, and as was elaborated above, the social sciences in general and the IR field in particular emphasize the understanding of *power over* compared to the concept of *power to* (or any other conception of power). One of the goals of this study is to connect with the existing literature on power in IR, hence the mainstream's focus on *power over* is retained. Secondly, the goal of this study is to illuminate the role of emotions within existing frameworks of power, and thereby to extend and improve our understanding of power in international relations, not to re-conceptualize power itself. In terms of how power is defined, this study does therefore not strive to go beyond the existing works of the IR mainstream.

As has to be emphasized, the choice to focus on this particular conception of power necessarily excludes other understandings of what power is. Left out are, for example, feminist conceptions of power which emphasize that power does not only happen on the level of elites and nation states but also through bottom-up processes (Enloe 2004, 42, 2014), and that power can also express itself through cooperation and empowerment (Allen 1998; Haugaard 2011; Miller 1992, 241; Tickner 1988, 438). These conceptions would certainly open up additional perspectives on the interplay of power and emotions and possibly help to re-conceptualize power on a more fundamental level, but as feminist approaches usually position themselves in explicit opposition to the mainstream and are anything but parsimonious in their variety, they lie beyond the scope of this project and are therefore not taken into account here.

Power defined

For the purpose of this study, a specific definition of *power over* was chosen. This definition is not meant to provide a universal answer to the question of what *power over* actually is and to settle the various debates surrounding the definition of power. Rather, it is meant to provide an intuitive, comprehensive and clear definition of the concept. These criteria are meant to ensure that the argument made in this study about power and emotions is not confined to an overtly narrow or specific conception of power, thereby limiting the scope of the argument. In other words, the definition of power utilized here is meant to ensure that this study can showcase how emotions matter for an understanding of power that is intuitively relevant for international relations.

Power is therefore defined as *the process through which actor A deliberately makes actor B behave in accordance with A's preferences. In other words, A makes B behave the way A wants B to.*

This definition rests on several basic assumptions. First, and as was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it defines power as an inherently social phenomenon that always involves the interaction of actors with each other. This interaction can take place between individuals, but also involve collective actors made up of individuals, such as states, organizations and companies. Following Dahl, this social interaction has a number of features. The existence of a social interaction implies that some sort of connection between A and B exists. They may be distant from each other in space or even in time, yet a causal link between the two is implied here. The social interaction between A and B is characterized by a time lag between the beginning and the end of the power process. The exercise of power by A precedes the reaction by B. Otherwise, it would be impossible for A to actually exercise power over B (Dahl 1957, 204).

The second basic assumption is that power describes a process. In this regard, the definition utilized here fits the idea of *power over*. While it stands to reason that A's exercise of power

over B requires A to have some sort of capacity, and thus the *power to* exercise that *power over*, this capacity is not what this study focuses on. A capacity may be necessary to exercise power, yet it is not sufficient to speak of an exercise of power. Following this logic, a robber with a gun has the capacity to exercise power over the employees of a bank by owning a gun, and by being able and willing to use that gun. But unless the gun is actually used to influence the behavior of the bank employees, this setup is not of interest for this study as no *power over* is actually exercised. This definition of power is therefore limited to the understanding of the term of *power over* and does not concern itself with conceptions such as *power to*.

A third assumption underlying the definition of power utilized here concerns the outcome of this process: the goal of power is always to manipulate behavior. The exercise of power can certainly target perceptions, beliefs, opinions, desires, preferences and – crucially for this study – emotions. But, at the end of the day, power is always meant to manipulate the behavior of another actor. The targeting of perceptions, beliefs, opinions, and so on is only a means to manipulate behavior but not an end in itself. This does not mean that exercises of power never aim to change, for example, opinions and preferences. But it is hard to imagine why any actor would want to exercise power over the opinions or preferences of another actor without at least implicitly aiming to manipulate that actor's behavior. The same is true for emotions: their manipulation can be a pathway for one actor to manipulate the behavior of another actor.

To say the exercise of power always aims to manipulate behavior does not necessarily mean that A changes the behavior of B. Power can also be exercised by ensuring that the way in which B currently behaves continues when it would otherwise change. This also includes non-behavior: actor A can manipulate actor B through the exercise of power to stay inactive when B would otherwise engage in an activity. In other words, the product of power is

behavior that would not occur without the exercise of power. Power therefore has to make a difference in terms of behavior. If the behavior of B changes in accordance with the preferences of A, but would have done so regardless of any interaction with A, then A did not actually exercise power over B. In this case, A could simply be described as lucky.

The fourth assumption, too, concerns itself with the outcome of the power process. Not only is the goal of power to influence the behavior of B, but to influence it in a way that fits the preferences of A. If A influences B's behavior in a way that does not suit the preferences of A, this does not represent an exercise of power. A bank robber may be successful in influencing how people in a bank behave during a robbery – but if this results in these people resisting the robber, this outcome does not represent an exercise of power as it clearly does not suit the robber's preferences. The outcome of the power process has therefore to be in A's interest.

It is worth emphasizing that this does not imply that the resulting behavior goes against the desires of B. The exercise of power does not depend on a clash of preferences and can result in behavior that suits the desires of both A and B. An example provided by Baldwin illustrates this:

> Shouting 'Watch out!' to a person about to step into an open manhole is likely to cause the person to shift course, but this change in behavior is not likely to be contrary to the person's preferences or desires. (Baldwin 2016, 36)

A fifth and last assumption is that the exercise of power happens in an active and intentional fashion. This assumption is a matter of debate in the literature on power, as was described above. It is certainly possible to define power in a way that involves passive as well as unintentional influences – and, ultimately, probably "a matter of taste and intuition rather than one of substance" (Zimmerling 2005, 145) how one incorporates intentionality into a

definition of power. But in order to provide an intuitive and clear-cut understanding of what power is, the concept is defined here as describing an active and intentional process. This implies that A actually has a conscious preference about the behavior of B and makes an effort to impose it on B. It is therefore not sufficient for B's behavior to suit A's preferences without A actively and intentionally working towards this goal. In this case, an exercise of power is not taking place, even if B's behavior or thinking suits the preferences of A. Instead of an exercise of power, this result merely represents luck.

Yet it is not always straightforward to determine whether an exercise of power counts as active and intentional. In some cases, this is easy: a robber who threatens employees of a bank in order to make them hand over money clearly acts in an active and intentional fashion. In other cases, it is more difficult to determine whether power is being exercised in accordance with this study's definition. Consider how the behavior of individuals belonging to privileged groups, such as white men in corporate America, influences the behavior of less privileged groups, for example by preventing minority women from speaking up about discrimination. The members of the first group may exercise power over members of the second group through their intentional behavior and in ways that clearly serve their interests. At the same time, they might not actually be aware of the social climate this contributes to. This example can therefore be interpreted as individuals actively and intentionally contributing to an exercise of power; or rather as a structural form of power that can hardly be described as active and intentional.

This study's definition of power and the assumptions it is based on are therefore not free from ambiguities – a caveat that applies probably to every definition of power. Nevertheless, I believe that this definition serves the purposes of this study as the ambiguities mentioned above are of little relevance here. In summary, this study's definition of power therefore rests on five assumptions:

1. Power is a social phenomenon and describes interactions among people.
2. Power is a process, not a capacity, even if it requires a capacity.
3. Power aims to produce behavior that would otherwise not occur.
4. Power aims to produce behavior that suits the preferences of A.
5. Power requires activity and intentionality.

This definition focuses on the behavior of actors; it does not concern itself with social structures that exercise power. As was mentioned above, it is a matter of debate whether social structures can actually exercise power. I believe that it would certainly have been insightful to explore how social structures exercise power by influencing emotions, yet they are not taken into account here for practical reasons. This study assumes that power involves agency and intentionality in order to clearly distinguish between processes that represent an exercise of power from processes that merely represent a form of influence or luck. It is difficult to argue that power can be intentional and structural at the same time, even though authors like Foucault make this claim. In order to avoid this problem and the complexities it involves, the definition of power that underpins this study excludes structural forms of power, even though their inclusion would have certainly opened up an interesting perspective on power and emotions.

As was mentioned before, this definition and the assumptions that underpin it are more specific and narrower than other conceptions of power. Consider, for example, the definition by Robert Dahl. In his seminal article from 1957 he proposed an "intuitive idea" (Dahl 1957, 202) of power that captures what people commonly understand the term to mean. It is meant to capture the basic idea that underpins not only our understanding of power, but also concepts such as influence, authority and control. The core of Dahl's definition: "*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise

do" (Dahl 1957, 202–3; emphasis in original)[12]. The first three of the five assumptions that were provided above are consistent with this definition. The last two of these assumptions, on the other hand, make the definition of power utilized here more specific than Dahl's concept. His definition is silent on whether power has to serve the preferences of A and whether power has to be exercised in an active and intentional fashion.

In a schematic fashion, this understanding of power and the process of exercising power can be illustrated as shown in figure 1. It depicts power as a process of social interaction between actor A on the one side and actor B on the other side. The former, through their behavior, exercises power over B by making B behave in ways that suit the preferences of A. This, of course, implies that A has preferences about the behavior of B and that A intentionally tries to influence B. The way in which this causal effect is achieved is referred to a power mechanism. Following the logic of this schema, the behavior of A is the independent variable in the power process. Actor B's behavior is the dependent variable.

Figure 1: Power process

[12] Since the publication of his 1957 article, Dahl has clarified a number of elements of this definition. Most importantly, Dahl and Stinebrickner wrote more than four decades later that power is "a relation among human actors such that the wants, desires, preferences, or intentions of one or more actors affect the actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more actors in a direction consistent with - and not contrary to - the wants, preferences, or intentions of the influence-wielders" (Dahl and Stinebrickner 2002, 17). This extended definition does not actually – or at least not explicitly - apply to power but only to "influence". Yet it has repeatedly been pointed out that power and influence are interchangeable terms for Dahl. This is consistent with Dahl's article from 1957 in which he argues that his definition of power also incorporates related concepts such as influence (Dahl 1957, 202; Stinebrickner 2015, 194–95).

The power mechanism at the center of figure 1 describes whatever method that A employs to make B act in accordance with A's preferences. The definition of power utilized here leaves largely open the mechanisms through which this happens. Based on this study's underlying assumptions about power that are spelled out above, it merely assumes that this mechanism is employed in an active and intentional manner. This mechanism can take a variety of forms, from coercion and the threat of violence to persuasion through convincing arguments. What unites all mechanisms: they are "analytical constructs that tell in detail how the two components of an explanation are related - that is, how the explanans produces the explanandum" (Maldonado 2011, 410) – or, in other words, how the independent variable produces the dependent variable, and how actor A exercises power over actor B.

In the literature on power, the idea of a "mechanism" that describes the way in which power is exercised is not an established concept. In fact, different authors refer to different things when they speak of mechanisms. Parsons, for example, considers power itself as a "*specific* mechanism operating to bring about changes in the action of other units" (Parsons 1963, 232; emphasis in original). This implies that there are other mechanisms to produce the same result, apart from power. In contrast to that, Lukes understands a mechanism as a description of the process through which an exercise of power unfolds. There are, thus, different mechanisms through which power can be exercised and the idea of mechanisms is a subset of the concept of power (Lukes 2005, 64, 87, 124). Other authors are even more specific in their understanding of mechanisms and refer to the influence of Adam Smith's invisible hand as well as the Marxist concept of surplus value, or the bandwagon effect and the idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Alves 2011; Maldonado 2011).

This study's understanding of power mechanisms resembles Lukes' who considers different mechanisms as pathways through which power can be exercised. Power is therefore an

umbrella term that encompasses various mechanisms. The definition of these power mechanisms is difficult and has to deal with confusing terminology. For example, whether "persuasion" and "convincing" or "coercion" and "compulsion" describe the same mechanisms or different mechanisms is anything but clear. For the purpose of this study, the number of power mechanisms one can imagine, their precise definition and the ways in which they differ are of little importance. The point made here is rather that one actor's exercise of power over another actor's behavior can take a variety of forms. It is therefore helpful to briefly introduce and discuss on the following pages a number of mechanisms that are prominent in the literature on power.

Mechanisms of Power

One starting point for illustrating these mechanisms is the framework of the *faces of power*. Framework, in this context, does not refer to a formalized and monolithic concept but to a debate of multiple scholars who proposed different conceptions of power in reaction to each other and over the course of several decades. Each of these conceptions represents a different understanding of how the *power over* can be exercised. In other words: each face describes a different power mechanism. These four faces were first outlined by Dahl in his afore-mentioned article from 1957, by Bachrach and Baratz in an article from 1962, by Lukes in a book from 1974 and by Digeser in an article from 1992. While the authors reference each other's works, not all of them speak of "faces of power" but rather use a confusing variety of terms[13]. And while they disagree on a number of issues and criticize

[13] Dahl labeled what came later to be known as the first face simply as a "concept of power". Bachrach and Baratz spoke of a second "face" in the title of their article and used the term as a synonym for "concept". Lukes spoke of these faces as different "views" on power. Digeser, finally, titled the article containing his contribution to the debate "The Fourth Face of Power", yet he also used terms such as "conception" and "conceptualization" as further synonyms. Whether one can assume that all these terms carry the same meaning is up for debate. Baldwin, for example, argues that "faces" and "concepts" refer to different things. According to him, the first three faces of power merely represent variants of the same underlying concept of power, not different concepts (Baldwin

each other's contributions to the debate, the power mechanisms they describe are widely interpreted as different ideas about what forms the exercise of power can take[14].

In the context of this study and its definition of power, these faces of power represent different mechanisms through which power can be exercised. Yet it should be noted that the authors who originally conceptualized these faces do not necessarily share this definition of what power is. For example, Steve Lukes wrote in the book that first outlined the third face of power that the exercise of power manipulates an actor in ways that run contrary to that actor's interests (although he changed his mind later on) (Lukes 1974, 37). This assumption about power is different from what this study's definition of the term argues: that the exercise of power can produce results that serve the interests of all actors involved. Nevertheless, the faces of power are useful to outline various mechanisms through which power can be exercised.

The origins of the debate on the faces of power lie in the wider field of political science, yet the framework is of relevance beyond that and plays a prominent role in the IR literature on power. Where the dominant understandings of power in IR and different conceptions of *power to* are explained, the four faces are oftentimes used as examples (see Baldwin 2013,

2013, 276). Other authors have introduced even more labels: Berenskoetter and Haugaard refer to the faces of power as "dimensions" and Nye labels them as "aspects" of relational power (Berenskoetter 2007, 4–12; Haugaard 2011; Nye 2011b, 14). Nevertheless, the reference to "faces" has established itself and been used for numerous discussions of the topic, for example in book titles (see Boulding 1990; Isaac 1987 for examples).

[14] Whether the original authors of the faces agree with this interpretation is not entirely clear. In their writings, they tend to introduce their own contribution to the debate as alternative or even superior ideas. Bachrach and Baratz, who conceptualized the second face of power, merely call for "a recognition of the two faces of power" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 952). This implies that these faces can co-exist and are complementary. In contrast to that, Digeser in his article outlining the fourth face of power speaks not of complementary but rather "competing ideas" (Digeser 1992, 979). And Lukes considers his own conception of power, which is generally referred to as the third face, as explicitly superior to the first two faces as it allows for "deeper and more satisfactory analysis" (Lukes 2005, 16). At the same time, it is noteworthy that Lukes (2005, 14, 124) describes the understanding of power advocated by himself also as a mechanism, which implies that power can take various forms.

276; Berenskoetter 2007, 3–12; Mattern Bially 2008 for examples). Other authors use the debate at least as a reference point in their writings on power in IR (see Barnett and Duvall 2005, 43; Gallarotti 2010, 25–30; Nye 2011b, 10–18; Robinson 2006).

A first mechanism through which power can be exercised is visible in the first face of power. It is based on Dahl's above-mentioned definition: "*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do" (Dahl 1957, 202–3; emphasis in original). The mechanism at play here is usually assumed to be compulsion or coercion[15]. Power, then, describes a social relationship in which A causes B to do something that B would otherwise not do – and, crucially, that B does not actually want to do. A thereby imposes its own preferences about B's behavior on B and ignores or overrules B's preferences. Following Barnett and Duval, this implies that "there must be a conflict of desires" as well as that "A and B want different outcomes, and B loses" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 49). Berenskoetter, too, speaks of "conflicting preferences" and the question of "who wins a conflict of preferences" (Berenskoetter 2007, 5, 7). The common interpretation of Dahl's definition of power is therefore one of "overt conflict" (Mattern Bially 2008, 693).

This conception of power as compulsion has been prominent – and maybe even dominant - in the IR discourse about power. As was mentioned before, IR has traditionally focused

[15] In his analysis of Dahl's definition of power, Baldwin rejects this interpretation. As he points out, Dahl does not make any statement about the preferences of actor B and whether these necessarily run counter to the behavior (or the predispositions to act) that are caused by actor A. Accordingly, power can also be exercised in situations where the preferences of A do not run in opposition to the preferences of B or in which they are neutral towards them; power it is not necessarily conflictual. Baldwin also rejects the idea that the first face of power necessarily relies on compulsion. As he argues, nothing in Dahl's writings indicates that power can take exclusively this form, just as it does not necessarily involve conflicting interests. Its scope is therefore not restricted to means that involve compulsion. Rather, it also can be exercised via charisma, persuasion, mentorship and various other forms of influence (Baldwin 2016). The interpretation of the first face of power here as being based on compulsion as its mechanism is therefore merely representing the common understanding of the first face of power in the literature – but, crucially, not necessarily what Dahl actually had in mind with it.

on the understanding of power as *power to*, whereas the mechanism visible in the first face of power describes the *power over*. Yet these two approaches to power are closely related, and this is most visible in the perception of power as a process of compulsion. It relies on the imposition of preferences by making resistance an unfeasible option. In IR's mainstream, and especially the Realist literature, this form of power is commonly equated with hallmarks of national power, such as economic and military capabilities, and thereby with the *power to* (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 49–51; Berenskoetter 2007, 4–7). With this in mind, a focus on compulsion as the mechanism through which A makes B behave in accordance with A's preferences has long been at the center of IR's approaches to power.

A second mechanism through which power can be exercised can be found in the second face of power. It describes a mechanism through which A is "creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948). As a result, the preferences of B are shut out of decision making processes. In the words of Bachrach and Baratz:

> To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences. (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948)

This second mechanism can therefore be described as agenda-setting. Just like the first mechanism, it assumes that actor A and actor B have conflicting interests that prevail throughout the process of exercising power. The crucial difference between the two mechanisms: whereas the first one assumes that A exercises power in an overt fashion, the second face understands the exercise of power as a covert process. It takes place through the shaping of rules, values, norms and institutions; it keeps conflictual issues off the agenda

and avoids open conflict. This mechanism therefore highlights processes through which decisions are not made, conflicts that not fought out, and the status quo is maintained.

Bachrach and Baratz illustrate this mechanism through the example of a university professor who is dissatisfied with a department policy. He decides to openly attack this policy at a faculty meeting – but "when the moment of truth is at hand he sits frozen in silence" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 949). In this example, his behavior is the result of social barriers created and sustained by other faculty members, and thereby an exercise of power's second face. The professor may be unwilling to speak up because he fears that this might be interpreted as an expression of disloyalty towards the department, that it might put him into a situation in which his opinion stands against that of all other faculty members, or that it might remove the solutions he was about to propose permanently from consideration. Power is therefore exercised over him by those who create and control social norms that discourage the airing of preferences. In other words, and in contrast to the first face of power, power is exercised in this example in a covert way.

In IR, this mechanism is commonly seen in institutions, regimes and organizations, as well as the power relations that create and control them. As Berenskoetter has argued, the second face of power goes beyond the first mechanism not only in regards to its analytical focus, but also with an eye on the participants in power processes and their resources. Whereas the first face usually involves a focus on states as the wielders of power, the concept of Bachrach and Baratz also takes into account how social movements, the global media and even consumers exercise power in global affairs. And whereas the first face is primarily about the resources that help states to win wars, the second face also takes into account factors such as authority and the access to as well as control over information (Berenskoetter 2007, 7–9). As a result, the second face of power illuminates a mechanism through which the *power over* is exercised that is subtler than the first mechanism.

A third mechanism and a third face of power are commonly associated with Lukes and the book he first published in 1974. It represents a direct response to the first two mechanisms and argues that they are inadequate for understanding the actual scope of what power can be. Following Lukes, the first and second mechanism fall short on three accounts. First, they ignore that not all forms of power can easily be tied to human behavior and decisions, for example the power that is exercised by cultural traditions. Second, they tie power to situations of conflict. This ignores that power can also underpin situations of consensus, and that power can manipulate preferences and desires so as to produce consensus. And third, they assume that power involves grievances and dissatisfaction on the side of those who are subject to power. Yet power can also be exercised to make those subject to power accept their situation (Lukes 2005, 25–28).

The second one of these three points deserves special emphasis. Lukes rejects the underlying assumption of Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz about power involving conflict. As he argues, this understanding imposes an unnecessary restriction on our understanding of power as it ignores situations of consensus. These are by no means free of power relations. In fact, they can even be the product of power. After all, power can shape desires and preferences, producing compliance and consensus through this mechanism. As Lukes asks:

> [I]s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes 2005, 28)

The mechanism described by the third face of power is therefore one of changing preferences[16]. Through this process, A makes B behave in a way that suits A's preferences. What differentiates this mechanism from the first two mechanisms introduced here is that the former does not describe the exercise of power through conflictual means, such as compulsion and agenda-setting, but through the shaping of preferences and production of consensus.

In the context of IR, the third face of power has received increasing attention during the past decades. Berenskoetter labeled its meaning and significance for the discipline therefore "a story in the making" (Berenskoetter 2007, 11). So far, its most popular and influential embodiment in IR has been Nye's concept of soft power. As he argues, power can not

[16] As Lukes wrote in the first edition of his 1974 book, this process has to take place "in a manner contrary to B's interests" (Lukes 2005, 37). This implies that A produces preferences in B that run counter to B's actual interests, and that B is not aware of their actual interests and the discrepancy from their currently held ones. The third face of power therefore describes situations of an overt yet false consensus and an absence of grievances. Simultaneously, it also describes situations of latent conflict: there would be a conflict between A and B if only B were aware of their actual preferences. For the purpose of this study, this differentiation between „actual preferences" and „false preferences" is not of relevance; the definition of power utilized here considers either outcome an exercise of power. Yet it is worth pointing out that this element of Luke's conception has been a matter of great debate. The assumption that power is exercised contrary to B's actual interests, as well as the assumption that there is something like an actual interest (and that it is evident to outside observers yet not the person in question), have been the most contentious part of the third face of power ever since the publication of Luke's book. In a second edition that was published in 2005 and contains several new chapters, this caveat about "contrary to B's interests" was subsequently abandoned my Lukes. As he writes there, it "was a mistake" (Lukes 2005, 12) to define power in this way. Power, as conceptualized by the third face, can also shape B's interests in ways that serve B's actual interests and promote their freedom. Examples are many positive forms of paternalism, for example the legal requirement to wear seatbelts, as well as parenting, therapies and teaching that utilize manipulative methods for the good of the subject (Lukes 2005, 84–85). Another contentious element of Luke's conception is the degree to which it overcomes the behaviorist focus of the first and second face. His intention was to step away from "the study of overt and actual behaviour - and specifically concrete decisions" (Lukes 2005, 153). The focus of the third face of power was supposed to lie on institutionalized or culturally determined patterns of behavior. Yet the conceptualization provided by Lukes never reaches this goal: his explanations and examples largely remain rooted in the vocabulary of "A influences B" and utilize concrete decisions. Contrary to what it was meant to achieve, the third face of power therefore remains rooted in the idea of power as a product of agency and behavior (see Groarke 1993 for similar criticism).

only be exercised on the basis of "hard" resources such as economic and military capacities and through coercion. It can also take a "soft" form that relies on cooptation on the basis of resources such as an attractive culture, appealing values and diplomatic outreach. Through this form of power, other actors get to "want what you want" (Nye 2004, 5) – or, perhaps more precisely, to "want what you want them to want" (Hall 2010, 206). This conception therefore emphasizes the absence of conflict and the creation of consensus, and the shaping of preferences.

The third face of power and the mechanism of changing preferences is visible in numerous other areas of the discipline. Next to soft power, the idea of civilian power illustrates how attractiveness can be the foundation of power. The concept was introduced in the 1990s by Maull who used it to characterize Germany and Japan as "prototypes of a promising future" (Maull 1990, 93) in which states commit to multilateral cooperation, invest in supranational institutions and refrain from utilizing military force. In proximity to this idea, the concept of normative power was developed which describes the "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" (Manners 2002, 239). It has been illustrated with the case of the European Union which – through its very existence and the example it provides – has been able to promote certain norms and behaviors on the international stage, for example the abolishment of the death penalty.

As was outlined above, this study assumes that the exercise of power always makes a difference in terms of behavior, and that behavior can be manipulated by targeting perceptions, opinions, beliefs, preferences, and so on. By looking at one of these concepts – preferences – the differences between these three faces of power can further illuminated. For this pur-

pose, it is useful to differentiate between first order preferences and second order preferences[17]. The former describe whatever preferences an actor has in a given situation. The later describe an actor's preferences about first order preferences. A man who orders a burger in a restaurant supposedly acts upon the first order preference to eat a burger. But if we assume that this man is on a diet and strives to avoid high calorie meals, his second order preference might be to not eat burgers and to not have the first order preference to eat a burger. In this case, his second order preference would be to have a different first order preference.

The exercise of power through compulsion and as described by the first face of power manipulates first order preferences but does not change second order preferences. Actor B therefore behaves based on preferences they would rather not have. The same is true for the second face of power. Its exercise takes place through agenda setting and the maintenance of the status quo. The third face of power, in contrast to that, describes the exercise of power through the creation of corresponding first and second order preferences. Actor B therefore follows first order preferences that suit their second order preferences. For this reason, the first two faces of power describe a situation of conflict and disagreement. After all, actor A and actor B have different preferences about what first order preferences B should have. The third face describes a situation of consensus in which A and B are in agreement about the first order preferences that B should have.

Beyond the work by Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes, the debate on the faces of power includes one more argument. This fourth face of power does not fit this study's

[17]To the best of my knowledge, the literature on power generally does not utilize the differentiation between first and second order preferences. The concept has rather been deployed in the field of philosophy (see, for example, Bruckner 2010). A number of authors trace the origins of this differentiation back to a 1971 paper by Harry Frankfurt (1971) who argued that second order preferences (or desires, as he called them) are a unique trait of humans that differentiate them from other beings.

definition of power and is therefore of comparatively little relevance here. It describes the exercise of power through the social constitution of actors, and thereby a power mechanism that is more fundamental than what this study is about: the exercise of power through the intentional behavior of actors. Nevertheless, it is useful to briefly introduce this mechanism here as it illuminates one of the limitations of this study's approach to power.

The fourth face of power was conceptualized by Digeser in a 1992 article. He saw a restrictive commonality in the existing three faces: they leave open "the possibility for human relationships not to be mediated by power" (Digeser 1992, 981). Following the work of Michel Foucault on power, the fourth face therefore characterizes power as an omnipresent background phenomenon that constitutes subjects and practices, values and norms – which, in turn, convey power. Power is thereby not only exercised when the behavior of actors is manipulated, as is the case in the first three faces of power. It constitutes actors in the first place and is conveyed through knowledge, conceptions of truth, processes of socialization and notions of what counts as normal. Power, according to this conception, is not necessarily the result of particular acts of behavior and cannot be easily identified; it is a result of "the myriad and infinitesimal mechanisms of our social practices and discourses" (Digeser 1992, 985). The mechanism at play here is therefore social constitution.

The most significant difference to the preceding three mechanisms is the absence of an active subject that is in control behind exercises of power. As Foucault writes, his conception of power does "not concern itself with power at the level of conscious intention or decision" (Foucault 1980, 97). Instead, it describes the continuous processes that control the behavior and thought of individuals through subliminal means. His term for the fourth face of power is therefore *disciplinary power*. Beyond this disciplining effect, the power Foucault describes "is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth" (Foucault 1980, 98). Power rather exists in

the entirety of social interactions whereby individuals are never only the wielder or target of power but "in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power" (Foucault 1980, 98).

In contrast to the first three faces of power, Foucault and Digeser thereby reject the reliance on an actor behind the exercise of power, may it be an actual person, a political or economic group, an organization, a government or a class. As Foucault writes about the nature of power systems:

> [T]he logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them: an implicit characteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose "inventors" or decisionmakers are often without hypocrisy. (Foucault 1978, 95)

Foucault and Digeser, thus, do not speak in terms of actor A exercising power over actor B. Their conception of power rather describes the constitution of individuals and their everyday interactions through power – and the reproduction of this power through individuals and their everyday interactions. On the one hand, this form of power is therefore indiscreet as it disciplines everywhere and always. As Foucault writes, "it leaves no zone of shade and constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of supervising" (Foucault 1995, 177). On the other hand, this form of power is discreet as it disciplines in silence and invisible. Hence, Foucault describes it as a "permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance" that "remain[s] invisible […] like a faceless gaze" (Foucault 1995, 214). While disciplinary power therefore affects all of us, we usually do not take notice of how we are shaped by it and how we reproduce it.

The fourth face of power has received comparatively little attention in IR. In *Power in World Politics* by Berenskoetter and Williams, neither the existence of a fourth face nor Digeser's article are referred to. One of the book's chapters introduces various conceptions of power in political science and devotes several pages to the first three faces of power but does not mention the fourth one (Berenskoetter 2007). The same is true for *Power and International Relations* by Baldwin on the concept of power in IR as well as his chapter in the 2013 edition of the *Handbook of International Relations* on the same topic, even though the former lists Digeser's article among its references (Baldwin 2016, 2013). This is not to say that the fourth face of power is generally absent from the discipline: a number of authors who wrote about power in the discipline in a less generalist way refer to it (see Barnett and Duvall 2005, 43; Mattern Bially 2008, 693–94).

Even though this part of the debate on the faces of power is not as prominent in IR scholarship as the other three faces, the underlying conception of power by Foucault has been utilized by a variety of authors. It was, in particular, a prominent influence on poststructuralist as well as constructivist works, the study of discourses and critical approaches towards the mainstream of the discipline. It has also sparked investigations of the power relations that constitute the discipline and that infuse with numerous biases its approaches to international affairs, both as a practice as well as an object of study, as well as towards power itself (Fournier 2014; Richmond 2010).

Numerous other works of IR scholarship follow the spirit of Foucault and build on his approach, even though this conception of power is not always explicitly referenced. One example is Jackson's account of the discursive shifts that established the language of a "Western Civilization" and of how the West came to be imagined as one civilization alongside others instead of as part of one universal civilization. This rhetorical construct has become commonplace and is powerful in shaping thought about international affairs; yet it

came about “in an almost wholly unintended manner” (Jackson 2006, 74). Another example is Doty’s work about the practices that constitute North-South relations and produce dualities such as first world and third world, developed and underdeveloped, core and periphery, and industrialized and developing (Doty 1996).

Foucault’s understanding of power is also visible in how IR scholars conceptualize power. It is the basis of what Barnett and Duvall have described as productive power in their matrix of power concepts (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 55–57); and it is visible in the idea of normative power which describes “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” (Manners 2002, 253). Although the mechanism of social constitution is therefore less prevalent in the IR literature than the previous three mechanisms, it has informed the discipline’s discourse on power.

These four mechanisms – or, as structural power is not taken into account here, the first three of them – illustrate what forms the exercise of power can take according to the definition of the term utilized here. As was emphasized in the beginning, these four examples are by no means exhaustive. Compulsion, agenda setting, the changing of preferences and social constitution represent merely four mechanisms that have received significant attention in the political science and IR literature on power. And for the purpose of this study, only the first three of these mechanisms are actually of relevance. With these examples in mind, the figure depicting the power process according to the definition used here can be updated as shown in figure 2. As should be noted, the fourth box under the three mechanisms of power that are of interest here emphasizes that there are potentially indefinite other mechanisms of exercising power.

Figure 2: Power process with different power mechanisms



There are myriad other mechanisms of power that could be added to this figure. Many – if not most of them – overlap with the four mechanisms presented here, yet they usually add a unique perspective on what forms the exercise of power can take. Consider the example of "communication power" as conceptualized by Castells. It describes the ability "to build consent, or at least to instill fear and resignation via-à-vis the existing order" which is "essential to enforce the rules that govern the institutions and organizations of society" (Castells 2013, 3). The mechanism at play here resembles that of social constitution, but Castells emphasizes that communication power is not merely reproduced through social interaction, but usually wielded by the state. It also resembles the mechanisms of setting agendas and changing preferences, yet Castells does not only concern himself with the shaping of agendas and preferences, but with that of the human mind on a more fundamental level. The mechanism he writes about could therefore be labeled "norm setting".

Another example for a mechanism that could be added to the figure is "attraction". It is commonly seen as the process through which soft power is exercised and has therefore been referred to as the mechanism underpinning the concept (T. Solomon 2014, 721). At the same time, the process through which soft power is exercised has been linked to various other mechanisms of power: to the setting of agendas and the second face of power (Nye 2011b, 13, 2011a, 14), to the changing of preferences and the third face of power (Baldwin

2013, 276; Berenskoetter 2007, 11; Gallarotti 2010, 25–26; Lukes 2007, 90), to both at the same time (Nye 2011b, 16), and to the idea of social constitution and the forth face of power (Y. W. Lee 2011; T. Solomon 2014) – or to all of these at the same time (Hayden 2012, 33). It is therefore anything but clear whether attraction would constitute a mechanism in its own right or merely a specific form of one or multiple mechanisms already part of the figure.

2. Emotions: Appraisal Theory and Intergroup Emotions

The second concept at the center of this study is that of emotions. For the purpose of this study, and as was mentioned before, three assumptions about emotions will be established. First, that the emotions of individuals affect their cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. Second, that the emotions of individuals can be manipulated by others. And third, that these effects of emotions as well as their manipulation can take place on the individual as well as the collective level. On this foundation, it will be argued in the following section of this study that the manipulation of others' emotions plays an important role in power mechanisms and enables the exercise of power over the behavior of others.

It is probably fair to speak of a general agreement – not only among laypeople but also among scholars - that emotions shape human life and human interaction. Yet there is considerable disagreement about the importance of this influence of emotions and its relevance for research, and especially so in the social sciences. The past decades, if not centuries, have seen the dominance of a rationalist approach that has systematically neglected, downplayed or even rejected the influence of emotions (Izard 1991, 1–2; Scheff 1992, 101). More recently, and as already described in the literature review, various scientific subfields have seen an "emotional turn" that led to a growing recognition of the role of emotions.

To pick but one example: whereas it was for the longest time a prominent assumption in the social sciences that individuals make decisions by rationally comparing the expected utility of the choices available to them, a growing number of researchers now speak of a decisive impact of emotions on this process (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003; McDermott 2004; N. Schwarz 2000). This increasing appreciation of emotions has, nevertheless, not produced a consensus about their general nature and impact. Yet it can be argued that they have widely come to be considered as having significant influence on human behavior and interaction - even though certainly not every scholar agrees with bold assertions such as that "of all major psychological processes, emotions are of prime importance" (Zajonc as quoted in MacMullen 2003, 54) or that they "constitute the primary motivational system for human beings" (Izard 1977, 3).

Independent of the importance one assigns to emotions, there is no consensus on what emotions actually are and how to define them (Frijda 2016, 610; J. A. Russell 2012). In this regard, emotions mirror what was already shown for power: agreement on the relevance of the concept; a lack of agreement on how to define it. The research on emotions disagrees even about fundamental questions, for example about whether the concept itself is scientifically useful, and references to emotion frequently mean very different things (LeDoux 1995, 209–10; Roddy Cowie, Sussman, and Ben-Ze'ev 2011). There is even disagreement about the necessity of a definition: whereas Mulligan and Scherer (2012) argue that the absence of a definition leads to fruitless debates and hampers research, Deigh (2012) calls into question the usefulness of any definition without an underlying agreement among researchers about what emotions are in the first place. Frijda goes so far as to argue that a definition of emotion "indeed is not to be found, and is not to be searched for" (Frijda 2016, 618) as the term merely describes a group of phenomena that are bundled together without obvious selection criteria.

Nevertheless, various researchers have attempted to aggregate conceptualizations of what emotions are from various sources and to seek out commonalities. Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) have done so on the basis of 92 existing definitions; Izard (2010) asked almost three dozen researchers who have done significant work on emotions about how they understand the concept. He latter concluded that, even though there are common elements to researchers' definitions, none of them is generally accepted and most research relies on operational definitions or other narrow approaches to the term. Of over-arching definitions, as proposed by Kleinginna and Kleinginna and Mulligan and Scherer, none has found wide-spread adoption.

Appraisal Theory and Emotions as Action Tendencies

This study therefore adopts one particular definition of emotion without assuming that it is intrinsically superior to other definitions, universal in its applicability or representative of the field of emotion research as a whole. The definition employed here was brought forward by Nico H. Frijda in the 1986 standard work "The Emotions". In the wider field of emotion research, his approach is probably the most prominent representative of the "central" or "mental" approach to emotions which follows the basic assumption that emotions are, first and foremost, a psychological process resulting from phenomena such as cognition. This approach is usually contrasted with the "peripheral" or "organic" approach which assumes that the psychological manifestations of emotions are the result of physical processes. The latter school had initially dominated the field but has since then become less influential (Coppin and Sander 2011; Mandler 2003).

While the mental approach emphasizes the psychological aspects of emotions, it does not deny their physiological manifestations. These physiological aspects of emotions include changes to hormone levels, heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, the functioning of mus-

cles as well as internal organs, the composition of body fluids and overt movement. Different emotions produce different physiological responses, even though it is not possible to align distinct physiological patterns with particular emotions.

On the most basic level, Frijda defines emotion as "changes in action readiness" (Frijda 1986, 466). The term therefore describes the output of a process through which an individual's readiness towards certain actions is created, modified or deactivated. This readiness describes "the inner disposition (and its absence) for performing actions and achieving relational change" (Frijda 1986, 469). It can concern actual behavior, cognition and the direction of attention and various ways in which an individual's relation to its environment can be altered. These inner dispositions manifest themselves in various modes of action readiness, for example the dispositions of an individual to accept, reject, facilitate or end an interaction with another person (Frijda 2016, 614–15).

It is worth emphasizing that the emotion process causes changes in action readiness but does not necessarily cause or predetermine action. As Frijda writes, the "link between emotion and action is intimate; yet it is weak" (Frijda 2004, 162). While emotions may result in tendencies towards behaviors like crying or screaming, as well as in physiological changes such as an increased heart rate, these tendencies are oftentimes suppressed or ignored by the individual because they are not deemed important enough or socially acceptable, or because no appropriate and meaningful action is available (e.g. because the costs of acting in accordance with the action tendency would be too high). Nevertheless, emotions can also translate directly into behavior, for example through impulsive reactions.

Just like there is no general agreement on what emotions are, so is there no agreement on what different emotions there are. The literature in the field is characterized by a long-running debate about whether there is a set of basic emotions, according to which all outcomes of the emotion process can be classified, and about how these basic emotions can be

defined. The variety of approaches illustrates the lack of consensus: Izard (1977, 83–84) conceptualized ten basic emotions, Tomkins (1962, 337) nine basic affects, Ekman (1992) six basic emotions, and Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) five basic emotions. On this basis, a range of studies have furthermore examined whether basic emotions occur and are recognized across different cultures (Sauter et al. 2010) and whether the same emotions are experienced and expressed in a different fashion across cultures (Eid and Diener 2001). Other scholars reject, in contrast to that, the concept of basic emotions as not rooted in theoretical or empirical realities (Ortony and Turner 1990).

Frijda, too, is critical of the concept of basic emotions. He argues that no general principle exists through which basic emotions can be defined and distinguished from one another. Instead, he proposes a number of fundamental action tendencies that are based on distinct patterns of behavior and facial expression. These tendencies usually correspond to certain emotions, for example "avoidance" to fear and "inhibition" to anxiety (Frijda 1986, 88). For the purposes of this study, these categorizations are of no particular relevance. The emotions that are taken into focus in this study, and in particular fear and anger, appear on every single of the afore-mentioned lists of basic emotions. It can therefore be assumed that the phenomena in the focus of this study have all the hallmarks that are generally associated with emotions.

To return to the emotion process: as was described above, the output of the process are changes in action readiness. The input of this process are stimuli[18]. These stimuli can be of an external nature (e.g. a threatening event or cold weather) or internal nature (e.g. hunger

[18] As Frijda argues, it might be more appropriate to speak of "events" or "situations" rather than "stimuli" in order to emphasize that stimuli usually do not occur in isolation and depend on their context. He writes: "Being alone is not the same as being alone after one's partner died; no food is different from no food when food was expected; threat when there is a way of escape is different from that when there isn't" (Frijda 1986, 268).

and pain) and become relevant for the individual primarily through cognition processes. In order to initiate the emotion process, stimuli have to fulfil two conditions. First, they have to arrive in the proper format. One example is that the loss of a loved one in itself is not a stimulus that elicits grief. This loss has to become apparent for the individual in a particular form, for example through the experience of arriving at an empty house (Frijda 1986, 329). Secondly, a stimulus has to be relevant to an individual's concerns in order to initiate the emotion process. Otherwise an individual may well be aware of a stimulus but without any emotional reaction to it.

Following Frijda's logic, concerns therefore underlie emotions. A concern is "a disposition to desire occurrence or nonoccurrence of a given kind of situation" (Frijda 1986, 335)[19] – or, in other words, whatever an individual cares about. Many concerns are "dormant demons" (Frijda 1986, 336) that come into play only when a stimulus becomes relevant for their satisfaction or safeguarding. Our all concern for our physical safety, for example, remains dormant unless a stimulus leads us to actually worry about our physical safety. Some of these concerns are tied to basic needs and desires, such as physical security, curiosity and sexual satisfaction. Other concerns are the result of experiences and socialization and relate to specific environments, other individuals, personal values and goals. It is assumed that the strength of a concerns correlates with the strength of the emotion and change in action tendency it can cause (Frijda 1986, 340).

What the presence of concerns in the emotion process emphasizes is that there is no linear and predetermined relationship that connects stimuli via cognition to emotion. To emphasize that stimuli become relevant in relation to concerns and factors such as an individual's

[19] Frijda emphasizes his preference for the term "concern" over supposedly similar terms such as "motive" or "goal". As he argues, neither one of these alternatives is suitable to describe the emotion process as they imply a level of awareness and activity that cannot always be found in this context.

mood and physical state, emotion researchers prefer to speak of "appraisal" rather than "cognition" (Frijda 1986, 269)[20]. Appraisals evaluate the relevance and meaning of stimuli for an individual's concerns by taking into account various criteria, for example novelty, whether a stimulus has a positive or negative valence, the extent to which the individual is certain about what is happening and the extent to which the individual is in control of the situation (Moors et al. 2013, 120).

As a result, the same stimulus can lead to different appraisals in different individuals or even in the same individual depending on the situation. At the same time, the same appraisals usually lead to the same emotion and different appraisals lead to different emotions. In other words: stimuli do not determine emotions; the appraisals of stimuli do (Frijda 1986, 195; Moors et al. 2013, 121).

Emotions have a clear function: "They serve concern satisfaction; they do so by monitoring the relevance of events and by modulating or instigating action accordingly" (Frijda 1986, 475). Although Frijda admits that this functional heuristic is not necessarily able to explain all emotions, he maintains that even those that seem distracting, without a clear purpose or outright irrational can oftentimes be interpreted through this lens. What makes oftentimes little sense is not the emotion process itself but rather the concerns that underpin it. Additionally, some nonfunctional emotions can be explained by processes that value gains in the short-term over those that occur in the long-term or represent emergency measures that prioritize a fast reaction. Thus, emotions are assumed to generally be functional even

[20] Frijda's theory therefore belongs to the tradition of "appraisal theories" that go back to the work of Arnold and Lazarus and are among the dominant approaches in the field of emotion research (Arnold 1960; Lazarus 1966) They try to differentiate themselves from other theories that merely posit a vague and unspecified role of cognition in the emotion process by specifying how different emotions are created (Coppin and Sander 2011; Moors et al. 2013, 120).

though there are exceptions that can be difficult to describe in terms of utility, for example sadness (Frijda 1986, 475–76)[21].

Emotions, therefore, stand in line with other reactions through which the bodies and minds of individuals regulate themselves and the relationships towards their environment. Among these reactions are basic reflexes as well as reactions to pain and pleasure. What sets emotions apart from most of these reactions is merely that they are "the most visible and complex part of a tall edifice of biological regulation" (Damasio 2004, 56).

As Frijda argues, emotions furthermore set themselves apart from other reaction mechanisms in that the involvement of passion is their core characteristic. As a result, emotions involve a sense of urgency and desire and an interest in a stimulus that "one has to *do* something with or about" (Frijda 2007, 26; emphasis in original). Among the characteristics of emotions are therefore their orientation towards a desired future state and their tendency to take control precedence: to interrupt other processes, draw attention and overrule other interests.

This conception of what an emotion is differs from the everyday understanding of the term in at least two important ways. A first difference is that emotion here does not describe a physical or psychological state but rather a process. Frijda labels this emotion process as a form of "information processing" (Frijda 1986, 453) that appraises stimuli in relation to concerns and produces corresponding changes in action readiness. This appraisal process

[21] The difficulty of explaining what function positive emotions and their action tendencies serve is among the criticisms leveled against Frijda's theory of emotions. While it suggests itself to connect fear with a tendency to flee and anger with a tendency to attack, it is anything but clear what tendencies are the result of joy or contentment. In fact, positive emotions can be interpreted as an actual lack of action tendencies and clear urges (Fredrickson 1998; Fredrickson and Levenson 1998, 192). Other authors see a clear function in positive emotions, for example as an indicator that things are going better than necessary and that attention and energy can be shifted to other domains in order to utilize opportunities there (Carver 2003).

can take a variety of forms which Frijda describes as "situational meaning structures" (Frijda 1986, 195). When we refer to emotions such as fear, anger or joy, we therefore describe particular situational meaning structures that are characterized by specific appraisal processes and action tendencies (even though understandings of what exactly certain terms describe oftentimes differ).

A second difference to everyday references to emotion is that "emotion" here is clearly distinct from "feeling". The former describes changes in action tendencies that can manifest themselves in a psychological as well as physiological manner. The latter refers to an "experienced action tendency or experienced state of action readiness" (Frijda 2004, 161). Feelings are products of emotions and the mental awareness of the emotion process. Thus, feelings are "the mental representation of the physiologic changes that occur during an emotion" (Damasio 2004, 52)[22]. Feelings are therefore a possible result of the emotion process; but as emotion can occur unconsciously, feelings do not always accompany this process. The purpose of feelings: to create mental awareness of the underlying emotions and to enable learning experiences (Damasio 2004, 56–57).

Other terms, too, can be located in relation to emotions. "Moods" are in principle similar to emotions and not clearly distinguishable from them. They, too, establish a particular kind of action readiness and tendencies within an individual. What differentiates moods from emotions is that they are not linked to the presence of a particular stimulus or object but of a less directional and more continuous nature (Clore and Gasper 2000, 11; Frijda 1986, 59).

[22] Frijda elaborates on what this means by emphasizing that feelings are usually not "experiences *of*" but "experiences *that*". The experience of having a particular feeling is usually related to particularly objects and action tendencies, not merely to abstract concepts such as fear or anger. As he explains with the example of depression, it is "not just described as pain, apathy, and heaviness in the limbs, nor is first of all labeled 'sadness' or 'depression'. Rather, it is described as feeling to be living in hell, from which there is no escaping, or of being faced with one's utter worthlessness" (Frijda 2007, 199–200; emphasis in original).

Another term that frequently appears in the research on emotions is that of "passions". It is oftentimes used interchangeably with "emotions" as well as "sentiments" (Frijda 1986, 103). As was mentioned before, Frijda equates emotions with passions (Frijda 2008, 72) and describes passion as "the core characteristic of emotions" (Frijda 2007, 26)[23].

To return to the influence of emotions: while the concept of action readiness is helpful to explain the behavior of individuals who experience emotions, it is less suitable to analyze individual's social and political behavior. After all, anger or happiness about social or political events usually does not translate into immediate changes in behavior. Of interest in this context is rather how emotions influence the perceptions, preferences and beliefs of individuals that might subsequently shape social and political processes. All these elements of mental activity are shaped by emotions, which is why a distinct mode of emotion-steered thought can be conceptualized. According to Frijda and Mesquita (2000, 64–68), it is characterized by four features:

(1) Instrumentality: thinking under the influence of emotions serves the dispositions and desires that characterize emotion. Cognition and attention, the creation of beliefs as well as their modification therefore are functional for the purpose of reaching certain goals. In this context, thinking can also serve emotions by shaping an individual's self-perception, for example by inducing a feeling of powerfulness and superiority.
(2) Motivational force: the passion and urge inherent to emotions also characterize the corresponding mode of thinking – which is why driven individuals are oftentimes described as *passionate*. The motivations and thoughts that spring from emotion

[23] In his earlier writings, Frijda also provides a vague definition for passions that distinguishes the term from emotions. According to this definition, passions are events that are – like emotions - based on a discrepancy between what an individual desires and what it experiences but without the resulting action tendencies that characterize the emotion process (Frijda 1986, 101–2).

are therefore highly present on the mind and usually resistant to change as this might undermine an individual's action readiness.

(3) Control of the scope of thought: emotions influence the direction of attention as well as the information that comes into focus. The ability to interrupt mental processes and behavior has therefore been described as the essential purpose of emotions (Simon 1967, 36). In line with the functionality of thinking under emotions, this helps to allocate the available mental resources and prevents unrelated, irrelevant issues from interfering. The result can be circular: emotion directs attention towards goal-relevant information and makes it seem more important, thus intensifying emotion and increasing the directionality of attention (Clore and Gasper 2000, 11, 34–35).

(4) Motivated bias: emotions influence not only what comes to mind, but also how it is evaluated, for example when judging the credibility of information. The construction and maintenance of beliefs is biased in ways that support the dispositions and desires that are created by emotions. Beliefs that do not fit what emotions indicate are thus oftentimes adjusted accordingly. Emotions and moods can thereby be a source of information based on which judgments are made – or, in other words, they can function as evidence in their own right (Clore and Gasper 2000, 12, 25).

On this foundation, emotions can result in the construction of new beliefs, the revision of existing beliefs and the increase or decrease of the strength with which beliefs are held. This strength of beliefs is determined by multiple factors. Of primary relevance is the degree to which these beliefs matter for concerns. In fact, both the intensity of emotions as well as the strength of beliefs depend on their relevance for concerns. In addition, the intensity of emotions in itself strengthens beliefs. Lastly, the anticipation of emotions can influence the strength of beliefs: if the prospect of abandoning a belief is assumed to result in unpleasant feelings, this only adds to the strength of that belief (Frijda and Mesquita 2000, 45, 61–63).

Emotion can therefore shape the cognition, thinking, judgment and the beliefs of individuals in ways that defy appeals to logic and evidence, and especially so when important concerns are involved. As Frijda, Manstead and Bem argue: "When it comes to issues of emotional importance, convincing someone to change his or her existing beliefs appears to be a virtually hopeless undertaking" (Frijda, Manstead, and Bem 2000, 3). Emotions also have the potential to not only influence but fully determine moral judgments. While these are commonly assumed to be the result of rationalist reasoning, it has been proposed that they originate from fast and automatically occurring intuitions. The moral reasoning is then added as a post hoc construction. Following this logic, moral judgments represent an "Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail", as Haidt (2001) put it in the title of a book[24].

Just like emotions can occur without awareness, so can these influences on cognition, thinking and beliefs occur without the individual necessarily taking notice. Even without any conscious cognition or the presence of notable feelings can emotions influence the creation of judgments, preferences, attitudes and beliefs (Clore and Gasper 2000, 13; S. T. Murphy and Zajonc 1993; Zajonc 1980). For example, studies that exposed their participants without their awareness to faces with a positive or negative expression could thereby influence participants' judgments of how pleasant or unpleasant they perceived Chinese characters which they were shown afterwards. The same effect has been demonstrated in a study for

[24] An example given by Haidt for this pattern is incest. Even for the hypothetical case of incest that takes place voluntarily, without the chance of producing offspring (as contraceptives are used), of posing a danger to the participants (again because of contraceptives), and without any emotional harm done (as both parties perceive the experience as positive), most people would judge this behavior as wrong. Only after this moral evaluation are reasons for this judgment sought. Similar patterns for moral evaluations that are driven by intuitions and affective reasoning, not by the benefits and harms that would occur, have been found for other actions that can be perceived as wrong yet are free of harm, for example homosexual intercourse, unusual forms of masturbation, the eating of dead pets and the cleaning of toilet bowls with national flags (Haidt 2001, 814, 817).

how beverages are evaluated (Dannlowski and Suslow 2006; Winkielman, Berridge, and Wilbarger 2005).

It is tempting to conclude that emotions are a great source of irrationality. In fact, the idea that emotions and passions on the one side, and reason and rationality on the other side oppose each other has a long history in the social sciences and philosophy (Elster 2004). More recent research points towards a more complicated relationship between emotions and rationality. Most famously, Damasio has shown that individuals with brain damage that prevents them from having emotions and feelings have problems arriving at rational thought and behavior (Damasio 1994). They are intelligent, in possession of a working memory as well as capable of logical thought and sustained attention – yet they continuously act in violation of what would be considered advantageous to them and socially expected.

Damasio concluded that emotions support reasoning and "may be an indispensable foundation for rationality" (Damasio 1994, 200), even though they can also interfere with rational thought. Emotions help the mind to figure out what is of relevance and to narrow down the available options based on past experiences and the emotions linked to them. A similar argument was made by de Sousa who perceives emotions as a mechanism to control "what would otherwise be an unmanageable plethora of objects of attention, interpretation, and strategies of inference and conduct" (De Sousa 1990, xv). These conclusions have been taken up elsewhere: political scientists have described emotion as, "inescapably, an essential component of rationality" (McDermott 2013, 699) and refer to a "consensus that emotion is important to rationality" (Mercer 2010, 3).

Other scholars are more critical of arguments that link emotions and rationality. As Elster has argued in response to Damasio's claim that rational behavior is impossible without

emotions, the absence of emotions and difficulties in behaving rationally may occur in tandem but are not necessarily related to each other (Elster 1999a, 291–92). There is also little disagreement that some behaviors are the outcome of emotional urges and violate what a rational cost-benefit analysis would dictate. Examples are social norms and expectations that impose costs on individuals that lead to no gains in utility (Elster 2004, 43), the moral judgments about issues such as incest that were mentioned before (Haidt 2001) as well as impulsive reactions to overwhelming emotions such as fear. The answer to the question of how emotions relate to rationality is therefore anything but obvious.

The possible implications of how emotions influence human thought for IR have been outlined by Mercer (2010, 210). He follows the argument that rational thought depends on emotions and argues that emotions help to constitute and shape our beliefs, that they determine the strength of our beliefs and provide evidence for what we believe. As a consequence, he argues that all beliefs are "emotional beliefs" and depend on emotions, just as products of beliefs do, such as trust and credibility. Many of the core concepts of IR have therefore an emotional component, for example deterrence and the underlying evaluations of information and assessments of risk.

In summary, the previous pages have established the first assumption about emotions that underpins this study: that they affect the cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior of individuals. Emotions do so in reaction to stimuli and in relation to the concerns of an individual, the satisfaction of which is the function of emotions. As a result of this process, emotions produce tendencies towards certain actions, either consciously or unconsciously. These action tendencies are the hallmark of emotions. Following the appraisal approach of Frijda, the influence on cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior is not merely a product of emotions; it is emotion.

Emotion Regulation

None of this implies that emotions invariably dominate human cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. In most situations, emotional responses are "dampened, graded, and monitored" (Frijda 1986, 406) to at least some degree through what psychologists describe as the regulation of emotion[25]. This process usually targets either the magnitude or the duration of emotional experiences. As a rule of thumb, individuals strive to produce and increase their positive emotions and try to avoid and decrease their negative emotions (Gross 2013b; Koole 2009, 14). Yet there are also examples for the opposite. Sometimes, individuals attempt to intentionally create emotions in themselves that would otherwise be considered negative. One example is the thrill of fear sought on rollercoasters, another one the controlled anger that athletes perceive as beneficial for their competitive performance (Robazza and Bortoli 2007; Tamir 2009).

The regulation of emotions can take various forms, can be intrinsic or extrinsic, intentional or unintentional as well as conscious or unconscious. It can affect all elements of the emotion process: it can target stimuli by avoiding, seeking as well as modifying situations; it can target cognition and appraisal through the focusing of attention and the elicitation or avoiding of certain thoughts; and it can target emotional responses, for example by suppressing them until they disappear. The incentive for emotion regulation can furthermore come from the inside, as is the case for the human tendency to avoid fear, or the outside, for example in the form of social expectations. Even the regulation itself can have outside sources, for example social company that helps to avoid specific stimuli or to handle certain action tendencies (Frijda 1986, 414–15; Gross 2013a).

[25] As is the case for the concept of emotions itself, so is there no general agreement on the meaning of emotion regulation. The expanding research on the topic has therefore been criticized for not clearly defining what emotion regulation actually is and for struggling to distinguish it from other concepts such as emotional reactivity and emotional sensitivity (Koole 2009, 8; A. R. Lewis, Zinbarg, and Durbin 2009, 86; R. A. Thompson 1994, 27; Zimbarg and Mineka 2007).

As emotions shape cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior, it is no surprise that the regulation of emotions equally has an influence on these processes. For example, researchers have explored the different consequences of suppressing emotions versus reappraising situations during the emotion process. One study indicates that people who tend to suppress their emotions have social relations that are less close and showcase lower self-esteem and a lower satisfaction with their lives than people who try to reappraise situations (Gross and John 2003). Another study involving romantic couples indicates that individuals who suppress their emotions in conflictual conversations with their partner have a worse memory of the conversation's content than those who reappraise the situation by recalling the positive aspects of their relationship (Richards, Butler, and Gross 2003).

Most of the literature on emotion regulation concerns itself with how individuals manage their own emotions, and therefore with self-regulation. In the case of this study, the focus lies on extrinsic emotion regulation and thereby on the ways in which individuals and groups of individuals regulate the emotions of other individuals and groups[26]. This extrinsic regulation of emotions can take numerous forms – in fact, Niven et al. speak of almost 400 distinct strategies (Niven, Totterdell, and Holman 2009). The academic literature from various fields has dealt with extrinsic emotion regulation, for example in the context of leadership in organizations (J. M. George 2000), the interactions of parents and children (Ekas et al. 2011), of doctors and patients (Francis, Monahan, and Berger 1999), and of prisoners and prison staff members (Niven, Totterdell, and Holman 2007).

[26] The literature refers to these processes not only as "extrinsic" but also as "interpersonal" emotion regulation. As this study concerns itself not only with how individuals regulate each other's emotions, but also with the ways in which collective actors such as nation states regulate emotions, the term "extrinsic" is used instead of "interpersonal". Beyond that, the term "affect regulation" is at times used instead of "emotion regulation". As most of the literature that is relevant for this study speaks of emotions instead of affect, the latter term is employed here.

It is therefore not surprising that emotion regulation has been described as a frequently occurring phenomenon in political contexts. As Maor and Gross argue: "Politicians regulate emotions in order to influence perceptions, preferences, and vote choices, as well as to exercise public authority to achieve substantive ends" (Maor and Gross 2015, 10). These attempts at regulating emotions can target various elements of the emotion process and take, for example, the form of emotional appeals in political campaigns that are meant to influence the formation of judgments and opinions (Brader 2006; Kühne et al. 2011; Wettergrena and Jansson 2013).

But not only do individuals and groups of individuals influence each other's emotions; the same can be said for social structures (even though they are not taken into account in this study). They regulate, primarily through norms and sanctions, which emotions an individual should value, experience and showcase in specific situations. For example, judges in court are expected to subdue their emotions in order to appear rational and impartial, even when other people present in court express strong emotions (Bergman Blix, Stina and Wettergren, Åsa 2016). Companies, too, require their employees to engage in what sociologists refer to as "emotional labor" and impose rules on them regarding the emotions appropriate and necessary on the job (Grandey 2000). On a larger scale, these processes have been examined under labels such as "emotional regimes". The ways in which these emotional regimes develop and work have been explored for examples such France during its revolutionary period (Reddy 2001) and for "emotional communities" in the early middle ages (Rosenwein 2006).

For the purpose of this study, the extrinsic regulation of emotions is treated as a means of exercising power. This marks a departure from the approach in the existing literature where the extrinsic regulation of emotions is usually seen as a means of creating positive or avoiding negative emotion for hedonistic reasons and the sake of itself (Niven, Totterdell, and

Holman 2009; Tamir, Mitchell, and Gross 2008). Following the argument advanced by Tamir (2009), this study steps away from the focus on hedonistic motivations and, instead, concerns itself primarily with instrumentalist motivations. Emotions, then, are not regulated for the sake of creating positive or avoiding negative emotions as a goal in and of itself, but to serve a greater cause: the exercise of power.

What is thereby established is the second assumption that underpins this study: that emotions can be regulated, either intrinsically by the individual that is experiencing the emotion or extrinsically by other actors and structural forces. Of particular interest in this context is the extrinsic regulation of emotions in an instrumental (instead of hedonistic) fashion, and therefore for the sake of exercising power over the individual experiencing this emotion. This form of emotion regulation is referred to here as manipulation.

Intergroup Emotions Theory

The two assumptions introduced so far in this study as well as the research on emotions and emotion regulation overwhelmingly speak of emotions as a process that takes place on the level of the individual. Yet politics in general and international relations in particular usually involve the interactions of individuals that organize in groups, may it be as members of small elite circles or of large nation states. The third assumption underpinning this study is therefore that emotions and emotion regulation can be of relevance not only on the level of individuals, but also on the social level of groups.

This third assumption is necessary as the conception of emotion as a phenomenon that takes place purely on the individual level provides little help to understand two facets of our social life. For one, this individual-centered approach can hardly explain emotional reactions to situations that are of little relevance for individuals. Why do soccer fans react with positive and negative emotions to the success or failure of their team, and correspondingly

behave different, even though the events on the pitch can hardly be said to affect their lives beyond the stadium (Jones et al. 2012; Kerr et al. 2005)? Why did Americans all over the country showcase post-traumatic stress symptoms in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks even though the great majority of them was not personally affected (Schuster et al. 2001; Silver et al. 2002)?

Secondly, to what extent do common references to the emotions of groups actually describe a psychological reality? In the media reporting as well as academic discourses it is common to refer to states and other collectives as if they have emotions. Examples are media headlines that state how "China reacts with anger" (Reuters 2017) to the South Korean deployment of anti-missile batteries or that "Israel [is] afraid of a few boats" (Munayyer 2017) on the way to Palestine with humanitarian supplies. In order to explore whether these attributions of emotions to collective actors such as nation states describe an actual reality or are mere figures of speech, it is helpful to explore the collective dimension of emotions and emotion regulation.

One way of approaching these questions is through the framework of Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET). It was developed, first and foremost, by Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith.

In the context of this study, IET was chosen for several reasons. First, the framework approaches emotions from an appraisal-perspective and therefore utilizes many of the assumptions as well as the terminology of Frijda's conception of emotions. Secondly, IET and its assumptions about collective emotions are backed up by the results of numerous empirical studies and experiments (Devos et al. 2002, 116–17; Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007; Smith and Mackie 2008, 433–34). And thirdly, other authors have already used IET to approach issues relating to international affairs and thereby help to inform this study (Brewer and Alexander 2002; E. Halperin 2013; E. Halperin and Gross 2011; Sasley 2011).

IET is based on the so-called social identity approach towards groups of individuals. This approach, in turn, is informed by insights from two other psychological frameworks which were developed since the 1970s: Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory.

Social Identity Theory posits that individuals not only have an individual identity but also social identities through which they consider themselves as members of various groups. These groups can be small, for example a family, as well as large, such the nation that an individual perceives itself as part of. This self-identification shapes the cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior of individuals, for example through favoritism towards one's own group. Individuals strive to maintain a positive social identity, which is why they try to see the groups they consider themselves as members of in a positive light. They are furthermore receptive to social identity threats, for example when a group they consider themselves part of is not recognized or when their own membership to a group is not acknowledged. This desire can result in conflict with other groups, especially if status differences between groups are seen as illegitimate (Hogg 2010, 797)[27].

The second element of the social identity approach is Self-Categorization Theory, which builds upon Social Identity Theory. It takes up the notion that individuals have multiple personal as well as social identities and specifies how they become relevant depending on the context. Through a process of depersonalization, individuals "come to see themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their differences from others" (Turner et al. 1987, 50). This process applies to

[27] Importantly, these behaviors and especially favoritism for the in-group do not rely on meaningful differences between groups. In experiments it has been shown that even group membership based on t-shirt colors, coin flips or preferences for specific painters is sufficient to lead to in-group favoritism, for example in the evaluation of information and the allocation of benefits. This indicates that the mere act of categorizing individuals into groups can be sufficient to create social identities (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Dunham, Baron, and Carey 2011; Tajfel 1970).

the self-perception of individuals as well as that of others. Which social identities are applied in this process depends on how easily they are available to the individual and on how they fit the situation as well as the relevant social expectations as perceived by the individual (Hornsey 2008, 207–8).

What Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory thereby emphasize: people perceive and treat themselves as well as others not only as unique individuals, but also as members of groups, and beyond that as stereotypical members of groups. These groups can range from formal organizations, such as companies and sports clubs, to lose social identities like that of a particular ethnicity, nationality or gender. The membership in a group becomes part of an individual's identity; oneself, other individuals, groups and events are seen through that lens and in terms of what they mean for the group.

IET applies this logic to the realm of emotions. Accordingly, the salient social identities of an individual are of relevance for the emotions which an individual experiences. Through the identification with a group, individuals perceive and appraise situations in ways that are different from how they would perceive and appraise the same situations based purely on their personal identities. As a result, individuals experience emotions based on how they matter to the group, not only to the individual. Intergroup emotions are therefore distinct from individual-level emotions as they relate to group-based identities, concerns and appraisals instead of personal identities, concerns and appraisals.

Beyond this crucial difference, individual-level emotions and intergroup emotions refer to identical phenomena that "feel pretty much the same" (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1873) for the individual experiencing them and cause comparable changes in action readiness. Thus, individual emotions and intergroup emotions are broadly similar in their effects and function: they regulate individual cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. The more an individual identifies with a group, the stronger the emotions it experiences on the basis of

this social identity, and the stronger the effects of these emotions (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1873–74; Maitner, Mackie, and Smith 2006; Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007; Smith and Mackie 2008, 428–29; Yzerbyt et al. 2003).

What establishes the connection between social identities and intergroup emotions are two processes. One is the appraisal of stimuli from the perspective of the group instead of the individual. Situations that have positive implications for the group or its members are therefore appraised as positive whereas those with negative implications receive a negative appraisal. This process can even lead to a positive evaluation of events that profit the group but harm the individual, or vice versa (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1870–71).

The second process is the self-stereotyping of individuals as a group member. The identification with a particular group leads individuals to experience certain emotions purely because of this social identity and based on emotions associated with this group. When individuals are asked to consider themselves as members of a particular nationality, they might therefore report higher levels of fear than when they consider themselves as individuals. And supporters of one sports team might get angry when encountering supporters of another team simply because this emotion has become habitually associated with this social identity (Mackie, Smith, and Ray 2008, 1872).

It deserves emphasis that these intergroup emotions are mentally and physically experienced by individuals who identify with a group, not by some hypothetical group consciousness. Even if all individuals who share a social identity experience the same emotions at the same time, these processes take place strictly at the level of the individual. Intergroup emotions are therefore collective in that they are based on the identification with a collective, but they do not describe a phenomenon that transcends the experiences on the level of the individual (Ray, Mackie, and Smith 2014, 248). Nevertheless, research suggests that the emotions felt by members of a group tend to converge and that intergroup emotions are

not only based on group membership but also shared among group members (Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007, 433).

Intergroup emotions therefore fit the definition of what has been described elsewhere as "group-based emotions". Both intergroup emotions and group-based emotions describe emotions on the level of the individual that are based on the self-identification as a member of a group. This phenomenon has been contrasted from so-called "group emotions" which "occur in and are shared within a collective of interacting individuals at a moment in time" (Niedenthal and Ric 2017, 223). Following this definition, the principal difference is that group emotions, in contrast to group-based emotions, are not dependent on a social identity as a group member. They can occur without the involvement of any identity, for example in the form of contagious joy among people who do not consider themselves as part of the same group (but just happen to be in the same place at the same time and experience the same emotion)[28].

To return to the two questions brought up at the beginning of this section: when we see Americans all over the country in shock after the events of September 11 and soccer fans in ecstasy after their team scores a goal, these emotions are not (or at least not primarily) the result of what the events mean for the individual. Rather, they are a result of what the

[28] The precise differences between group-based and group emotions have been defined in various ways. According to Niedenthal and Brauer, group emotions refer to an experience that results from a shared situation with a degree of interaction among the participants (Niedenthal and Brauer 2012, 269). Elsewhere, it has been proposed that group emotions differ from group-based emotions in that the latter are emotions that individuals feel on behalf of a group whereas group emotions are felt about belonging to a group. An example for this kind of group emotion can be the joy one experiences about belonging to a group that is held in high esteem by others or has become associated with positive emotional experiences in the past, as Kuppens and Yzerbyt (2014, 1576) argue. Lastly, group-based emotions also differ from phenomena such as emotional contagion, and therefore the tendency of people interacting with each other to synchronize their emotions, and empathy. According to Hogg, these concepts describe motion processes that take place in an individual because of other people's emotions, not because of the individuals' shared identity as a members of the same group (Hogg 2010, 473).

events imply for a group that these individuals consider themselves past of[29]. Even supposedly mundane situation such as athletic victories that have no tangible effect on the fate of other individuals can therefore elicit powerful emotions based on what they imply for a group, for example as a foundation for pride.

In the same vein, when we state that "China reacts with anger" towards South Korea or that "Israel is afraid" of approaching ships, this does not refer to emotions that occur in some sort of collective consciousness, but to emotions that individual members of these nations experience, presumable based on their social identities and not their individual concerns.

This does not imply that each and every Chinese or Israeli citizen is experiencing these emotions. Rather, it assumes that a significant number of individuals showcase this emotion. What constitutes a significant number depends heavily on the context and is not necessarily based on numbers: when a hundred farmers in rural China are angry at South Korea, this is hardly significant; but when all 25 members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China are angry, this is certainly significant and implies that China as an actor in international relations does in fact experience anger.

Beyond the parallels in how emotions based on individual as well as social identities are produced, these different kinds of emotions are also similar in that they can be manipulated in a variety of ways. The regulation of intergroup emotions can take place in an intrinsic

[29] It should be emphasized that this understanding of emotions is based strictly on what situations mean for the group that an individual considers itself a member of, not on effects such as emotional contagion, sympathy or empathy. Group-based emotions are not felt because of how other group members feel but because of what they mean for the group and its members (even though processes such as emotional contagion can certainly occur at the same time). For the case of joy in response to athletic victories this means: "When our national team wins an Olympic medal, we do not feel happy because the individual members of the team are feeling happy and we empathize with them as individuals. Rather, we feel happy because the victory is a positive event for our national ingroup, a group that helps define our own self" (Smith and Mackie 2010, 473).

fashion, when individuals regulate their own group-based emotions, as well as in an extrinsic manner, when individuals regulate the group-based emotions of others. Apart from that, these processes can be deliberate and targeted as well as without intent and even unconscious.

Of particular interest in the context of international relations is how emotion regulation has been described as a potential strategy to aid the resolution of emotionally charged, often intractable intergroup conflicts. For this purpose, "collective fear and hatred must be reduced" and "collective hope, trust, and mutual acceptance must be actively fostered" (Bar-Tal and Rosen 2009, 568). While individuals may be personally affected by these conflicts, it stands to reason that many of the emotions at play are actually group-based. As Halperin (2013) has argued, the regulation of these emotions can be attempted either through direct strategies that aim for a change of the emotions at play, for example through cognitive reappraisal, or through indirect strategies that try to change the appraisals that underpin these emotions.

A number of studies provide examples for the direct approach to emotion regulation. During the Gaza War of 2008 and 2009, one study investigated the influence that cognitive reappraisal has on the attitudes of Israeli individuals towards Palestinians. Participants of the study who reported to frequently deal with negative emotions by changing the way they look at a situation also showcased a propensity to be more hopeful about a better future and to support humanitarian aid for innocent Palestinians (E. Halperin and Gross 2011). In another study, Israeli participants who had received training in cognitive reappraisal showcased a tendency to support more conciliatory policies towards Palestinians than those who had not received the training, both in laboratory setting as well as during periods of real-world diplomatic strive between the two groups (E. Halperin et al. 2013).

Other studies have attempted to affect change through the creation of emotions. One experiment in Rwanda measured the effects of a radio soap opera that addresses the lasting legacies of the country's genocide. It tells the story of two fictional communities in Rwanda, thereby educating about the roots of prejudice and violence, and the paths to healing in the aftermath. While the program had little effect on the personal beliefs of listeners, the sympathy and empathy it sparked in its audience have been associated with more sympathetic and empathetic perceptions of particular groups of other Rwandans, such as prisoners, genocide survivors and politicians (Paluck 2009).

The indirect approach to emotion regulation with its focus on regulating appraisals, too, has been illustrated by a number of studies. Several of them tested the effect of self-affirmation on attitudes towards other groups that were previously harmed by individuals' own group. Israeli and Serbian participants were given the opportunity to write about values important to them and events that made them proud. This process of self-affirmation led to a decreased tendency to react defensively to information that reflects negatively on themselves. Crucially, it also resulted in an increased tendency to acknowledge how the participants' respective groups had wronged others (here: Palestinians and, respectively, Bosnians), as well as feelings of guilt and support for reparations. The self-affirmation of individuals can therefore be utilized to create feelings of guilt and, in turn, allow for reconciliation (Cehajić-Clancy et al. 2011).

A similar study was conducted in the context of the persistent ethnic conflict in Cyprus. The participating Turkish Cypriots were asked to read either a psychological article about the aggressive nature of social groups being fixed and unchangeable or an article about this aggressive nature being malleable. Afterwards, the levels of anxiety that both groups of Turkish Cypriots held towards Greek Cypriots were analyzed. The results showed signifi-

cantly lower levels of anxiety and an increased willingness to engage with the Greek Cypriots among those Turkish Cypriots who had received information about the potential of social groups to change for the better. Again, this result has been interpreted as evidence for the potential of emotion regulation – here: the regulation of anxiety - to help solve intractable conflicts (E. Halperin et al. 2012).

Particular attention has furthermore been paid by researchers to the regulation of group-based emotions among members of a group. For example, the participants in popular protests against disadvantagement have been described as "passionate economists" who not only strive to further their individual interest but also act in response to group-based anger. This implies that one pathway to collective mobilization leads through emotion regulation and, for example, the creation of anger in fellow group members (Van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears 2012). On a more general level, Jasper has argued about the regulation of emotions in groups that:

> Leaders construct situations in part to suggest or allow certain reactive emotions among participants; certain situations demand certain feelings; and a central part of sharing cultural meanings is to share feelings. Organizers have also done a great deal of work to construct background emotions that shape reflex emotions of the moment. Foremost among these background emotions are reciprocal feelings among group members. (Jasper 2014, 352)

What is substantiated by all these examples and theoretical considerations is the third assumption that underpins this study: that emotions and their regulation are of relevance not only on the level of individuals, but also on the level of groups. As Intergroup Emotion Theory explains, emotion processes take place not only on the basis of individual identities but also through group identities. Emotions can therefore be group-based and collective in nature, even though they take place on the level of the individual. And just like individual

emotions can be regulated, so can group-based emotions be manipulated in a variety of ways and in an intrinsic as well as extrinsic fashion.

In summary, this study bases its understanding of emotions on Frijda's conception of them as a process that evaluates situations in relation to an individual's concern and produces tendencies to react in particular ways. Emotions can be manipulated and regulated by the individual that is experiencing them as well as by others, for example by other individuals or even groups of individuals. While emotions are assumed to occur strictly on the level of the individual, they can – as Intergroup Emotions Theory argues – not only relate to what matters to the individual, but also to what matters to the individual as a member of a social group. In this case, they are based on group identities. These group-based emotions, too, can be manipulated and regulated.

3. Power and Emotions in IR

So far, power and emotions have been introduced as separate and independent concepts. But as this study concerns itself with the interplay of the two, the ways in which power and emotions interact and the relevance of the two concepts for each other still have to be elaborated on. As was mentioned before, the conception of power that underpins this study is that of a process through which one actor makes another actor behave in accordance with the first actor's preferences. How exactly this process unfolds and what mechanism leads to this outcome is largely left open (although four mechanisms were explained above: compulsion, agenda setting, the changing of preferences and social constitution). This process was already illustrated through the following figure.

Figure 3: Power process

What is crucial in the context of this study: the power mechanism at the center of this process can utilize the manipulation of B's emotions to make B behave in accordance with A's preferences. This is not meant to say that the exercise of *power over* always involves the manipulation of actor B's emotions and that emotions are always present as an intervening variable[30]. Rather, this conception of how the *power over* can be exercised is meant to draw attention to one particular form that A's exercise of power over B can take. While means such as economic incentives and threats of violence have received plenty of attention in the IR literature, little attention has been given to the role that the manipulation of emotions can play in this context. And even where emotions are likely to have played a role in the exercise of power, other explanations were usually given precedence.

The emotions created, stoked or alleviated through this process can determine B's behavior in two ways. First, emotions themselves can shape behavior. Fear or anger, to pick but two examples, can be action tendencies in their own right and override other action tendencies, thereby producing specific behavior. Second, emotions can affect cognition, thinking and judgment, for example by producing a motivated bias, as was explained in the chapter on emotions. As a result, emotions not only produce certain behavior on their own; they can

[30] At the same time, one can certainly ask whether all exercises of *power over* involve emotions in one way or another. Although the facts that human beings are inescapably emotional and human decision-making and behavior are hardly ever free of emotional influences point in this direction, this argument is not made here. One of the few authors who has taken steps in this direction is Haeney who has argued that emotions are "even more fundamental to *power-over*" (Heaney 2011, 271; emphasis in original) than they are for *power to*.

also affect various processes that help to determine the incentivizes an actor faces, for example information processing and the judgment of situations. In these cases, one would probably not say that behavior was driven by certain emotions, but that emotions played a role in the determinants of behavior, such as cognition, thinking and judgment.

Consequently, one way for actor A to make actor B behave in accordance with A's preferences is to manipulate B's emotions. This is illustrated in figure 4 where the emotions of actor B were added as another element in the power process. Between the independent variable of this process on the left and the dependent variable on the right, they represent an intervening variable that can be necessary to understand the power process. This variable has received little attention in the IR scholarship so far (though, as was mentioned before, this does not mean that it plays a role in all exercises of power or is always the sole determinant in exercises of power that involve the manipulation of emotions).

Figure 4: Power process involving emotions



This focus on emotions within the power process can be linked to the examples for power mechanisms that were presented above. Three of them will be looked at in more detail here: compulsion, the changing of preferences and social constitution. Another one – agenda setting - does not receive specific attention as it, arguably, difficult to link this mechanism to the manipulation of emotions.

The first mechanism, compulsion, describes the process of A making B act according to A's preferences and against B's will. Once emotions are taken into account, this mechanism describes A's manipulation of B's emotions in a fashion that gets B to act in a way it would

prefer not to. At the core of this process lie emotions that can have a compulsive effect on behavior. This process is easier to imagine for negative emotions, such as fear, than for positive emotions[31]. A robber who threatens a victim with a weapon changes the victim's first order preference about whether to acquiesce to the robber's demands yet not the second-order preference about which first order preference to have. In other words: through fear the victim is forced to act in a way they would rather not act in.

The idea that emotions can exert a compulsive influence over the behavior of individuals is well-established. Frijda refers to this phenomenon as the "control precedence" of emotions, for example over the direction of attention, cognitive processes, the interpretation of information and behavior. To him, this control precedence is "the hallmark of passion" (Frijda 2007, 28) and gives emotions an "imperative character" (Frijda 2013, 5). It does not necessarily manifest itself in an urgency to act; it can also lead to inaction, for example through stiffness in the face of a threat. And it even applies to emotions that do not involve the pressure to act, to become inactive or some other kind of urgency. One example that Frijda provides is nostalgia: it may not result in action, but it may overcome a person through a sudden rush and fully occupy the mind (Frijda 2013, 6).

In extreme situations, the control precedence of emotions can lead to behavior that is the result of compulsive short-term preferences. It is intentional, but only in a narrow way. For example, a person driven by fear away from a threat does act intentional, but only in regards to the immediate goal of escaping the threat, yet possibly without any intention as to where safety might be sought. Elster describes this mode of behavior as "action without choice" and "intentional but not guided by consequences" (Elster 1999b, 155). Fear is only one of

[31] The closest term available to describe compulsive positive emotions might be that of seduction. The term implies actor A getting actor B to behave in ways that actor B would otherwise not desire to; and while the connotation of seduction is generally negative, it generally involves an emotional component and a form of attraction.

numerous emotions that can have this effect. Anger, pain, the desire for revenge, shame and sexual arousal can exert a compulsive control precedence. In all these cases, it is imaginable that the individual experiencing these emotions would rather not have the intentions that result from them.

A similar argument about the role of emotions – and their manipulation – can be made for another power mechanism: the changing of preferences. Especially the fields of consumer science and marketing have produced a variety of studies about changing preferences through the manipulation of emotions. One focal point has been the question how consumers can be brought into a positive emotional state in order to improve product perceptions and produce intended behavior, for example purchasing decisions. Among the means that have been researched for this purpose are ambient odors in shopping malls (Chebat and Michon 2003), the availability of premium services such as VIP areas (Pullman and Gross 2004), the importance of aesthetics and usability for online stores (Porat and Tractinsky 2012), music during waiting periods in service environments (Hui, Dube, and Chebat 1997), and music and its relation to the perception of shopping times (Yalch and Spanenberg 2000).

More complex is the link between the exercise of power through social constitution on the basis of influencing emotions[32]. One approach to this process can be found in the idea of emotional regimes. This concept has been utilized by a number of sociologists, historians and anthropologists and is, at its most basic, defined as "the social expectations regarding adequate emotional expression in any given context" (Gonzalez 2012, 1). Most prominent

[32] In the context of Foucault's conception of power, the fourth face of power and the idea that power can constitute individuals, it makes sense to speak of "influencing emotions" instead of "manipulating emotions". As was explained earlier, this form of power focuses on structures, not actors. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to speak of "manipulating" emotions as this implies some form of activity and intentionality. A better term to describe how this form of power utilizes emotions is therefore "influencing".

in the literature on emotional regimes are the writings of Reddy who emphasizes that emotional regimes may differ in their content and degree of strictness, but always regulate which emotions can and cannot be expressed in certain situations. Emotional regimes are therefore normative and prescriptive; they demand conformity and sanction defiance (Reddy 2001, 125, 129)[33].

His analysis centers on the emotional regimes in France during the 18th and 19th century, on the emotional suffering they caused and on the ways in which they underpinned the political regimes of the time. Prior to the French Revolution in 1789, a new sentimentalism and an "enthusiasm for emotional expression and intimacy" (Reddy 2001, 146) clashed with the existing emotional as well as political regime. The result was a revolution in both the political as well as the emotional sphere. Yet the new regimes of political and emotional freedom equally led to suffering and collapsed in failure. Subsequently, another emotional regime was established around 1794 which was characterized by a "new pessimism about the role of emotions in human life" (Reddy 2001, 147).

As Reddy writes, emotional regimes usually coincide with political regimes, and leaders "must display mastery of this style; those who fail to conform may be marginalized or

[33] The concept stands in a wider discourse on the social regulation of emotions. A similar concept was developed later on by Rosenwein under the title of "emotional communities". She criticized Reddy's notion of emotional regimes for its inability to account for the simultaneous existence of multiple emotional rulesets as well as its reliance on modern constructs such as the nation state. From Rosenwein's perspective, the idea of an emotional regime is therefore not appropriate to analyze the emotional standards of earlier time periods and their multitude in any given context (Rosenwein 2016, 10–11). But as pointed out elsewhere, this criticism might be based on a narrow reading of Reddy's work. Additionally, and as pointed out by Boddice, the concept of emotional regimes "essentially does the same job as the emotional community, but with a stronger focus on the power dynamic that gives emotional prescriptions within a given community their necessary weight" (Boddice 2016, 22). For these reasons, Reddy's idea of emotional regimes was chosen for this analysis instead of Rosenwein's concept of emotional communities. Independent of that, the differences are probably neglectable for the purposes of this study, just as the various terms used in the literature – emotional community, emotional regime, and emotional style – can be seen as overlapping and having no fixed definitions (Gammerl 2012).

severely sanctioned" (Reddy 2001, 121). This idea hints at the potential for exploring emotional regimes in IR. Obviously, there is no singular political regime on the international level that is comparable to the structures of nation states. At the same time, the idea of an international community or international society that regulates itself through rules and norms is widely established – which may hint at the existence of an international emotional regime that shapes behavior on the international stage.

Little research has been done in this area, but it is easy to imagine situations in which the emotional regime of the international society could become visible. For example, natural disasters in one country routinely result in expressions of compassion and condolences by politicians in other countries. In the same vein, terrorist attacks in one country are commonly answered by expressions of shock, grief and resolve. The absence of these emotional reactions – or the expression of other emotions, such as joy in the face of natural disasters – would go against this regime and most likely be sanctioned by the international community. Of course, one could easily dismiss these expressions of compassion or grief as nothing but diplomatic routine and not representative of any underlying emotions. But as Hall has already argued, there are equally good reasons to assume that this form of "emotional diplomacy" does actually involve real emotions (Hall 2015, 17).

Many of the mechanisms through which the *power over* can be exercised can therefore utilize the manipulation of emotions, as was shown here for compulsion, the changing of preferences and social constitution. It is straightforward to see how this process unfolds on the level of individuals and the emotions they experience. It has also been explained, on the foundation of Intergroup Emotions Theory, how the same logic applies to groups of individuals who experience emotions based on their social identities. The target of the manipulation of emotions and the power process can therefore be a single individual as well as groups of individuals.

Yet it is not yet clear how the link from group-based emotions to nation states, the main object of study in IR, can be made. After all, states are usually not described as mere groups of people. At the same time, they are collective actors – and in that sense they are, at the most basic level, groups of people. It is therefore worth pondering whether concepts such as group-based emotions can easily be applied to states. One approach to dealing with the collective nature of nation states has been outlined by Sasley. He, too, approached the issue of emotions in IR on the basis of Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Emotions Theory. As he argues for the leap from groups to states:

> A state is of course a large and complex entity. But it is still a group. As such, the sense of belonging to the state means that citizens of the state, including decision makers, share in their psychological–emotional identification with the group enough to react as a group to an event or development. In turn, this impacts on foreign policies. (Sasley 2011, 465)

Following this logic, the state is simply a very large group. What applies to the group-based emotions of soccer fans and their emotions therefore also applies to nation states. This has been echoed in the example of "China reacts with anger" in the previous section: once a significant number of individuals who consider themselves as members of the Chinese group react with anger, the state as a whole can be said to react with anger. The emotions of states can, according to this conceptualization, be found in their members. They do not transcend them, even if they are based on the social identities of group members and not on their individual identities. And once a significant number of the individuals who make up a group experience a certain emotion, it can be argued that the group as a whole experiences it.

As Sasley continues, we can expect this to hold true in particular whenever a group clearly distinguishes itself from another group, for example in situations of conflict. And we can expect that the leaders or decision makers within a group are especially likely to be so-called high identifiers with that group: individuals with a strong social identity as members of that group. These lead, act and react in the name of the state, they represent the state within the group as well as towards the outside, and they are particularly often in contact with the representatives of other groups. But while they may differ from other group members (and the wider public) in terms of their position and function as well as their likelihood to be high identifiers, they still hold the same social identity and experience the same group-based emotions.

Following this model of the state as a group, it is possible to examine the emotions of a state by looking at its leaders and decision makers. Not only do they have a high likelihood to experience these group-based emotions, they are also the most relevant group members for the purpose of analyzing how emotions affect state behavior and policy making. Sasley's conclusion is therefore that "researchers need not examine the emotions and behavior of every member of the group—they can focus on these state leaders" (Sasley 2011, 468). This focus on a few members does not imply that they are the only group members who experience group-based emotions or that only their emotions matter; it rather assumes that state leaders reproduce the emotions of the state as a group through the statements and policy decisions they make. In that sense, the number of individuals that are significant for examining a state's emotions can be relatively small (Sasley 2013)[34].

[34] While Sasley states that the analytical focus of his approach lies exclusively on leaders and decision makers, some of his other writings imply that the analysis of the larger group and society as a whole also has its place. He distinguishes his approach clearly from those that focus exclusively on decision makers and argues in the same text that "it requires a study of society as well as of the individual leaders who decide for it" (Sasley 2013). It is not entirely clear whether his statement about the analytical focus on state leaders is thereby invalidated.

This conception of state emotions is only one among several. As Sasley himself outlines, there are at least two alternative answers to the question of where we can locate and analyze the emotions of states (Sasley 2013). One of them follows the approach of Foreign Policy Analysis and the assumption that the behavior of states is best understood by looking at decision makers as well as the organizational processes that surround them. Hand in hand with that goes attention to the personalities and emotional experiences of the relevant individuals (Breuning 2007, 46). The emotions of a state are thereby equated with the emotions that its elites experience or display. They are not only seen as representatives of emotions in the larger group, as is the case in Sasley's own approach, but as the only group members whose emotions are of interest. The group members not part of elite and decision making circles are assigned little or no relevance at all.

One example for this approach can be seen in Hymans' work on nuclear proliferation. He explains the decisions of countries to indigenously develop nuclear weapons on the basis of their leaders' national identity conceptions, and especially so in relation to other states of particular relevance for these leaders. These national identity conceptions spawn specific emotions, some of which – and in particular the combination of fear and pride – can induce "emotional impulsions" (Hymans 2006, 35) that motivate the decision to acquire nuclear weapons. For Hymans, the most relevant variable in this process are the national identity conceptions and emotions of leaders; the larger public and the collective emotions outside of elite circles receive little attention (Hymans 2006, 45–46).

Another variant of this leadership-centric approach is on display in Hall's works on emotions in international relations. He focuses on the display of emotions by states and conceptualized them as the result of "politically sophisticated actors operating in strategically oriented, institutionalized decision-making environments" (Hall 2015, 9). When we see,

for example, a display of anger by the Chinese government, this is a coordinated performance of foreign policy elites in Beijing, for example in the form of official statements and policy decisions. This display can be motivated by genuine emotions of the participating individuals, but it does not have to be. In the case of anger, to pick but one example, the purpose of this display is to signal to other actors that that a violation of norms and acceptable behavior has occurred (Hall 2011).

Both Sasley's group-centric approach as well as the decision maker-centric approach of Hymans and Hall conceptualize the emotions of states as a phenomenon that takes place on the level of individuals, even if they are members of larger collectives. The third approach to the emotions of states takes a different path. It conceives the emotions of a state not as an experience of individual members of that state, but as a collective phenomenon that transcends individuals. This path was taken by Mercer who argues that the emotions of a state "cannot be reduced to the individual experience of emotion" (Mercer 2014, 516). He speaks therefore of group emotions (not just group-based emotions) that can be causally attributed to individuals but have an ontological existence of their own. In this regard, emotions are similar to norms and culture: they are "neither identical to, nor wholly autonomous from, the individuals who constitute them" (Mercer 2014, 521).

The title of the article in which Mercer advances this idea – "Feeling like a state" – thus ascribes a collective personhood to states. This aligns with Wendt's (2004) observation that we, which includes both the public as well as the academic discourse, commonly refer to the state as if it were a person. This includes the attribution of various human characteristics to states, from identities to goals and emotions. On this basis, Wendt reasons about the possibility of understanding the state as a collective organism with a collective consciousness. This conception of the state and its emotions is obviously different from the previous two approaches. Hall, for example, rejects this approach: "Because states are collective,

institutional actors, one cannot claim that they feel angry—again, they do not have a coherent body capable of feeling anything" (Hall 2011, 532).

The research presented here roughly follows the first approach as outlined by Sasley: it perceives the state as a group of individuals which harbor the same – or at least a similar – social identity and thereby experience collective emotions. These collective, group-based emotions are what is referred to as the emotions of the state. Where this study diverges from Sasley's approach is in the analytical focus. Instead of paying attention exclusively to state leaders, as he proposes, it is assumed that relevant emotions can also exist beyond the elites. The collective emotions within the group become state emotions once they are significant for the state's behavior, independent of where they occur. If collective emotions do not translate into state behavior, they cannot be state emotions; the state, after all (and in contrast to what Mercer and Wendt propose) does not have a consciousness that could produce them independent of individuals.

The rejection of the state leader-centric approach (and from Sasley's focus on analyzing them) has two reasons. For one, it is assumed that the collective emotions within a state can become relevant even if state leaders do not share them. Once again, the example of the Franco-Prussian war illustrates this: the French government was urged to declare war on Prussia by public outrage, yet the decision makers did not necessarily share this outrage. In the words of Emperor Napoleon III: "even if we had no admissible excuse for war, we should be obliged none the less to make up our minds to it, in order to comply with the will of the country" (as quoted in Olliver 1914, 321). Secondly, the manipulation of emotions for the purpose of exercising power can not only target decision makers but also the public. While a focus on state leaders may therefore be warranted in many situations, it is most likely not always sufficient to comprehend the emotions of a state and their link to state behavior and the exercise of power.

Also rejected here is the conception of state emotions as a phenomenon that transcends individuals and is not only group-based but takes place on the level of the group. The problem of this approach: it is largely speculative, provides us with little guidance on how and where to look for the collective emotions of the state as a person, and has (to the knowledge of the author) so far not been employed for any empirical studies that truly seek emotions on a level that transcends individuals.

In summary, this study therefore understands states as groups of individuals. These individuals experience emotions not only as individuals, but also on the basis of their social identities and the identification with a state. Once these group-based emotions are experienced by individuals who are significant for the behavior of a state, we can say that this state is experiencing emotions. These emotions shape the cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior of the individuals that experience them – and, subsequently, of the state. The focus of this study lies on how these state emotions are manipulated by other states in order to produce behavior that suits their interests.

IV. Methodology & Case Study Selection

On the foundations laid in the previous chapter, the link between the exercise of power and the manipulation of emotions in IR will be illustrated through several case studies. The goal of each of these case studies is to showcase through the analysis of a historical episode how the manipulation of an actor's emotions plays a role in changing that actor's behavior, and thereby in the exercise of power. As has to be emphasized upfront, these case studies are each linked but not necessarily limited to a particular emotion. Many real-world events can be interpreted as involving various emotions at the same time. The case studies are meant to single out one emotion that is assumed to have been particularly relevant in the respective context.

The selection of the historical episodes that underpin the case studies was guided by the ambition to find examples in which the role of emotions in the process of exercising power is distinctively visible, and where empirical evidence suggests that the manipulation of emotions played a causal role in this process. The underlying ambition is not to prove the existing narratives and explanations of these events wrong - a task that would go beyond the scope of this study. The case studies merely aim to shine a light on an aspect of the events in question that receives little or no attention at all in the existing literature, and to make a case for its relevance. Against this background, the historical episodes that underpin these case studies were chosen with several criteria in mind.

First, all case studies focus on the exercise of power by one nation state over another nation state. The reason for this focus on nation states is straightforward: they are commonly assumed to be the primary actors in international relations. This provides the easiest way to engage with the IR mainstream. A second criterium for the selection of the case studies was the intentional exercise of power. There is, as was explained in the previous chapter,

not general agreement about whether the concept of *power over* should describe only intentional exercises of power or also include the unintentional exercise of power. Yet the understanding of power in this study as well as the case studies conceptualize power as a process driven by intentional actions. This focus on intentional exercises of power ensures the selection of historical episodes in which the link between power and emotions cannot easily rejected as a collateral consequence or simply luck.

The last criterium based on which the case studies were selected is the ambition to illustrate the relevance of a diverse set of emotions for exercises of power. The historical episodes in focus were therefore chosen with the ambition to present different emotions. The following case studies therefore deal with relatively intuitive emotions, such as fear and anger, but also with more complex phenomena that involve emotions, such as shock. Through these choices, this study aims to deal with emotions that already feature in the IR literature, such as fear, but also with phenomena that have not yet received much attention.

The examination of these cases does not restrict itself to a single level of analysis. As the afore-mentioned case of Bismarck's provocation of a war with France illustrates, the exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions can take place on several levels simultaneously, and the processes on these levels can influence one another. Whereas the example of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 was set in motion by Bismarck as an individual, it incited French public opinion, and therefore unfolded its influence on the collective level. Neither the general argument made here nor the specific case studies are therefore tied to a single of the levels of analysis as they are commonly used in IR scholarship.

Similar to Hall's (2015) case studies on displays of emotional diplomacy, the case studies will rely on a descriptive-interpretive approach that aims at the triangulation of evidence from various sources. These will include second-hand accounts from the academic literature and, where possible, first-hand accounts of the involved actors (biographies, reports,

speeches, memorandums, etc.). The goal is to provide a narrative that goes beyond what has been presented in the work of authors such as Petersen (2011) whose formalized treatment of power and emotions in a game-theoretical model was criticized for neglecting the "ideological and discursive schemas" behind the events and "the constant feedback among emotion, belief, and action" (Wertheim 2012).

At the same time, this approach does not claim the ability to provide absolute proof for the existence of specific exercises of power and the causal relevance of specific emotions. Neither power nor emotions and their effects on cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior are visible to the naked eye, after all. The goal of the case studies is therefore not to provide an objective, positivist account of the events in question, but merely – and like all interpretive inquiry – one that is "worthy of trust and written up convincingly" yet remains "open to alternate or more expansive interpretations" (Angen 2000, 392). This process inevitably goes beyond what is visible in historical records and relies on interpretation.

In this sense, the approach taken in this study represents the notion of heuristic research. As Diesing defines the term, it describes a "loosely systematic procedure for investigation or inquiry that gives good results eventually and on the whole, but does not guarantee them in any particular case and certainly cannot promise 'optimum' results" (Diesing 2017, 15). This form of research cannot always rely on guiding rules as the descriptions of power and emotions inevitably rely on interpretations on the side of the researcher. What counts as evidence, what conclusions are drawn and what is considered as truth "ultimately can be accredited only on the ground of personal knowledge and judgment" (Moustakas 1990, 33).

At the bottom of this methodological approach lies the assumption that the emotions relevant in a given situation – and regardless of whether they are of an individual or collective nature – are accessible for outside observers. While emotions per se may be invisible, they are among the factors that shape decisions and become thereby discernable in behavior.

This approach follows the logics of Classical Pragmatism and Symbolic Interactionism, and the assumption that the ideas that motivate behavior become accessible by focusing on their practical consequences. In other words: emotions cause behavior, and as different emotions cause different behavioral patterns, the observation and interpretation of behavior allows for inferences about the underlying emotions (Fields, Copp, and Kleinman 2006, 173–74; Hochschild 2012, 28–29; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2006).

V. Shock

1. Shock to Surrender: The US and Japan

The first case study concerns itself with the shock created by the two nuclear bombs dropped by the United States on Japan during the last days of World War II in August 1945. A few months earlier, in May of that year, Nazi Germany had surrendered to the Allied powers. The focus of the war therefore shifted to the Pacific theater and the struggle against Japan. At the Potsdam Conference in July and August, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China presented the Japanese government with a choice: to accept "unconditional surrender" or to face "prompt and utter destruction" (National Diet Library of Japan 2003)[35]. The Japanese government ignored this ultimatum and issued no official response. For US President Truman this was not a surprise. He did not expect the Japanese to accept the offer, as he wrote in his diary the day before. The declaration was merely a final chance for the Japanese to change course – and a final warning that would justify the use of nuclear weapons (Truman 1945a).

Eleven days after the Potsdam Declaration, on August 6 the United States dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima. Three days later, another and even more destructive nuclear bomb

[35] Although among the victorious powers of the Second World War, the Soviet Union did not sign the Potsdam Declaration, as the message to Japan became known as. Formally, the country was still bound to the neutrality act it had signed with Japan in 1941. Signing the declaration would therefore represented a declaration of war. Historical records suggest that the Soviet delegation to the Potsdam Conference was willing to take this step and participate in a declaration demanding unconditional surrender from Japan. Yet the signatories of the Potsdam Declaration did not involve the Soviet delegation in the drafting process of the document and did not seek its signature. This was driven by strategic considerations on the American side: keeping the Soviet Union out of the loop would allow the US to issue a final warning to Japan, acquire a justification for dropping a nuclear bomb and allow it to end the war against Japan on its own terms before the Soviet Union would even declare war (Hasegawa 2005, 156, 161).

was dropped on Nagasaki. Less than a week after this second explosion, the Japanese government announced its surrender and acceptance of the conditions set out in the Potsdam Declaration (with some reservations regarding the future of the Japanese monarchy). This decision was, at least in part, the result of the destructiveness on display[36]. Ever since, nuclear bombs have therefore become a symbol of ultimate material power. Yet this focus on the damage done by the bombs, the hundreds of thousands of casualties they caused and the devastation they left in Hiroshima and Nagasaki leaves little space for another aspect of these weapons: their emotional impact.

This is not to say that this psychological dimension has not been taken into account by established narratives about the events in August 1945. Numerous authors have argued that the effect of the two nuclear bombs was just as much of a psychological nature as it was material (Asada 1998), and that American decision makers were intent on maximizing this psychological impact, even at the cost of the bombs' material effect (Alperovitz 1995, 523–24; McNelly 2000). These arguments are usually made without explicit reference to emotions, yet the relevance of emotions is implied in phrases such as that the atomic bombs were meant "to shock them to surrender" (Rhodes 1986, 697) and that they "succeeded in […] shocking Japan into surrender" (Freedman and Dockrill 2004, 80). This study therefore takes these accounts as a starting point for a more extensive exploration of and emphasis on the role that the manipulation of emotions played during this exercise of power.

In theoretical terms, the dropping of the nuclear bombs represents an exercise of power by the United States over Japan. It was intentional, successful and achieved the American goal

[36] It is a matter of ongoing dispute whether the nuclear bombs or the Soviet declaration of war against Japan on August 8th – and therefore between the detonations of the two nuclear bombs - was the decisive reason for the decision to surrender. This study follows the more common narrative according to which the nuclear bombs provided the decisive impulse. The dispute about this question will be briefly elaborated on at the end of this chapter.

of making Japan do something it would otherwise not have done: surrender. The mechanism at play was that of compulsion. Not only did Japan do something it would otherwise not have done, it did so against its will and because the consequences of non-compliance were seen as not bearable. And as this case study illustrates, this compulsion took place on the basis of creating a particular emotion: shock.

The focus of this case study lies therefore on the concept of shock. In its common use, the term is usually not understood as describing an emotion. Yet various scholars have referred to shock as an emotion, among them Frijda who links it to the action tendency of "interruption" and considers "reorientation" the purpose of shock (Frijda 1986, 88; TenHouten 2007, 89; Zammuner and Frijda 1994). Even under the assumption that shock is not an emotion in itself, it is telling that the term is usually defined through terms that either describe emotions or emphasize the emotional nature of shock. One example is the definition of shock as "a sudden emotional disturbance" (R. C. Solomon 2008, 205) or "affective reaction" (TenHouten 2017, 98), another one the idea that shock simply describes the combination of surprise and disgust (TenHouten 2007, 89–90).

Apart from the reference to shock as an emotion or an emotional phenomenon, what unites many definitions of the term is that they refer to it as a reaction to something that is not only unanticipated but also negative. TenHouten has therefore described shock as a reaction to an event that is "unacceptable, even disgusting, and which diminishes one's personal and/or social identity" (TenHouten 2017, 98) or to "violations of one's territorial domain or of one's sociomoral boundaries" (TenHouten 2013, 21). Yet there are also exceptions to the idea that shock refers only to events that are undesirable. Frijda, for example, refers to shock simply as the "response to something sudden" (Frijda 1986, 79), independent whether it is positive or negative.

The terminology surrounding shock is anything but clear. Most authors consider surprise an element of shock; others see shock and surprise as different outcomes of a similar process. Following this logic, Ortony et al. describe both shock and surprise as the result of an unanticipated event. If this event is undesirable, the result is shock; if it is desirable, the result is surprise (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1990, 126). Lastly, shock has also been described as a phenomenon that produces and stimulates emotions, either positive or negative, but does not describe an emotional phenomenon in its own right. In the words of TenHouten, shock represents therefore a disturbance of emotions and it is possible to "shock the emotions" (TenHouten 2007, 90, 2013, 21).

Shock has also been linked to a number of other emotions. Disgust was already mentioned above as a potential foundation of shock. Two other emotions that have been linked to shock are fright and fear. As Casimir argues, the former is the immediate reaction to the shock of a dangerous situation and usually results in either startlement or flight. If the source of danger and cause of the initial shock persist, the outcome can be fear (Casimir 2009, 60). Another emotion that has been presented as a product of shock is resentment. As TenHouten theorizes, resentment occurs in reaction to shocking violations of social and moral standards. Yet shock alone is not sufficient as a foundation for resentment; it also requires contempt and outrage (TenHouten 2013, 21–22).

Against the backdrop of these disagreements, this study strives to follow an intuitive understanding of shock. It considers shock as an emotion that occurs in reaction to an unanticipated event which is perceived to be negative. Following Frijda's conception of shock, the immediate effect of shock is the interruption of a present state. The purpose and the end result of shock are "reorientation" and an adaptation to the shock-producing circumstances (Frijda 1986, 88). Shock can go hand in hand with other emotions, such as disgust, fear and resentment, but a universal and clear causal link is not assumed here.

With this conception of shock as an emotion in mind, this case study is intended to showcase how American decision-makers intended to exercise power over Japan by creating the greatest possible shock; and how the shock of the atomic bombs played a role in convincing the Japanese leadership to accept and admit defeat (even though this shock it not necessarily the only factor that led to the Japanese surrender). Support for this argument can be found both in American considerations prior to the dropping of the bombs as well as in the Japanese reactions afterwards.

That the nuclear bombs were intended to have not only a material impact but also an emotional effect is visible in various documents and statements detailing the preparations of the atomic bombs' use in the United States. As Leslie Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project, outlines in his biography, the primary target of the atomic bomb was meant to be "the will of the Japanese people to continue the war" (Groves 1962, 267). The effect on the country's military capacity was only a secondary consideration. Alperovitz (1995, 165) and Strong (2005, 17) equally made the argument that Japan's military situation was perceived as so desolate and the American public so war-weary by decision makers in Washington, D.C. that a massive shock was perceived as both urgently necessary and sufficient to push the country into surrender.

Memorandums from meetings of the committee tasked with selecting potential targets for the bombs in Spring and Summer 1945 illustrate this argument. Both military officers and scientists working on the Manhattan Project took part there. As the notes from a meeting on May 11 and 12 show, the potential psychological impact of dropping the bombs on various cities was given "great importance", with "the greatest psychological effect against Japan" and the image created in the international public being important considerations. The detonations had to be "sufficiently spectacular" (National Security Archive 1945d, 6). Among the possible destinations for the atomic bomb, Kyoto stood therefore at the top of

the list of potential targets as of May 1945 due to the effect that the city's devastation was assumed to have on the Japanese elites and decision-makers (National Security Archive 1945d, 5). The city was seen as the country's intellectual center with people "being more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon" (National Security Archive 1945d, 6)[37].

Similar considerations were made in a meeting on May 31 of the so-called Interim Committee, which followed up on the target selection committee and was run by Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War. As the memorandum states, the participants concluded that "we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many inhabitants [of Japan] as possible" (National Security Archive 1945c, 14). In the same meeting, Robert Oppenheimer, the head of the Los Alamos Laboratory which ran the Manhattan Project, "stated that the visual effect of an atomic bomb would be tremendous". It "would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet" (National Security Archive 1945c, 13). At the same time, it was emphasized in the meeting that the bomb's effect on Japan's military capabilities would "not be much different" (National Security Archive 1945c, 13–14) from the damages the ongoing air campaigns with conventional weapons were already causing.

The American perception at the time was that a further extension of conventional warfare would be insufficient to force Japan into surrender. As General George C. Marshall, at the time the Army's Chief of Staff, was quoted: "It destroyed the Japanese cities, yes, but their morale was not affected as far as we could tell, not at all" (as quoted in Mosley 1982, 337).

[37] Ultimately, Kyoto was not chosen as a target for the atomic bombs. Various explanations for this decision focus on the lack of military targets in Kyoto. These accounts have been called into question as the bomb's ultimate destinations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were equally large civilian centers. An alternative explanation is that Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War at the time, took Kyoto off the list due to personal sentimentalities for a city he had visited several times himself, possible even for his honeymoon (Wellerstein 2014).

As even large-scale material destruction did not yield the intended results, the need for a different approach became apparent in order to destroy Japanese morale and evoke a change of stance. To Marshall, "it seemed quite necessary, if we could, to shock them into action" (as quoted in Mosley 1982, 337).

As the reasoning behind the selection of Kyoto as a potential target already implies, the target of these shocks was, first and foremost, the Japanese elite. Stimson therefore wrote of a "shock on the Japanese ruling oligarchy" with the goal of "strengthening the position of those who wished peace" (Stimson 1947, 105). The goal was to create a window of opportunity for the liberal forces among Japan's elites to push for surrender – a position that was markedly different from Stimson's perception of Nazi Germany where he did not even see a liberal element among those in power that could be targeted (Winters 2009, 106).

These ambitions had practical implications in the weeks before the atomic bombs were dropped in August 1945. Several meetings of the Interim Committee concluded that the Japanese could not be given any warning prior to the deployment of the bomb (National Security Archive 1945c, 14, 1945a, 1). Furthermore, there should be "no revelation to Russia or anyone else [...] until the first bomb had been successfully laid on Japan" (National Security Archive 1945b, 2), as Stimson argued in front of President Truman. In the run-up to the deployment of the atomic bombs, even the dropping of leaflets with warnings over Japanese cities was stopped in order to maximize the surprise of the explosions (McNelly 2000, 138). Stimson explained in a meeting with Truman also his worries about the large-scale bombardment of the cities designated as potential targets for the atomic bomb with conventional weapons. As he worried, too much destruction might rob the bomb of a "fair background to show its strength" (National Security Archive 1945b, 3).

It is noteworthy that during the process leading up to the deployment of the atomic bombs all kinds of other considerations were made about how to maximize their psychological

impact. Among these was the idea to drop multiple bombs simultaneously on different targets, which ultimately was not feasible (Strong 2005, 3). Another idea implied by Oppenheimer in a phone call with Groves was to emphasize the bomb's visual effect by dropping it at night, which was "very desirable" but "unfortunately" not possible to ensure the safety of the plane carrying the bomb (as quoted in Reed 2013, 394). Even the palace of the Japanese Emperor was taken into consideration as a target. It had "a greater fame than any other target" (National Security Archive 1945d, 6), yet there was little strategic value to bombing it. This idea never made it beyond the target selection committee.

With an eye on these assumptions made on the American side, Freedman therefore speaks of a strategy of shock. During their deliberations on "the most effective use of the bomb", policy makers and generals concluded that its deployment should not aim for a maximization of destruction but rather be "aimed at maximizing its shock value" (Freedman 1978, 77). As Stimson concluded two years later, "the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon" (Stimson 1947, 103). His Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, made the same argument in hindsight. He emphasized the element of surprise as an integral part of the bomb's effect and concluded that there "has never been a surprise to equal it since the Trojan horse" (as quoted in Newman 1995, 103).

This is not to say that no other considerations were made about the nuclear bombs, aside from their emotional impact. Among the targets taken into consideration were also several that had, first and foremost, strategic value. Among those were Yokohama as an industrial area, the Kokura arsenal which produced heavy weapons, and Niigata with its large port (National Security Archive 1945d, 5). Yet urban centers were at the top of the list of potential targets. Rather oddly, President Truman wrote in his diary about the desire to avoid

civilian casualties. Ten days before the first bomb was dropped, he penned down that the target "will be a purely military one" (Truman 1945a)[38].

Nevertheless, the statements, documents and recollections above indicate that American policy makers, scientists and generals perceived the atomic bomb as a weapon that would have its effect not only on the material level but also in the realm of emotions. The core ingredients of shock, that is: surprise and the evocation of fear and terror, are visible in the American considerations about the deployment of the bomb. Obviously, this is only the American perspective. Whether the atomic bomb actually had the intended effect on the Japanese side is another question.

Statements by some of those who were present when the decision to surrender was made indicate that the atomic bomb had a psychological impact on the policy makers in Tokyo. Obviously, there was no physical impact to expect as both Hiroshima and Nagasaki are several hundred kilometers away from Tokyo. Yet the statements of the decision makers in the Japanese capital about their memories are indicative. In an interview conducted in November 1945, the Emperor's closest advisor Kōichi Kido spoke of a "psychological moment" and a "psychological shock" (as quoted in Asada 1998, 498) that enabled the push for surrender, against the intentions of the military leadership. This surprise and shock are also visible in other statements. Kawabe Torashiro, at the time the Japanese Army's Deputy Chief, reminisced that a "surprise attack with this new weapon was beyond our wildest dreams" (as quoted in Asada 1998, 504–5).

[38] Even after tens of thousands of civilians in Hiroshima had died, he announced to the American public in a radio speech on August 9th that "the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base" and that "we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians" (Truman 1945b).

The element of surprise is equally emphasized by historians. While Japan was aware of the possibility and potential of nuclear fission, even scientists tasked with the development of new weapons were unaware that the United States had developed and was in possession of atomic bombs (De Groot 2004, 92–93). The effect of the Manhattan Project's extensive secrecy was therefore that the atomic explosions came as a complete surprise to the Japanese people and leadership[39]. While the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War was seen in Tokyo as a possibility that could turn the tide against Japan, nuclear warfare was not among the factors taken into consideration in Tokyo (Hatano 2007, 95; Asada 1998, 504).

With the factional conflicts within Japan's political and military leadership in mind, Butow has made the argument that the shock of the atomic bombs enabled one faction among Japan's decision makers to overrule the other and thereby to push for surrender:

> The real significance of the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet clash into Manchuria was that these events produced a shock great enough to [...] force everyone [...] to acknowledge a fact which could no longer be denied. It was not that the military men had suddenly become reasonable [...] it was rather that they, like the machinery of government with which they had been tinkering, had momentarily been caught off balance. (Butow 1954, 180)

[39] While the history and unfolding of the Manhattan Project are not per se part of the decision-making process behind the atomic bombs' deployment, they are nevertheless instructive for how the United States intended to use them. As Groves wrote in his memoirs, among the overarching goals of the Manhattan Project's secrecy was "to ensure a complete surprise when the bomb was first used in combat" (Groves 1962, 141).

Similar words were chosen by Freedman and Dockrill to characterize the impact of the atomic bombs on Japan's decision makers. They were "caught off guard by the news of Hiroshima and […] never recovered their balance" (Freedman and Dockrill 2004, 66).

These metaphors have to be interpreted in the context of how the military leadership what perceiving the country's situation vis-à-vis the United States. As Kantarō Suzuki, at the time Prime Minister of Japan, explained during interrogations in late 1945, the decision makers "did not believe that Japan could be beaten by air attack alone" (as quoted in Kort 1998, 358). Consequently, the military was expecting an American invasion of the Japanese mainland and preparing with all means available. When the nuclear bomb was dropped, this calculus about air attacks was proven to be wrong. And once it was obvious that the United States "need not land when it had such a weapon" (as quoted in Kort 1998, 358), the military's strategy for defending Japan fell apart.

A similar point was made in the report by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), a panel of experts tasked with (among other things) evaluating the effects of the atomic bombs on Japan. As one of the reports produced by the USSBS argues, the bombs were able "to break the deadlock within the government over acceptance of the Potsdam terms" (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 28). Among the reasons cited is that the superiority of the American forces on display allowed the Japanese government to surrender without embarrassing its military leadership. As Hisatsune Sakomizu, at the time the Prime Minister's chief secretary, is quoted in the report: "Without the atomic bomb it would be impossible for any country to defend itself against a nation which had the weapon" (as quoted in United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1947, 99), thus making it pointless to continue to fight.

Apart from the military leadership, which voiced opposition to surrendering and accepting the Potsdam terms until the very end, the atomic bomb's effect among the elites is primarily

linked to Emperor Hirohito. While Japan's head of state had for centuries taken a passive role in Japan's political dealings, he actively intervened twice during the last days of the war, urging the cabinet of Prime Minister Suzuki to surrender. This step has been interpreted as decisive for overcoming the military leadership's resistance (see Winters 2009, 107) – and as highly unusual. In the words of Edwin O. Reischauer, it represented "the one clear expression of a Japanese Emperor's will since ancient times" (as quoted in Butow 1954, vi).

The decision by the Emperor to leave behind the traditional political passivity of his office, to speak out and to oppose the military leadership has been linked by historians to the shock of the atomic bombing. In the words of Large, they created – together with the Soviet Union's entry into the Pacific War - "the extreme national emergency that made it possible for the Emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender" (Large 1992, 125). Or, in the more prosaic words of Winters:

> The sudden transformation of this conservative emperor into a revolutionary leader, seizing the entire nation's power, as well as its fate, in his own unaccustomed hands, had been effected by the shock of the American display of unraveling the tiny atom of uranium. (Winters 2009, 121)

The atomic bombs, obviously, not only affected the elites in Tokyo but, first and foremost, the civilian residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the surrounding areas. While the victims were not part of the decision-making process that led to Japanese surrender, their reactions are nevertheless illustrative for understanding the effects of the bombs. In the context of the USSBS, several hundred interviews were conducted in the affected areas in late 1945. Beyond the physical damage and suffering caused by the bombs, the panel's final report describes the primary reaction of survivors as "uncontrolled terror" and "sheer horror" (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 23) – but, curiously, also

admiration of the science underlying the technology of the bombs (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1947, 93–94).

Opinion surveys conducted before and after the dropping of the nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki furthermore indicate that they affected public opinion and morale, helping to convince significant parts of the affected populations that defeat was inevitable (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 24). It is noteworthy that these effects on morale and public perceptions were most pronounced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that they were significantly weaker as the distance to the two cities increased. The bomb's psychological impact was "subordinate to other demoralizing experiences" in areas not directly affected by the bombs, for example bombing with conventional weapons and deprivation (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 27). As the authors of the report argue, this can be explained with the already low morale in Japan at the time, the lack of understanding of the bomb's impact and the limited access to mass media (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1946, 26–27)[40].

Among the weapons available at the time, the nuclear bombs were therefore in a league of their own, chiefly because of the shock and fear they caused. The damage they caused in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was devastating yet did not add much that could not be achieved with conventional weapons, just as the American decision-makers had expected. Compared to the several dozen Japanese cities that experienced heavy air raids during the summer of 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki trail behind others in terms of civilian lives lost and in terms

[40] At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that Japan surrendered a mere nine days after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. Had this decision come later, the bombs' effects on the public morale might have been stronger as the information could have spread further (United States Strategic Bombing Survey Morale Division 1947, 100).

of square miles as well percentage of city area destroyed. The material damage of the nuclear bombs therefore is not in a league of its own, as for example Wilson (2013) emphasizes, yet the psychological impact the bombs had on the Japanese elites was.

One can therefore wonder whether this emotional impact could have been achieved without the material damage of the nuclear bombs. A demonstration of the technology's power over uninhabited territory or even the ocean could have been sufficiently shocking to have a similar effect on the Japanese leadership. This idea was proposed two months before the detonations, in June 1945, by a group of nuclear scientists in the so-called Franck Report. It argued against the use of nuclear weapons against Japan as this would damage the standing of the United States, make any regulation of the technology and its spread more difficult and potentially escalate into an arms race. Instead, it argued for a demonstration of the weapon "before the eyes of representatives of all United Nations, on the desert or a barren island" (Federation of American Scientists 1945), thereby sending a clear and ultimate warning towards Japan. This recommendation was ignored by the government.

The shock caused by the two nuclear bombs shaped American considerations about nuclear weapons and military strategy for years, and especially during the early years of the Cold War. In 1947, the government prepared a list of targets within the Soviet Union for atomic bombs in the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan BROILER. The selection of these targets was driven by the ambition to create "the maximum psychological effect of the atomic bomb" (as quoted in Herken 1988, 228). As the thinking behind the plan went, the shock, fear and hopelessness evoked by a nuclear explosion could quickly overwhelm Soviet morale. It was considered "logical to anticipate that this psychological effect, properly exploited, could become an important factor in the timing of … the cessation of hostilities" (as quoted in Herken 1988, 228).

The following plan, finalized in 1948 under the name HALFMOON (also known as FLEETWOOD), followed the same logic. Through the "destructive and psychological power of atomic weapons" (Herken 1988, 266) it was assumed that the Soviet Union could be dealt a sudden, decisive blow that would make protracted warfare with conventional weapons unnecessary[41].

Even after the end of the Cold War, when nuclear weapons and their threat lost much of their immediate relevance, the lessons learned from the shock imposed on Japan remained relevant. In 1996, a number of scholars proposed the concept of "shock and awe" as a doctrine for American military operations in the 21st century. The doctrine's goal is the establishment of what the authors refer to as rapid dominance through a fast and overwhelming display of military power. The mechanism of shock and awe: to "paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding of events so that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic levels". This approach was clearly inspired by the events in 1945. As the authors argue, shock and awe aims to impose "the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese" (Ullman and Wade, Jr. 1996, xxv–xxvi).

The concept received wide-spread attention during the runup and the early days of America's invasion of Iraq in 2003. While the government didn't explicitly speak of shock and awe, many statements by officials left the impression that a similar approach was being followed. Much of the media's reporting on the events in Iraq therefore used shock and awe as a catchphrase for the American strategy. In hindsight, this was probably not a correct

[41] These assumptions were not without critics: a report by General Hubert R. Harmon in 1949 cast doubt on the possible psychological effect of nuclear bombs on the Soviet Union and cautioned that, instead of destroying the Soviet morale, they might play into Moscow's propaganda and unify the people of the Soviet Union in opposition to the United States (Herken 1988, 294). Nevertheless, the BROILER and HALFMOON plans illustrate that the American government saw enormous psychological potential in nuclear weapons based on the experiences made in 1945.

assessment: whereas shock and awe calls for comprehensive and instantaneous strikes, the American invasion was largely sparing infrastructure and unfolded over a comparatively longer period of time. And just like the invasion did not live up to the concept's promise of a swift victory, it is doubtful whether the strategy of the United States caused either shock or awe (Correll 2003).

In conclusion, these historical episodes point towards the compulsive force that the evocation of shock can have in international affairs. As the example of the events in August 1945 shows, the atomic bombs dropped on Japan were an exercise of American power that took place not only through material destruction, but also through the manipulation of emotions. This psychological effect and the emotions it caused were an intended effect of the bombs, and they played a role in coercing the Japanese leadership into accepting defeat and surrender. The American deployment of the atomic bombs thereby created emotions on the Japanese side that made the country act in a way that America wanted it to, but that Japan itself did not want to. The mechanism at play in this exercise was therefore compulsion; it changed the first order preferences of the Japanese decision makers, but without changing their second order preferences; and the emotion at play was shock.

As has to be emphasized, this study does not make the claim that the atomic bombs were decisive in pushing Japan to surrender, but merely that they played a part. How the effect of the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki compares to the effect of the Soviet Union's entry into the Pacific War is a matter of dispute. Many historians perceive both events as factors that contributed to the surrender (see, for example, Hatano 2007). A number of revisionist voices dispute this account and point towards the decisive effect of the Soviet Union's declaration of war or argue that Japan would have surrendered soon anyway

(Alperovitz 1995; Hasegawa 2005; Wilson 2013). This case study sides with the mainstream account that perceives the atomic bombs as relevant for explaining Japan's surrender, even if they might not have been sufficient or even necessary to produce this decision.

VI. Fear

1. Stirring Fear: The US and West Germany

The second case study focuses on the emotion of fear – and, more specifically, the fear of abandonment – through which the United States dissuaded West Germany during the 1950s and 1960s from developing a nuclear deterrent of its own. While the German government saw the acquisition of nuclear weapons as necessary to ensure the country's security, it was perceived as potentially destabilizing for regional and even global stability in Washington, D. C. The administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson therefore utilized the institutional position of the United States in the security alliance with West Germany, which was in a situation of military dependency. By threatening to withdraw from the region, American diplomats stoked the German fear of abandonment, thereby producing a change of first order preferences in Bonn[42]. This example, too, represents the mechanism of compulsion at work.

This case study follows the argument made by Gerzhoy (2015) who utilized the example America's opposition to West Germany's nuclear ambitions to illustrate the concept of *alliance coercion*. His article utilizes neither the vocabulary of power nor emotions but implicitly references both. Especially the decisive role of emotions is evident in that the United States was able to exercise power by "manipulating the client's underlying fear of abandonment" (Gerzhoy 2015, 102), with West Germany being the client in this case. As Gerzhoy emphasizes, coercion – or, to use a different word: compulsion - was only part of a larger policy effort: the United States had to also "provide assurances that threats of aban-

[42] At the time of the events described in this case study, Bonn was the capital of West Germany. Berlin became the capital of Germany only after reunification in 1990.

donment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices" (Gerzhoy 2015, 102). Nevertheless, the manipulation of emotions and the creation of fear on the German side were a necessary element for the exercise of power in this case.

The historical context of the events is the period of German occupation by the Allied powers and the country's rearmament after World War II. Immediately after the surrender of Nazi Germany in May 1945, the occupation powers pursued a policy of complete demilitarization. This included the disbanding of all German military units and the dismantlement of much of its arms industry. But as the Cold War began to pick up steam and under the impression of events such as the Korean War (1950-1953), the Allied powers began the process of gradually rearming Germany.

In May 1955, the Paris Accords went into force which ended the occupation, gave West Germany "the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs" (CVCE 1952, 57), and made the country a member of the Western European Union as well as NATO. West Germany established its own armed forces and introduced military conscription, albeit the Paris agreements limited the size of the West German armed forces to 500.000 men. Furthermore, Germany agreed to not develop any nuclear, chemical or biological weapons on its territory. Importantly, this did not rule out the acquisition of these weapons from other states, their development outside its territory as well as their use.

The decade after German independence saw the Cold War heating up, most prominently through the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. West Germany, at the time, lay at the frontline between the two blocks and saw itself as militarily dependent on the United States. From the 1950s on and for several decades, it therefore hosted a quarter of a million American soldiers as well as American nuclear weapons (Kane 2005a; National Security Archive 1975c, 33). On the other side of the inner-German border, the Soviet Union tied together its satellite states in the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact in

1955. From this time on, around half a million Soviet soldiers as well as Soviet nuclear weapons were stationed in East Germany (Kowalczuk and Wolle 2010, 116; Uhl 2015, 143).

The conflictual relations of the great powers as well as the military situation at its border ignited the West German fear of abandonment. This feeling was stoked, in addition, when details about internal debates within the American government about massive troop reductions in Europe were reported in the press in 1956. As the argument went, a focus on nuclear weapons instead of large numbers of conventional troops would be cheaper to sustain and provide larger firepower. NATO estimates projected that, in case of warfare under these conditions, hundreds of nukes would be dropped on Germany, large parts of the country devastated and millions killed. The implication as seen in Bonn: "Germany might be abandoned if the strategy were not carried out, and destroyed if it were" (Schake 2004, 236; see also Bierling 2005, 113).

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer thus reminisced in his memoirs that these plans called into question whether the United States was a reliable partner. As he wrote, the presence of American troops was not only valuable from a military perspective. It was also a guarantee that the United States would live up to its alliance obligations. Any attack on West Germany would also hit American troops, thus drawing the United States into the conflict (Adenauer 1967, 199). He emphasized his worries in a conversation with the head of the CIA from which he quotes in his memoirs: "Die NATO wird schlecht behandelt" (NATO is being treated badly), "wird senil" (is growing senile) and "die Aussichten für die Zukunft sind schrecklich" (the prospects for the future are terrible) (Adenauer 1967, 213; translated from German by the author). Ultimately, the American plans to withdraw hundreds of thousands of soldiers were scrapped, yet the damage was done.

A core issue for Adenauer was that West Germany had little control over its own destiny. As he explained at a meeting of the national executive board of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the party he was heading, in September 1956, he came away from meetings with American officials with the impression that the United States cares exclusively about its own defense, not the defense of other countries. In this context, he described as "unerträglich" (unbearable) (Buchstab 1990, 1029; translated from German by the author) a situation in which only two countries control nuclear weapons and therefore the fate of all nations. To him, America was not reliable as a guarantor of West German safety – and if West Germany wanted to ensure its safety and gain control over its own fate, it would have to acquire nuclear forces of its own (Trachtenberg 1999, 232).

The fear of American abandonment was therefore a driving force at the top of the West German government. Adenauer declared in the same meeting of the CSU national executive board that it is wrong to believe that the United States would never abandon Europe (Buchstab 1990, 1030). One of his closest confidants, Heinrich Krone, equally argued that relations with the United States are currently good – but cautioned that this should not be taken for granted. America, after all, is far away from Germany and has interests that go beyond Europe (Buchstab 1990, 1034). Beneath these worries lay the insight that West Germany and its fate occupied neither a central nor a permanent spot in America's national interest. As Graniere writes about an extended tour abroad by the German chancellor in 1960:

> As a man from the generation that still viewed Europe as the center of world affairs, the leader of a state at the heart of a divided Europe, Adenauer was unsettled by what he learned. Close relations with the US were supposed to guarantee West German stability and security. After more than ten years, however, that stability seemed as far off as ever. The world had gotten bigger, and

> the Americans appeared to be losing interest in German concerns. (Graniere 2003, 111)

In this context, the question arises whether the fear of abandonment visible here actually describes an emotional phenomenon or merely strategic calculations. It has been argued, for example, that Adenauer exaggerated the perception of American unreliability in order to secure foreign goodwill for German rearmament (Trachtenberg 1999, 234).

At the same time, there are indications that these fears went beyond mere calculation and had an emotional component. Franz Josef Strauß, Adenauer's Minister for Nuclear Energy and later Defense Minister, ascribes the chancellor a "geradezu existentielle Angst" (pretty much existential fear) (Strauß 2015, 168; translated from German by the author) of Communist invasion and American abandonment, and especially so after the outbreak Korean War. He equally wrote of a "tiefeingewurzelte Angst" (deep-rooted fear) (Strauß 2015, 254; translated from German by the author) in Adenauer that the victors of the Second World War could engage in great power dealings that would degrade West Germany to a mere pawn.

This "fear of an agreement among the Four Powers at Germany's expense" (H.-P. Schwarz 1995, 6) has been labeled by Hans-Peter Schwarz, his foremost biographer, as an essential force behind Adenauer's foreign policy. In the same vein, the chancellor's attitude towards the isolationist tendencies in American politics (H.-P. Schwarz 1995, 37) and towards French nationalism at the cost of NATO (H.-P. Schwarz 1995, 358) have been described by Schwarz as marked by fear. Other authors have equally argued that Adenauer's judgment was at times shaped by "shock, fear, and anger" about signs of American disinterest in or even abandonment of West Germany (Brady 2009, 186).

These fears were also observed on the American side. As Dean Acheson – who served as Secretary of State under President Truman - recalled later on in an interview when speaking about a conversation with Adenauer in Bonn in April 1961, the German chancellor seemed "worried to death--just completely worried" (JFK Library 1964, 17) about America's intentions towards the situation in Europe. Just before the West German chancellor visited Washington later during the same year, a memo by Henry Kissinger for President Kennedy spoke of Adenauer having largely irrational and "vague fears of being abandoned" (as quoted in Rueger 2011, 105). The briefing prepared by the State Department for the same meeting equally ascribed Adenauer "an almost pathological fear" (as quoted in Rueger 2011, 106) that the United States could come to an agreement at the expense of Germany.

Based on his lack of trust in the United States and NATO, and the subsequent fear of abandonment, the West German government therefore began to voice its belief that the country should acquire nuclear weapons. In December 1956, Adenauer described these as "dringend erforderlich" (urgently necessary) (Bundesarchiv 1988c; translated from German by the author) in a cabinet meeting. His reasoning was shaped by mistrust in West Germany's security alliances. As he saw it, the use of American nuclear weapons or those of other NATO allies against a potential enemy would require approval by the American Congress or unanimity within NATO, neither of which was assured in case of an emergency. Earlier that year, in a cabinet meeting in July 1956, Strauß had already used similar rhetoric and declared that a nation which does not produce nuclear weapons on its own is outclassed (Bundesarchiv 1988a).

Beyond the immediate security concerns, Adenauer and Strauß also described the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means for West Germany to regain control over its own fate – and to overcome its status as an inferior power next to its neighbors and NATO allies. The chancellor, for example, went so far as to label the country as a "nuclear protectorate"

(as quoted in H.-P. Schwarz 1997, 239). Strauß, in his memoirs, equally spoke of a nation without access to nuclear weapons as being reduced to the status of a "Kolonialarmee" (colonial army) and a "militärischen Flohzirkus" (military flea circus), and of nuclear weapons as a "entscheidendes Merkmal der Souveränität" (decisive element of sovereignty) in the nuclear age. They were, therefore, a means of reclaiming German independence (Strauß 2015, 382, 404, 530; translated from German by the author). The mere prospect of West Germany acquiring or building them was seen as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other NATO members (Küntzel 1992, 27).

Towards the outside, the government chose a more ambiguous language. It thereby took into account that assertive rhetoric about West German nuclear weapons would provoke opposition abroad as well as at home, and especially so with an eye on the national elections in September 1957. In January 1957, after a lengthy conversation, the government therefore left a group of German scientists with the impression that no acquisition of nuclear weapons was desired (von Weizsäcker 1957, 284). A few weeks later, Strauß explained in a statement that West Germany has no immediate plans to build or acquire nuclear weapons, carefully remaining silent on the government's desire to do so (*Die Zeit* 1957). In other public statements, references to nuclear weapons were embellished and trivialized, for example by referring to them as small or light or clean nuclear weapons, or simply as "die modernsten Waffen" (the most modern weaponry) (Wengeler 1992, 200; translated from German by the author).

In October 1956, Adenauer voiced in a cabinet meeting the idea of producing nuclear weapons through the European Atomic Energy Community (Bundesarchiv 1988b). This already indicates what would characterize the West German desire for nuclear weapons during the following years: their development on German territory was never seriously taken into consideration. This would have required a revision of the Paris Accords, might have provoked

the Soviet Union and upset relations with the NATO allies that West Germany was dependent on, and certainly have fueled the domestic opposition against nuclear weapons. The idea of a homegrown nuclear weapons program, similar to that of the United Kingdom at the time, was therefore foregone because it was not feasible, not for a lack of interest (H.-P. Schwarz 1989, 576–77).

Following this approach, West Germany in November 1957 signed treaties with France and Italy for a trilateral arms development program. The conventional part of the program was public knowledge; that it also involved the development of nuclear weapons was kept secret. France expected to profit from the financial and technical assistance of its neighbors, and to free itself from what was perceived as an Anglo-Saxon monopoly on nuclear weapons within NATO. Under the agreement, Germany would not have become the owner of nuclear warheads but gotten guaranteed access to warheads stored in France. Yet this nuclear weapons program never made it far: when Charles de Gaulle became French Prime Minister in June 1958, he withdrew from the program (Kocs 1995, 20–21; Küntzel 1992, 29–30).

It is noteworthy that this program was initiated regardless of American concessions and even support regarding nuclear weapons in European hands. From 1957, the Eisenhower administration intended to support the British and French nuclear programs. And in order to empower its European allies to defend itself, it not only stationed nuclear weapons on their territory but gave them effective control over their deployment. The American capability to control their use was severely limited – and West Germany thereby became a "de-facto nuclear power, at least in a limited sense" (Kocs 1995, 27; see also Trachtenberg 1999, 193–94). As Eisenhower himself argued during a meeting in March 1960: "we cannot deny to our allies those weapons which most assuredly our enemies have" (Digital National Security Archive 1960, 1).

As Gerzhoy points out, one would expect that this approach of the Eisenhower administration would have given West Germany confidence in the American commitment and dissuaded it from pursuing nuclear weapons. But as the timeline of events shows, this was not the case, most likely because the reliability and permanence of the American commitment to West Germany's security was never seen as unquestionable (Gerzhoy 2015, 110).

The transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy in 1961 came with a novel attitude on the side of the United States towards the spread of nuclear weapons. Whereas Eisenhower stopped short of encouraging their development in Europe, the Kennedy administration took a more negative view of their proliferation. Every additional nation with nuclear weapons would introduce new risks into the international system; and every American ally with nuclear weapons would make it more likely that America would get drawn into a nuclear conflict (Küntzel 1992, 41–42). Kennedy himself summed up this understanding in his address to the nation on July 26, 1963 on occasion of signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union:

> During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical, and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. […] I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. (JFK Library 1963a)

Shortly after Kennedy came to power in 1961, it became visible what he had in mind with restricting nuclear weapons to the four states that possessed them at the time: the United

States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. All American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe were equipped with technology that would require authorization by the America President for their deployment; and the idea of giving control over nuclear weapons to NATO allies in the context of a combined strike force was abandoned (Gerzhoy 2015, 111). Additionally, Kennedy was "in principle ready to draw the line after France" (Trachtenberg 1999, 366): whereas Britain and France would be allowed and even receive American support to develop nuclear weapons, West Germany would be excluded from this exclusive group.

West Germany was thereby pushed back into the role of a non-nuclear state. Simultaneously, West German foreign policy was perceived as running counter to these ambitions. Although the nuclear weapons program from 1957 had gone nowhere, West Germany and France once again made steps towards a joint program for the development of nuclear weapons. In January 1963, Adenauer and de Gaulle signed the Élysée Treaty, formally committing themselves to the friendship of the two nations and the mutual political consultation on a variety of issues. The impression created by the treaty was strengthened by a press conference one week prior in which the French President had declared his ambition to create an independent Europe that would be neither under the dependency nor the control of the United States[43].

[43] The Kennedy administration saw in de Gaulle a force that opposed America's interests in Europe and a threat to the West's political integrity as well as NATO. As Carl Carstens, State Secretary in the West German foreign office, reported after a trip to the United States and conversations with dozens of American politicians: "It is becoming ever more evident to them that de Gaulle wants to rule over Europe, that he wants to push the United States out of Europe, and that he wants to ultimately destroy NATO. [...] In doing so, he trusts that the Americans, even after they would have left Europe, would be forced to defend Europe in case of a Russian attack. It is the cynicism expressed in these goals and methods of de Gaulle that especially embitters the Americans" (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 88; translation by the author). Concerns about West Germany arose against this backdrop and from questions about the country's alignment and a possible desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States, for obvious reasons, did not want West Germany to follow de Gaulle.

From the American perspective, de Gaulle's rhetoric and the friendship treaty signaled the intention to create an independent European block in world politics – and most likely the collaboration in the nuclear field as well as the prospect of West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons. After all, if the European powers were planning to distance themselves from the United States, they would require a nuclear deterrent of their own against the Soviet threat. But whereas de Gaulle's general attitude towards America's role in Europe was seen as a rather abstract problem, the "German nuclear question was the ultimate touchstone" that had to be dealt with (Trachtenberg 1999, 392, 369–70).

West German politicians subsequently tried to convince the United States that their government did not follow de Gaulle's line and had no ambitions to create a European bloc (see, for example, FRUS 1994d, 190). Secretary of State Dean Rusk furthermore notified Kennedy that there is no evidence for an open or secret Franco-German nuclear weapons program. Yet the suspicion had been created and Rusk cautioned to the West German Defense Minister that "we would take a very serious view of any such arrangement" (JFK Library 1963b). The impression that the friendship treaty between France and West Germany was motivated by the German interest to acquire nuclear weapons was also present in Moscow, as Nikita Khrushchev himself made clear in conversations during a visit to Great Britain (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 117).

Considerations about nuclear weapons were indeed made in France as well as in West Germany, although not in public and without specific intent. One week before the signing of the Élysée Treaty, Adenauer asked his advisor Heinrich Krone whether he should tell de Gaulle that Germany was ready to cooperate on the production of nuclear weapons (Krone 2003, 2:146). The day before the treaty was signed, de Gaulle and Adenauer agreed that America was holding its European allies in a state of perpetual security dependency by monopolizing the nuclear weapons on the continent. Adenauer therefore welcomed that

France was developing its own nuclear weapons; and de Gaulle stated it would be only natural for West Germany to seek nuclear weapons of its own. Their acquisition would change the country's relations with both the West and the East, but France would not oppose this step, as he argued (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 117–18, 141–42).

The West German interest in nuclear weapons and the American determination to strictly limit their proliferation therefore clashed with each other from the early 1960s on. The Kennedy administration was aware of this and willing to utilize its institutional position in the security alliance with the Adenauer government. As Trachtenberg writes about the American approach:

> Even if Britain and France were helped, the Germans could still be told that they could not have their own nuclear weapons. They would not like it, but they were dependent on the United States and could be made to swallow the pill. If they defied America, where else could they go for protection? It was a question of who needed whom, and the Germans would have to give way in the end. (Trachtenberg 1999, 356)

Based on de Gaulle's rhetoric, Kennedy furthermore feared the creation of a Franco-German block, either because the Europeans did not trust America's security guarantees – or because they saw the alliance with America as detrimental for their own security. As Kennedy cautioned in a meeting of the National Security Council Executive Committee on January 25, 1963: "As soon as the French have a nuclear capability […] we have much less to offer Europe and the Europeans may conclude that continuing their ties with us will create a risk that we will drag them into a war in which they do not wish to be involved" (FRUS 1994e, 488). Apart from controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons, an American interest at the time was therefore the prevention of a Franco-German bloc that would diminish the role and influence of the United States in Europe.

Kennedy's conclusion in a meeting on February 5: The United States should "make clear to the Germans that they faced a choice between working with the French or working with us" (FRUS 1994c, 175). For this purpose, America had to "get ready with actions to squeeze Europe" and develop "a cold, hard attitude toward the situation which may develop in Europe" (FRUS 1994e, 489–90). One week later, he therefore reasoned that a letter to Adenauer should outline the potential consequences of a political split between Europe and the United States, among them "the opportunity to the Russians to fish in troubled waters" and the "public demand to get out of Europe" on the American side (FRUS 1994b, 163).

The Kennedy government therefore started to play on the West German fears of abandonment. In the words of the American Ambassador to West Germany, the goal was to keep the Germans "nervous about our relations with them" (FRUS 1994c, 175). In a meeting with the German Ambassador and the head of the CDU's parliamentary faction, Rusk cautioned that "it would be impossible for any American Government to keep US troops" (FRUS 1994d, 190) in Europe if the public came away with the impression that the United States were not welcome there.

The West German government attempted to prove wrong the American suspicions. In fact, there have been no indications that West Germany would side with France at the cost of its relationship with the United States or actively pursued the development of nuclear weapons after the failure of the trilateral program in 1958. In the law ratifying the Élysée Treaty, the German Bundestag added a preamble stating that the agreement was signed to maintain and deepen "the association of free peoples, especially the close partnership between Europe and the United States of America" (German Historical Institute 2017, 2). Nevertheless,

the Kennedy administration wanted an assurance that Germany would refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons of its own – and found a litmus test in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty[44] which was under negotiation at the time.

The treaty was negotiated in 1963 by the United States and the Soviet Union as part of a general easing of relations between the two superpowers. It was open for signature to all states, and the Kennedy administration subsequently expected and pressured West Germany to join. One reason was that this fit Kennedy's ambitions to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As Kennedy argued already in 1961 in a conversation with Khrushchev, a nuclear test ban would not reduce the number of weapons already in existence and not stop the production of new ones. Yet it "would make development of nuclear weapons by other countries less likely" (FRUS 1994a, 88). Beyond that, the American government had an interest in West Germany signing the treaty as, in exchange for the United States keeping West Germany's nuclear ambitions in check, the Soviet Union acquiesced on the issues surrounding Berlin (Gerzhoy 2015, 117).

Initially, the Adenauer government voiced objections. Its primary concern was that a signature of both West Germany and East Germany, as intended by the United States and the Soviet Union, would be a de-facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic. In order to prevent this break with the West's long-standing policy of not accepting the German division, the United States and Great Britain explicitly labeled East Germany as a non-

[44] As the name of the treaty implies, is does not prohibit nuclear tests in general. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty only prohibits nuclear explosions in earth's atmosphere, under water and in space. As most nuclear tests take place underground, it is therefore anything but an effective ban on the development of nuclear weapons. Beyond that, the treaty contains no details about how a ban on nuclear tests could be actually enforced. With this in mind, it has to be interpreted as an expression of a general yet limited easing of tensions during the Cold War (Pautsch 1994, 151). Additionally, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should not be confused with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which does prohibit all nuclear tests but has so far not come into force.

state signatory (Pautsch 1994, 148). In August 1963 the treaty was therefore signed by West Germany.

Adenauer had been a stringent opponent of the treaty. In a conversation with de Gaulle on September 21, 1963 he described the treaty as having "weder Sinn noch Zweck" (neither logic nor purpose) (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 356; translated from German by the author). In his biography, he argued that West Germany had already agreed to not produce nuclear weapons in the Paris Accords. The only purpose of the treaty was therefore to tighten the grip of the superpowers on Europe, and especially of the Soviet Union over West Germany (Adenauer 1978, 244–45). Strauß in an interview not only raised the same points as Adenauer about the questionable purpose of the treaty; he went so far as to compare it to the Munich Agreement of 1938 through which France and Great Britain had accepted the partial annexation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany (Pautsch 1994, 131).

That the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would lock in West Germany's status as a country without nuclear weapons of its own was evident (Küntzel 1992, 67; Trachtenberg 1999, 394). As a secret briefing for the German Foreign Minister argued, the treaty would not only prohibit West Germany from testing nuclear weapons of its own but also from participating in other countries' nuclear tests – which can be read as a reference to a potential Franco-German nuclear program. Furthermore, the de-facto ban on the development of nuclear weapons would not be contingent on security guarantees from other Western powers, as is the case in Paris Accords. In other words: West Germany would lose the potential to develop nuclear weapons as leverage in negotiations with both West and East (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 244–45).

Especially with an eye on Adenauer's fear that the United States might abandon West Germany, there was little incentive to sign the treaty. Yet it stands to reason that this was not

an option, in part because of how the Kennedy administration played on these fears. Adenauer therefore explained to Strauß that abstaining from the treaty was not an option due to the international pressure that the country was facing (Strauß 2015, 331). In a similar vein, Krone noted in his diary: "Sollen wir unterschreiben? Es wird nichts anderes übrigbleiben. Ich denke an Versailles" (Shall we sign? There will be no other choice. I am thinking of Versailles) (Krone 2003, 2:206; translated from German by the author), thereby referring to the Peace Treaty at the end of World War I that was forced upon Germany.

Even the previously-cited secret briefing for the German Foreign Minister, regardless of its outspoken opposition to the treaty, came to this conclusion. It argued that a refusal of German participation would not be possible because of how significant the United States considers the treaty for world peace (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 245).

Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to assume that the American exploitation and amplification of the Adenauer government's fear of abandonment contributed to the West German participation in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. As Trachtenberg sums up, a withdrawal of the United States from Europe was "not entirely out of the question"; and if "the Americans insisted that Germany remain non-nuclear as part of the détente policy, the Federal Republic had little choice but to accept that status" (Trachtenberg 1999, 397).

That this process was perceived coercive on the German side is evident in Krone's reference to Versailles. It is also visible in Adenauer's description of the situation as existentially threatening for West Germany and "friß oder stirb" (sink or swim) (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 257; translated from German by the author) in a conversation with Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense. The decision to sign the treaty was thus not made because the West German government saw it as beneficial – but because even the agreement's critics saw no viable alternative (Pautsch 1994, 147).

This is not to say that the perceptions of German decision-makers were necessarily correct and that the West German participation in the treaty was against its national interest. After all, the treaty solidified the détente policy after some of the Cold War's worst years and ensured America's commitment to Germany's security. This study does also not argue that America's exploitation of West German fears was the only factor at play. The Adenauer government also signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in order to not isolate itself internationally and provide the Soviet Union with fodder for its propaganda machine, and because German public opinion as well as parts of the domestic political spectrum were far less critical of the United States and the agreement than Adenauer and his aides (Institut für Zeitgeschichte 1993, 245; Trachtenberg 1999, 397).

Nevertheless, it stands to reason that the American efforts at stoking the German fear of abandonment were a "major factor" (Trachtenberg 1999, 397) in the decision-making process of the Adenauer government to join the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The two governments had different interests regarding Germany's acquisition of nuclear weapons – and America made West Germany act in accordance with its preferences. Just as was the case in the previous case study, this exercise of power utilized the mechanism of compulsion and therefore confronted the West German government in Bonn with the choice between acquiescence and paying a price that was considered too high. Its first order preferences were changed; its second order preferences about nuclear weapons remained in place. The foundation of this compulsion was the manipulation of emotions and, in particular, the stoking of West Germany's fear of abandonment.

While it is uncontentious that fear represents an emotion, it is worth specifying here how fear is assumed to work. Consider Frijda's conception of fear: he considers "avoidance" as the action tendency that results from it and "protection" as the purpose of fear (Frijda 1986, 88). What this means in practice is highly dependent on the context. Fear does not result in

any particular behavior but rather in the production of specific goals that have an "avoidance quality" (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2015, 128). The outcome of fear can therefore be the desire to flee, to seek information, to hide – or, as in the case of West Germany, to acquiesce to demands in order to avoid the object of fear. The fear of abandonment therefore pushed the government in Bonn to do what was necessary to avoid the potential alternative: abandonment by the United States.

As Gerzhoy (2015) illustrates, this logic of the United States exercising power over West Germany prevailed beyond the year 1963. Adenauer left office and Kennedy was assassinated in the fall of that year, yet the West German lack of confidence in America's security guarantee prevailed, just as the desire to suppress Germany's nuclear ambitions prevailed in the United States. And just like the Kennedy government had stoked the West German fear of abandonment in order to ensure the participation in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, so did the Johnson government play on German fears in order to ensure a signature for the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969.

2. Alleviating Fear: The US and South Korea

Causing and stoking the fear of abandonment is one way in which the manipulation of emotions can play a role in exercising power. The other way around, emotions are also manipulated when one actor tries to calm the fear of abandonment of another actor. One example for this can be found in the security alliance between the United States and South Korea during the 1970s. Richard Nixon had just become American President after running a campaign during which he made the pledge that "we shall have an honorable end to the war in Vietnam" (McMahon and Zeiler 2012, 1:628). Little more than half a year after he came into office, in July 1969, he therefore announced what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine: America would stand by its alliance commitments and provide a nuclear umbrella,

yet its allies would generally be responsible for their own security. For the presence of the United States in Vietnam this meant that the burden of fighting would be shifted to South Vietnamese troops and that American forces would slowly be withdrawn.

At the time, the security situation on the Korean peninsula was short of escalating after a number of incidents. North Korea had attempted to assassinate the South Korean President Park Chung-Hee in January 1968 and, only a few days later, taken the American spy ship USS Pueblo as well as its crew hostage. Against this backdrop, the more than 66.000 American soldiers (Kane 2005b) stationed in South Korea were seen in Seoul as essential to deter North Korean aggression and as a symbol for the commitment of the United States to South Korea's security. Yet this troop presence was about to be cut down by the Nixon Doctrine. As the US President noted in a memorandum to Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, in November 1969: "I think the time has come to reduce our Korean presence" and "to cut the number of Americans there in half" (FRUS 2010a). These plans were announced to the South Korean government in December of that year.

The result was an increasing fear of abandonment on the South Korean side. A number of factors added to this impression in Seoul: US foreign policy making at the time was unilateral and largely ignored South Korean concerns and interests. The decision makers in Washington cared first and foremost about the situation in Vietnam and saw their country's Asia policies through that lens. A military response to the North Korean provocations at the time was rejected in Washington in order to avoid an American entanglement in another corner of Asia. On top of that, America as a nation seemed disenchanted with its military presence in the region. Later on, through Nixon's trip to Beijing in 1972, the United States even reproached a country that South Korea had been fighting against only two decades earlier. The result has been described as the "Nixon shock" that led to disappointment,

frustration and anxiety in South Korea (Hwang 2006, 59; see also Engel 2016; C.-J. Lee 2006, 69; S.-Y. Kim 2001, 54–55; Nam 1986, 78).

The South Korean side did not hide this shock. A month after the North Korean assassination attempt in 1968, the impression that President Park left on American diplomats was already that of a "[h]ighly emotional, volatile, frustrated and introspective" (FRUS 2000, 385) man. Speaking with the Head of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1969, Park even described war with North Korea as inevitable should America withdraw its troops (FRUS 2010b, 46). In April 1970, the South Korean Ambassador to the United States reported to the Department of State that the proposal of troop reductions had come to Park as a "profound shock" (FRUS 2010e, 57). Two months later, the South Korean head of state himself wrote a letter to Nixon in which he argued that the announcement of troop withdrawals would have "psychological adverse effects" on the Korean people and would leave them with an "unexpected shock" (FRUS 2010i).

During the runup to the troop withdrawal, the decision makers in the United States were certainly aware of the South Korean fear of abandonment. After the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, Kissinger spoke of an "overwhelming" (FRUS 2003, 112) fear of abandonment of America's allies in Asia in case of a withdrawal of the US from the region[45]. In an internal memo, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that any troop withdrawals "could cause anxiety to the Koreans" (FRUS 2010c) and leave the impression that the United States was retreating from its alliance commitments. The memo therefore argued for measures to offset these fears, for example support for the modernization of South Korea's military forces. Similar rhetoric is visible in a memo of a National Security Council

[45] Kissinger prefaced the document by saying that it was written by an aide and that "I do not agree with its every last word". His statement about the fears of America's allies in Asia does not refer to South Korea in particular and mentions several other countries; yet it is implied that all allies of the United States in the region are being referred to.

meeting in March 1970 during which both President Nixon and Vice President Agnew refer to the fears of Asian leaders about American intentions and the desire to avoid the impression of American disengagement from the region (FRUS 2010d). On another occasion, Agnew even compared the Nixon Doctrine's reception among America's allies in Asia to that of a "lead balloon" (Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations. U.S. House of Representatives 1978, 60).

One obvious question in this context is whether the South Korean fear of abandonment, and especially that of President Park, can be legitimately be described as an emotion. Talk about the fear of abandonment can, after all, be interpreted as nothing but a metaphor for strategic calculations about insecurity, reliability and trust. Yet there is reason to believe that this fear of abandonment was in fact an emotional reaction.

As Kim argues, his fear "should not be dismissed as merely a self-serving excuse or anti-communist propaganda" (H.-A. Kim 2011, 32). Park had good reasons to feel personally threatened by the political situation on the Korean peninsula. His wife had been shot by a North Korean sympathizer in 1974 during an assassination attempt on Park himself. Four years later, North Korean soldiers infiltrated South Korea and made their way to the President's residence in order to kill him. The assassination attempt was thwarted only at a check point in front of the building and ended in a firefight that killed dozens. After a meeting with Park one month later, Cyrus Vance – a former United States Deputy Secretary of Defense sent to Seoul as an envoy - therefore wrote in a memorandum that these events had "unfortunate psychologic effects on him" and that "his fears for his own safety and that of his family were markedly increased" (FRUS 2000, 385).

Beyond the geopolitical circumstances of South Korea, the fear of abandonment has also been described as an inherent trait of Park's personality. As Chon argues in his biography of Park, anxieties about abandonment were dominant force in his life from early childhood

on. He was an unwanted child, and after multiple abortion attempts had failed, his family never hid this from him. His career can be interpreted through this lens as a struggle to achieve a sense of social belonging, for example in the military, and to gain of safety from the possibility of abandonment. A logical conclusion of this mindset: the desire for overcoming weakness, insecurity and the reliance on others (Chon 2006). Controversial policies such as South Korea's decision to pursue the development of nuclear weapons have therefore been interpreted as driven by Park's fear of abandonment and the goal of acquiring independence, thereby ridding the country of the possibility that it might be abandoned, chiefly by the United States (Hymans, Kim, and Riecke 2001, 131).

It therefore stands to reason that both South Korea's political situation and Park's personal situation drove this fear of abandonment, and that this fear went beyond cynical maneuvering and had an emotional dimension. To my knowledge, no opinion surveys are available that allow for conclusions about how the wider public in South Korea felt during this era; yet it seems likely that at least Park did actually feel the fear of abandonment. It originated from the circumstances of his country, and it was emphasized by his biography and the close link between national security and his personal security. While these personal emotions might have been of little relevance in a political system less centered on one individual, Park's dominant role in the South Korean governance apparatus likely made his emotions influential enough to warrant understanding them as state emotions.

The decision makers on the American side were probably aware of Park's situation. As even Kissinger, who repeatedly was the source of much pressure on the South Korean government at the time, wrote by hand on a memorandum in 1970: "I feel sorry for Park" (FRUS 2010j, 165).

The American government, thus, took various steps to alleviate the South Korean fear of abandonment. In August 1969, one month after the Nixon Doctrine had been announced,

the US President assured President Park during a meeting in San Francisco that "I rejected the idea of decreasing the number of our men staying" (FRUS 2009, 35). Nevertheless, at the end of that year, the United States announced its plans to withdraw troops. Nixon wrote two letters to Park during the following summer in which he assured him of the ongoing commitment of the United States to the shared alliance, the sufficient strength of America's remaining troops (together with the armed forces of South Korea) to ensure South Korea's security, and of plans to provide the country with the means for a comprehensive modernization of its armed forces (FRUS 2010f, 2010j). Vice President Agnew even made a trip to Seoul in August 1970 in order to personally provide President Park with reassurances of America's commitment[46].

Not only did the United States seek to reassure the South Korea government that its national security would not be negatively affected by the troop withdrawals and that it would be compensated through a modernization of its armed forces. Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, even gave these plans a positive spin in a memorandum for a Member of Congress who was about to travel to Korea. In that memo, the troop withdrawals are presented as "a means of assuring that [the United States] can continue to cooperate over the long term in assuring Korean security" (FRUS 2010k, 13). After two decades without significant military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, the current troop levels would seem excessive to the public, as he argued; bringing back some troops would therefore alleviate pressures to withdraw from Korea. This illustrates the American effort

[46] While Agnew's trip to Seoul was meant to alleviate the South Korean fear of abandonment, it made the news also because of a statement by the Vice President prior to his departure. He stated that all American troops would be withdrawn anyway within five years, independent of the current dispute. This was "unexpected and contrary to the stated U.S. policy" and "greatly upset the Koreans" (Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations. U.S. House of Representatives 1978, 67). The purpose and background of this statement are not clear. One interpretation is that Agnew intended it as a way of emphasizing to the South Korean government that the presence of American troops should not be taken for granted.

to allay the South Korean fears, even though it is not clear whether this framing of the withdrawal plan ever reached the Park government in Seoul.

Beyond diplomatic assurances, the United States provided South Korea with $1.5 billion in support for its military modernization, thereby covering a significant part of the project. Over the following years, this allowed the government in Seoul to acquire hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns (J.-I. Kim 1996, 38–40; Nam 1986, 101). The US Congress furthermore decided to approve the construction of an American arms factory in South Korea (Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations. U.S. House of Representatives 1978, 66–68). Taken together, these efforts at allaying the South Korean fears of abandonment were able to overcome the resistance of the Park government. While it was certainly not happy about the withdrawal of American troops, it was at least able to extract diplomatic commitments and military assistance from the United States. For this case as well as the "Nixon shocks" that preceded and followed it, Engel concluded that "it could be argued that the Nixon Doctrine did its best to relieve Korean fears of abandonment" (Engel 2016, 85) after each decision that undermined the faith in America's security commitment.

But while the details of the American plans to withdraw troops as well as the compensation for South Korea underwent lengthy debates and negotiations, and although decision makers in Washington, D.C. took the South Korean fears into account, the opposition of the Park government did not lead to a reconsideration. By the time Nixon was halfway through his first term in 1971, the number of American troops in South Korea had therefore been cut by 40% and stood at about 40.000. South Korea went along and began to shoulder more of its defense burden – to which the military modernization program is testament. This outcome represents a successful exercise of power by the United States. The Nixon Doctrine and the "shift from paternalism to partnership in alliance policy" (Nam 1986, 67) were

successfully implemented on the Korean peninsula and, although not with the outspoken approval of the Park government, at least with its acquiescence.

The change in attitude on the South Korean side is visible in American diplomatic cables of the time. In meetings with American diplomats during the summer of 1970, the attitude of President Park was marked by "hard line resistance", "recalcitrance" and a "lack of sensitivity" towards American concerns (FRUS 2010h). In a conversation with the American ambassador, he implied that troop reductions without his approval were not even possible under the shared alliance agreement (FRUS 2010g). In another meeting he insisted that consultations on the issue could not begin without guarantees regarding American support for South Korea's military modernization (FRUS 2010l).

A few months later, things looked markedly different. In October 1970, the South Korean government presented the American government with a draft agreement in which troop reductions would be accepted in exchange for guarantees of American support (FRUS 2010m). Ten days later, the American Ambassador was "surprised to some extent by Park's acquiescence" and his general acceptance of troop reductions (FRUS 2010n).

This illustrates that power and the manipulation of emotions not only come together where the fear of abandonment is stirred, as was the case for America's efforts to dissuade West Germany from its nuclear ambitions. The exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions also plays a role where the opposite is goal is pursued: calming down an ally's fear of abandonment. Obviously, this exercise of power cannot be described as a form of compulsion. Rather, the American government was able to change the preferences of the South Korean government through incentives. While it was not able to win outright support from President Park for the troop withdrawals, it at least influenced him in a way that made him give up his stubborn opposition.

3. Sticks, Carrots and Fear: The US and South Korea

The previous sections have illustrated how states can exercise power by stoking or alleviating the fear of abandonment in other states. These two approaches cannot only be used on their own, but also simultaneously: on the one hand, the stoking of fear can be used to coerce another state into compliance; on the other hand, the alleviation of fears can be used to change preferences through softer means. The relationship between the United States and South Korea, once again, can be used to illustrate this. The simultaneous use of both approaches became visible, in particular, during the Presidency of Gerald Ford in the mid-1970s and after it had become apparent that South Korea was trying to develop nuclear weapons of its own.

The decision to acquire nuclear weapons was made in South Korea in response to the growing fear of abandonment and a lack of trust in American security commitments. This desire can therefore be interpreted as a reaction to the Nixon Doctrine, even though factors such as the American rapprochement with China and North Korean provocations certainly also played a role. From the early 1970s on, the government and scientists in South Korea therefore worked on a nuclear weapons program and tried to acquire the technology necessary to produce fissile materials from Canada and France.

These decisions were made without prior consultation with the United States, were kept secret and led to a "nuclear 'hide and seek' game" (Choi and Park 2009, 377). South Korea utilized deceptive means, for example by describing its nuclear program as civilian in nature, and sent signals to back this up, for example by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975. At the same time, it kept itself all options open, for example when President Park announced that his country would go nuclear should America recede its nuclear umbrella (Burr 2017a, 2017b; Hong 2011, 487; Hymans, Kim, and Riecke 2001, 129–31; Jang

2016; Reiter 2016, 110; Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations. U.S. House of Representatives 1978, 79–80).

Nevertheless, the American government found out about the nuclear ambitions of its ally around early 1975. In February of that year, a National Security Council memorandum concluded based on reports from the American embassy in Seoul that South Korea "has entered the initial stage of nuclear weapons development" (FRUS 2010o). From then on, the United States opposed and tried to stop South Korea's nuclear program. As the State Department explained in a telegram to the embassy in Seoul, nuclear weapons in South Korean hands would have a "major destabilizing effect" and "significant political impact" on neighboring countries. Among the potential consequences was a nuclear arms race in the region. It was therefore the "basic objective" to prevent this from happening (National Security Archive 1975b). Compromise was not an option as America's interests in the regional order as well as in the global nonproliferation regime were at stake (Hong 2011, 485, 493).

The communication between the State Department and the American embassy in Seoul as well as within the White House indicate that the development of a strategy to deal with this problem had to integrate a number of conflicting considerations. A swift and firm approach was seen as prudent, especially in the face of President Park's recalcitrance and denials as well as with an eye on what was at stake in the region. At the same time, it was perceived as unlikely that South Korea could be permanently dissuaded from developing nuclear weapons as long as the United States could not provide a permanent and convincing security guarantee. In conversations in the White House it was therefore acknowledged that "South Koreans had some reason for their concern over their future security" (U.S. Department of State 2010). In fact, too much diplomatic pressure came with the potential to deepen the rifts between the United States and South Korea and to further weaken the

shared security alliance (Hong 2011, 499–500; U.S. Department of State 1975a, 1975c). The approach taken therefore reflected these conflicting considerations.

On the one hand, the United States went to great lengths to stoke the South Korean fear of abandonment. As various accounts of the events stress, not all details of how this was done are known as relevant documents remain classified to the present day and many of the involved individuals are not alive anymore (Hong 2011, 500, 502; Young 2003, 20). Yet it is clear that the US exerted increasing pressure on the South Korean government. Initially, this was done by emphasizing the negative consequences that the nuclear program would have on the region's stability and on American nuclear support, for example in the form of financial assistance (National Security Archive 1975a; U.S. Department of State 1975b, 1976a). Beyond that, the US confronted the South Korean government with the possibility of reevaluating its security commitment should the nuclear program proceed against American interests.

In August 1975, James R. Schlesinger, the American Secretary of Defense, made clear to President Park during a visit to Seoul that a South Korean nuclear program had the potential to jeopardize relations between the two countries (Oberdorfer and Carlin 1997, 71). A few months later, a telegram sent by Richard Sneider, the American ambassador to South Korea, to the Department of State advocated even stronger pressure. He recommended that it should be made unmistakably clear to the South Korean ambassador in Washington, D.C. that America was willing to reevaluate its military and political ties with South Korea should the nuclear program proceed (Hong 2011, 500, 501). One week after that, Sneider conveyed this to South Korean officials in Seoul (Hong 2011, 502). The same message was delivered by Philip Habib, the former American ambassador to South Korea, who had a reputation for frank talk and a well-established reputation in the Park government (Young

2003, 19–20). In Spring 1976 this was repeated once more by Donald Rumsfeld, who had taken over Schlesinger's post as Secretary of Defense (Oberdorfer and Carlin 1997, 72).

Oberdorfer and Carlin have labeled this approach as "the heaviest threat ever wielded by the United States against South Korea" (Oberdorfer and Carlin 1997, 72). This illustrates how the American government, on the one hand, employed extreme means to dissuade the Park government from developing nuclear weapons. It stands to reason that this approach was chosen to stir and utilize the South Korean fear of abandonment, especially because decision makers in Washington, D.C. must have been well aware of this fear based on the experiences made in the aftermath of the Nixon doctrine's announcement.

On the other hand, the United States also tried to alleviate the South Korean fear of abandonment during the clash over the country's nuclear weapons program. In 1975, the American government acknowledged for the first time publicly that tactical nuclear weapons had been deployed to South Korea. They had first been sent there shortly after the Korean War; as of the mid-1970s, several hundred nuclear weapons of different types were stored in South Korea. Around the same time, the American military began to regularly visit South Korean ports with submarines carrying ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. These displays of the nuclear umbrella have been interpreted as a means of reassuring the Park government that South Korea was protected by a nuclear deterrent even without a nuclear weapons program of its own (Kristensen and Norris 2017, 351–52; O'Neil 2013, 61; Roehrig 2017, 149). During testimony in Congress in June 1975, this message was supported by Schlesinger's statement that nuclear retaliation for the purpose of defending allied nations was an option for the United States (S.-Y. Kim 2001, 64; O'Neil 2013, 61).

Schlesinger also delivered further assurances during high-level meetings with the Korean government. In August 1975, he assured President Park and several other high-ranking officials that America was fully committed to South Korea, that there are no plans and

desires for troop reductions in the coming years, and that the United States was willing to support the local defense industry, the development of South Korea's defense forces, and to expand joint military exercises (Wilson Center Digital Archive 1975). And going beyond assurances to South Korea in particular, President Ford announced in December 1975 his "Pacific Doctrine" and emphasized that America's national security was dependent on its commitments in Asia (Naughton 1975).

This combination of threats and assurances, of measures to stoke and alleviate South Korea's fear of abandonment, was successful: by 1976, the Park government indicated that it was giving up its nuclear program. In January of that year, Sneider recommended that the United States should take pressure off the Park government, most likely because concessions on the South Korean side had become visible (Hong 2011, 502). At the end of the month, the Park government stated in discussions with United States officials that it was considering to step away from the plan to purchase nuclear reprocessing facilities from France. In exchange, the American government held out the prospect of expanding the cooperation and assistance in various areas relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy (U.S. Department of State 1976b). As a result, historical accounts of South Korea's nuclear weapons program generally locate the end of the country's nuclear ambitions in late 1975 or early 1976 (Debs and Monteiro 2017, 377; Hong 2011, 507; Lin 2012, 181; Reiter 2016, 110).

This supposedly straightforward narrative comes with two caveats. For one, the American attempt to stop the South Korean nuclear weapons program was not restricted to the bilateral relations between the two countries. The United States also lobbied the governments of Canada and France to reconsider or at least delay the sale of nuclear technology to South Korea. As a result, the Canadian government made the sale of a nuclear reactor conditional on South Korea not purchasing a reprocessing plant from France (Burr 2017b; Lin 2012,

179). Kissinger described this requirement in January 1976 as a "knockout blow" (U.S. Department of State 1976c, 3) to the Park government's desire for a reprocessing plant. In addition, both Canada and France joined in on the American pressure on South Korea to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty in April 1975, thus setting up additional hurdles for any nuclear weapons program by the Park government (Hong 2011, 499).

Secondly, the situation in early 1976 did not mark the end of the story of South Korea's nuclear ambitions. One year after, Jimmy Carter became President in the United States and was openly talking about renewed troop withdrawals from South Korea (Malcolm 1977). This reignited the Park government's ambition to acquire a nuclear deterrent. Based on the agreement from a year earlier, the acquisition of the necessary technology from abroad was not seen as feasible. And as the country had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and faced suspicion from the United States, it could hardly engage in the direct development of nuclear weapons. The Park government therefore focused its efforts on the acquisition of the knowledge and technology to develop nuclear weapons through an indigenous civilian program. These plans led to several research programs but largely came to an end with Park's assassination in 1979 (Hong 2011, 508–10).

Regardless of these caveats, the events during the Ford Presidency thereby illustrate how the fear of abandonment can be simultaneously stirred and alleviated. The approach of the United States for exercising power over South Korea has therefore been described as involving both "carrots and sticks" (Hersman and Peters 2006, 548; Lin 2012, 179).

This case furthermore illustrates that the fear of abandonment can be stirred both intentionally and unintentionally. That the Nixon doctrine led to a growing fear of abandonment in South Korea was both an unintentional and undesired outcome of American foreign policy decision making. That the American attempts to dissuade the Park government from developing nuclear weapons stirred the South Korean fear of abandonment, on the other hand,

was intentional and desired. The relations between the two countries during the 1970s therefore illustrate various other aspects of how power and the fear of abandonment interact beyond what is visible in the first example based on America's efforts to dissuade West Germany from going nuclear.

In all three cases, the United States successfully exercised power. In dealing with the nuclear program of West Germany, the power mechanism at work was clearly compulsion as the government in Bonn was confronted with possible consequences it was not willing to endure. In contrast to that, the effort to alleviate the South Korean fear of abandonment during the Nixon era utilized the mechanism of preference change in order to convince the government of President Park of America's commitment to the shared alliance. Lastly, the way in which the United States got South Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions showcases a combination of both mechanisms. What united these examples: the fear of abandonment was an object of power relations and an emotion that was intentionally shaped, stoked or alleviated in order to achieve certain goals.

VII. Anger

1. Provoking Anger: Prussia and France

Beyond shock and fear, the link between power and a third emotions will be illustrated with the afore-mentioned example of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and 1871. During the months prior to the war, Prussia shaped French behavior through the creation of anger. As in the previous case studies, attention will be given to both the considerations made on the Prussian side and the reactions on the French side. This historical episode was previously analyzed with an eye on the emotions at work by Hall. His focus lay on the emotional component of provocation. But while he linked the act of provocation to considerations about power, this was done in an implicit fashion (Hall 2017a). The account of the lead-up to the Franco-Prussian War provided here thus strives to offer a perspective different from Hall's in that it analyzes the events with a focus on the exercise of power and the manipulation of emotions for this purpose.

The historical context of the events is the search for a new king in Spain after the revolution of 1868 which toppled Queen Isabella II[47]. A suitable candidate was found in Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern[48], who was subsequently offered the crown by the leaders of the Spanish revolution. While Leopold was disinclined to accept, he was willing to "appreciate reasons which would subordinate his personal wishes to considerations of high policy"

[47] While the search for a new king of Spain provided the immediate context of the Franco-Prussian War, a number of other developments contributed to the ongoing tensions between Prussia and France. Among them were two other disputes relating to the German emperor's official title and a railway through Switzerland. Additionally, the decision-makers in both Prussia and France faced domestic predicaments that contributed to their willingness to escalate the tensions between their countries (Wawro 2003, 29–33).

[48] The House of Hohenzollern had been ruling the Kingdom of Prussia ever since its creation in 1701. From the Franco-Prussian War onwards, the German Emperors came from the House of Hohenzollern until the end of Germany's monarchy in 1918.

(Steefel 1962, 54). The decision was therefore deferred to Wilhelm I., the head of the Hohenzollern family and the King of Prussia. His chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, outlined in a memo the benefits Prussia could expect from putting Leopold on the Spanish throne: a prestigious post, increased commercial exchange with Spain, and a military ally to south of France, which would keep the French animosity towards Prussia in check and encircle it in case of war (Steefel 1962, 57–58).

The last point is of particular importance once the political climate of the era is taken into account. Prussia had anti-French sentiments lingering from the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815) and was acutely aware of its own growing national strength. France was suspicious of Europe's tilting balance of power, especially after Prussia's territorial expansion in the aftermath of the war with Austria in 1866. On top of that, a war with France was seen in Prussia as a potential opportunity to unite with the southern German states (Headlam 1899, 315–16). As Bismarck reminisced in his biography: "I took it as assured that war with France would necessarily have to be waged on the road to our further national development" (Bismarck 1898, 57). In this context, the decision whether to accept the Spanish offer and put Leopold on the throne was not merely a family affair of the Hohenzollern house but a question of European power politics.

By the end of June 1870, the candidacy was approved by Wilhelm I. and accepted by Leopold. Although it was Bismarck's intention to delay the announcement and to keep the Prussian involvement secret, the French government found out in early July. Its position was promptly announced in a statement by foreign minister Antoine de Gramont. It labeled the Prussian ambition to put Leopold on the Spanish throne as a threat to Europe's balance of power and to French interests and honor. Should the Prussian plan be realized, "we shall know how to discharge our duty without faltering or weakness" (as quoted in Steefel 1962, 114). France, in other words, was infuriated and threatened war in response to what was

perceived as a major insult and threat. In the words of the Prussian ambassador to France, "the devil is loose in Paris. It looks like war" (as quoted in Steinberg 2011, 285).

Driven by the desire to keep the peace, Wilhelm I. wrote to Leopold's father who subsequently convinced his son to renounce the candidacy for the Spanish throne on July 12. Bismarck learned of this change of plans only after the fact and retained his position that war with France was, ultimately, a necessity (Steefel 1962, 174; Steinberg 2011, 286). Yet this Prussian concession was not deemed sufficient on the French side. During a conversation with Wilhelm I. in the German spa town of Bad Ems on July 13, the French ambassador to Prussia, Count Vincent Benedetti, demanded a guarantee that no similar efforts at placing a Prussian candidate on the Spanish throne would ever be made again. The king rejected this demand as well as the request of a further meeting with the ambassador who wanted to discuss the matter once more.

On the face of it, the matter was therefore settled. After Wilhelm I. had met with the ambassador, Bismarck received a telegram by the king containing a summary of the conversation in Bad Ems as well as the authorization to publish its contents to the press as well as the Prussian embassies abroad. Bismarck did as he was told – yet he shortened the account of the meeting to about half of its original length, thereby changing its tone. The edited version did not add anything that was not part of the original version, yet it removed the conciliatory rhetoric of the Prussian king and turned the event into a "brusque confrontation" (Carr 1991, 197). The result was a press release that cast the courteous meeting between Wilhelm I. and the French ambassador as an impolite rebuke after the diplomat's demand of further concessions.

The implicit conclusion of the account that was published was that Prussia had just rebuffed the French Ambassador and terminated diplomatic relations, done so without even providing an explanation, and communicated this not through diplomatic channels but rather via

the media for all the world to see (see Steefel 1962, 189; Wawro 2003, 37). The text printed in the continent's newspapers thereby turned "a dynastic insult into a national one" (Wawro 2003, 301) and was "a slap in the face" (Gall 1986, 359) for France. Additionally, this account of the meeting in Bad Ems was communicated to the other European powers via the Prussian embassies in order to "give the affront a formal and official character" (Lord 1924, 104).

In his memoirs, Bismarck justified this step with the defense of "the honour of Prussia and the national confidence in it" (Bismarck 1898, 100) against the presumptuous French diplomatic conduct[49]. He was well-aware that the likely outcome would be an ignition of the mutual animosities in both France and Prussia, and therefore war. But as long as the hostilities were initiated on the French side, this was perceived as a success. The international perception of Prussia as a victim would serve the German "impetus towards our national development" (Bismarck 1898, 98), unite the German states under Prussia's leadership against a common enemy and prevent the intervention of any outside powers, as he calculated (Gall 1986, 359).

There is evidence that this was more than mere opportunism by Bismarck but the outcome of longstanding plans. More than a year before the events in summer 1870 he already told a Russian diplomat about his intention to provoke France so it would attack Prussia. This would allow Prussia to engage in a conflict with France without giving an aggressive impression, as he later on reminisced in his writings (Clark 1942, 197).

[49] It remains an open question to what extent Bismarck saw this as a personal defeat and not only than a national humiliation. As he writes in his memoirs, the initial decision by Prussia to withdraw Leopold's candidature after the French threat of war brought him to the verge of resigning from government service. "This impression of a wound to our sense of national honour by the compulsory withdrawal so dominated me that I had already decided to announce my retirement at Ems" (Bismarck 1898, 94).

The role that emotions, and especially the arousal of anger in the face of humiliation, were supposed to play in this plot is visible in Bismarck's own recollections[50]. The Ems Dispatch, as the account of the meeting in Bad Ems that was released to the public became known as, was intended as a "red rag upon the Gallic bull" and supposed to play on "Gallic overweening and touchiness" (Bismarck 1898, 101). As the chancellor's words emphasize, his goal was not merely the evocation of emotions for their own sake, but rather for the purpose of eliciting an aggressive response from French decision-makers. Thus, the Prussian chancellor attempted to manipulate emotions on the French side in order to make France act in accordance with his preferences and declare war on Prussia.

Bismarck's plan proved to be successful. The French mobilization began on July 14, the day after the Ems Dispatch had been publicized, and on July 19 a declaration of war was sent to Prussia. The driving force was the public's reaction which swept from anger to enthusiasm about the opportunity to answer the Prussian provocation. French decision-makers faced a "rising crescendo of public excitement" (Wetzel 2003, 161; see also Kolkey 1996, 133). Crowds were shouting "On to Berlin! Down with Wilhelm! Down with Bismarck!" (as quoted in Wawro 2003, 38) in the streets of Paris and spectators were cheering for the troops even at remote train station in the countryside (Wawro 2003, 65). In the words of Wetzel:

[50] Obviously, Bismarck wrote his memoirs after the fact and might have described the events of July 1870 in a manner that fits his interests and the image of himself he would like to promote. It has therefore been argued that the "statements in his memoirs are notoriously unreliable and misleading" (Lord 1924, v). The narrative according to which Bismarck planned the Franco-Prussian war well in advance as the last chapter of the two countries' competition "does not today command general assent" (Howard 2001, 40) Additionally, the possibility of the hindsight bias at play has to be kept in mind: the predictability and influenceability of events may seem obvious after they have occurred, even though none of this may have been evident at the time. It is therefore worth keeping in mind that Bismarck's recollections may – intentionally or unintentionally – misrepresent the events.

> Much of the country was celebrating. In Paris, something like hysteria reigned; mobs in the street blurted out the forbidden *Marseillaise* and shouted *'Vive la guerre!'* by day and night. Unbridled joy filled the air. (Wetzel 2003, 3; emphasis in original)

This outpouring of national sentiment left an impression among the elite: nothing but a display of swift and decisive action by the government against Prussia would be acceptable to the upset masses. The recollections of Émile Olliver, at the time Prime Minister of France, illustrate this. In a conversation with Emperor Napoleon III. he cautioned that "the people would throw mud at our carriages and hoot us" if the decision about how to react to the Prussian provocation would not be taken by the Emperor but left to parliament. The Emperor agreed, saying that the decision to go to war had to be taken regardless of necessity "in order to comply with the will of the people" (Olliver 1914, 321).

Similar sentiments arose within the government. Olliver himself describes in his book on the origins of the war that "I was beaten in my fight for peace. […] After this slap in the face from Bismarck peace was no longer possible save in weakness, in humiliation, in debasement" (Olliver 1914, 326). He also quotes his foreign minister, Antoine Gramont, as stating to him that "you see before you a man who has just been slapped in the face" (as quoted in Wetzel 2003, 165). In the same vein, the other ministers of the cabinet perceived the Ems Dispatch and its flaunting in the press and through diplomatic channels as a "deliberate insult", just as the chambers of the French parliament "howled for war" (Lord 1924, 114–15).

This indicates that the Prussian behavior created anger and the enthusiasm to go to war both among the elites as well as the wider public. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the French decision makers in private spoke of the necessity to behave in a way that would fit the public anger. It stands to reason that Napoleon III. and his Prime Minister had qualms

about going to war that were overwhelmed by the public's war fever, as their conversation about the necessity to align with the popular sentiment illustrates. But as Welch argues, the French cabinet was not in a position to resist the public's call for war and the government so weak that it might not have survived opposing these demands (Welch 1993, 87).

With this in mind, the events in July 1880 showcase three forms of outrage as they were conceptualized by Hall in his paper on provocation and the Franco-Prussian war: the personal outrage of decision makers; the performative outrage of decision makers which communicates to the public an image of outrage; and the public outrage (Hall 2017a). In the lead-up to the Franco-Prussian war, a combination of all three forms of outrage can be seen as the driving force behind the events. The perception that Prussia had treated France in a disrespectful manner "resonated through the government and public alike" (Welch 1993, 88). As Hall argues, "French attention—both official and popular—became fixated upon immediate satisfaction, and no other option but the blind rush to war became thinkable" (Hall 2017a, 25). On top of that, the decision makers around Napoleon III. knew about the performance that the angry public expected from them.

As has to be emphasized, the target of this anger was primarily the style of Prussia's behavior, independent of its larger implications for great power politics and the balance of power in Europe. Olliver singles out the Ems Dispatch in his memoirs as the decisive factor behind the French declaration of war. As he writes, the war was caused by neither the tensions between Prussia and France during the previous months and years, nor the Prussian refusal to guarantee a renunciation of the Spanish throne, nor the rejection of the French Ambassador by the Prussian king. Instead, the French "were outraged by that refusal of an audience solely because it had become a palatable insult by virtue of the promulgation of the telegram placarded in the streets and transmitted to the legations and newspapers" (Olliver 1914, 335).

The same emphasis on the style of Prussia's behavior – and the emotional reaction it caused in France – instead of its substance can be found in a statement of Napoleon III. in a conversation with Olliver. "Just see in what a position a government may sometimes find itself: even if we had no admissible excuse for war, we should be obliged none the less to make our minds to it, in order to comply with the will of the country" (as quoted in Olliver 1914, 321). Olliver's own statements point in the same direction. In front of the parliament he argued that war was necessary to defend French dignity in the face of Prussian "pieces of theater", without mentioning any larger necessity[51]. In his words, the cabinet was accepting this responsibility "with light heart" (as quoted in Wawro 2003, 39) and without any qualms.

Other sources equally reference the French sense of honor and its violation. Carr argues that the runup to the Franco-Prussian War saw the emergence of a perception of international affairs "which substituted for rational discussion of disputes the ethos of a dueling match" (Carr 1991, 203). Without this attitude, the events in Spring and Summer 1870 could not have escalated towards a declaration of war. In the same vein, Olliver stresses this feeling of the inevitability to declare war in response to the Prussian provocation in his recollections. He saw "France […] threatened in her dignity and her honor" (Olliver 1914, 298); "we had no choice. Placed between a doubtful war and a dishonorable peace, we were compelled to pronounce for the war" (Olliver 1914, 396).

In this context of the violation of the French sense of honor, anger and the lust for revenge, voices that urged caution were quickly drowned out, attempts at solving the crisis through diplomacy among the great powers were abandoned, and political moderation became an

[51] As other sources emphasize, the Prussian behavior not only violated the French sense of pride and honor but was also met with "one genuine French perception of injustice" (Welch 1993, 89) The Prussian attempt at installing a member of the Hohenzollern family on the Spanish throne went against the international norm of asking for consent among Europe's great powers before placing someone on a foreign throne.

impossibility. Adolphe Thiers, a politician who would become President of the Third French Republic later during the same year, even called out the government in front of parliament for going to war without a substantive reason: "Do you want all of Europe to say that although the substance of the quarrel was settled, you have decided to pour out torrents of blood over a mere matter of form?" (as quoted in Howard 2001, 56; see also Olliver 1914, 330–31; Wawro 2003, 39).

As a result, France declared war on Prussia without a substantial reason, without having realistic objectives and without a clear prospect for victory. From today's perspective, this decision therefore seems irrational (Aschmann 2005, 151). Kolb equally argues that "irrational-emotionale Faktoren" (irrational-emotional factors) (Kolb 1970, 131; translated from German by the author) played a dominant role at the cost of a somber analysis of the situation and the diplomatic options. Howard goes so far as to speak of a "tragic combination of ill-luck, stupidity, and ignorance" that led France to war "in a bad cause, with her army unready and without allies" (Howard 2001, 57). A similar judgment is reached by Wetzel who sees the war with Prussia as an example for the "irrational, costly and ultimately self-destructive purposes" (Wetzel 2012, 143) that France pursued out of nationalist fervor among large parts of its society.

Historians locate a primary reason for the French defeat in the hasty and chaotic mobilization that followed on this enthusiasm. For the troops of Napoleon III. "everything turned on the speed with which they could deploy to the frontiers" (Wawro 2003, 65)[52]. Yet the mobilization ended in disorder as it was undertaken without a comprehensive plan, led by

[52] At the same time, the urgency that sprang from French anger was not the only reason for a hasty mobilization. A quick mobilization was assumed to give France an upper hand in at the outset of the war as it had a large standing army, whereas Prussia would have to mobilize its reserves first in order to ready its smaller army for war (Wawro 2003, 85).

a disorganized high command, stymied by a lack of transport infrastructure, logistical difficulties and a lack of trained reserve soldiers. Not even the food supply of the soldiers on their way towards Prussia could be ensured. This chaos became the primary reason why France was at an overwhelming disadvantage in the war against Prussia from the beginning (Howard 2001, 52–59; Wawro 2003, 67–79).

France, consequently, lost the war in a humiliating fashion and had to surrender in May 1871. The armies of Prussia and its German allies "totally destroyed" (Howard 2001, 1) the French forces and laid bare its outdated foundations. It was inferior not only in terms of manpower, but also in its organization, logistics, strategic planning and leadership. These realities and the advancements made on the Prussian side had been openly visible for years, for example in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Yet they had not resulted in appropriate reforms of the French armed forces, partly out of complacency, partly because of domestic opposition (Carr 1991, 177; Wawro 2003, 41–53, 60–63). On the outset of the war, the French nation was nevertheless "confident in the invincibility of its army" (Olliver 1914, 397), as Olliver wrote later.

These evaluations emphasize what could have been visible to the French decision-makers: declaring war on Prussia was not in France's national interest. But judging from the available evidence, these somber assessments of the situation were cast out by the anger about the Prussian diplomatic conduct and the enthusiasm to go to war. As a result, the French decision-makers were not only convinced that going to war was the right thing to do but also that France would win a war against Prussia (Carr 1991, 200–201; Olliver 1914, 298, 397).

This aspect of the Franco-Prussian War emphasizes how effective this exercise of power was: it not only changed French preferences but did so to an extent that made France act

against its actual interests. It is obviously difficult to determine the "real interest" of a nation – after all, the French public as well as its government were convinced at the time that war was in their interest. Nevertheless, and in accordance with the historians cited on the previous pages, it shall be maintained here that the war did not serve France's larger national interest, and that this was foreseeable.

These observations about the French behavior are congruent with what psychology tells us about the effects of anger and the ways in which it influences human cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior. Anger is usually the result of situations which create the perception that the self has been offended or harmed by someone else. A central element of anger is therefore the perception of unfairness. The perceived source of this unfairness matters: anger is different from sadness, which is usually the result of negative events that are blamed on circumstances, as well as from guilt and shame, which are usually the result of negative events for which oneself is responsible for (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989, 220; Jennifer S. Lerner and Tiedens 2006, 117; Mauro, Sato, and Tucker 1992, 309).

One consequence of anger is the desire to answer the injustice with punishment, independent of the offender's intentions (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999, 789). In fact, anger influences causal judgments and determines how others are seen and how blame is assigned to them. The perception of others as responsible is therefore an integral element of what it means to experience anger. As Keltner et al. argue, under the influence of anger even "our colleagues, friends, loved ones, and children seem lazy, manipulative, and intentionally obtuse" (Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993, 751). On the collective level, anger has been associated with "a psychological readiness to evaluate outgroups negatively vis-á-vis ingroups" and the appearance of negative prejudices against out-groups "from thin air" (DeSteno, Dasgupta, et al. 2004, 323).

As a result, anger leads to "*antagonistic* tendencies" (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989, 220; emphasis in original) and the desire to act. In the words of Izard, anger creates an "impulse to strike out, to attack the source of anger" and "the need for physical action" (Izard 1991, 241). Various studies indicate that these urges go beyond verbal expressions of anger and create a desire of physical action with the intention of inflicting hurt on a target (Berkowitz 1999, 424–25). Elster (2009, 402) describes the action tendency created by anger simply as the desire to cause suffering in the object of anger. Nussbaum even goes so far as to argue that "anger conceptually contains the payback wish" (Nussbaum 2016, 35). Against this backdrop, the French desire to punish Prussia for the perceived offense and the enthusiasm to go to war can be interpreted as a direct result of anger.

In the context of the Franco-Prussian war, the action tendencies on the French side can aptly be described as the desire for revenge (or vengeance). This desire it by no means the only outcome that anger can produce, although it has been described as an integral component of it. The events in Summer 1870 fit Elster's definition of revenge as "the attempt, at some cost or risk to oneself, to impose suffering upon those who have made one suffer, because they have made one suffer" (Elster 1990, 862). It is noteworthy that revenge in itself is not an emotion, yet the desire for revenge showcases all the hallmarks of an emotion, among them a state of impulse and physical excitement as well as an action tendency towards a specific target (Frijda 2007, 260). In reaction to the Prussian provocation, the particular form that anger took on the French side can thus be described as the desire for revenge.

The role that honor played during this historical episode emphasizes how anger brought about the desire for revenge. Of all the explanations that have been advanced for why humans develop the desire for revenge, Elster (1990, 883) considers the drive to assert one's honor as the most convincing. Elsewhere, too, the drive to restore pride and escape shame,

to get even and correct a perceived loss of power are seen as reasons for why we desire revenge (Frijda 2007, 265–74). This fits with how historians see the French sense of honor and its violation at the center of the Franco-Prussian war. Anger therefore went hand in hand with the desire to right the perceived wrong, possibly to the extent that this desire was perceived as a moral duty (Aschmann 2005, 153–54).

These action tendencies induced by anger go hand in hand with a sense of urgency. The concept is different from impatience: whereas the latter describes a preference for early rewards, urgency refers to a preference for early action (Elster 2009). This helps to explain why France declared war against Prussia a mere six days after the Ems Dispatch had been released and in the absence of any urgent threat that would have necessitated this haste.

The historical circumstances were conducive to this reaction. The French anger was created in a situation in which the relations with Prussia were already strained and characterized by aggressive tendencies on both sides. It is possible that the result was a vicious cycle. As Tiedens (2001, 248) argues, aggressive individuals make more hostile inferences, which in turn make aggressive behavior more likely. Thus, it stands to reason that the Prussian provocation might have had less of an effect if relations with France had not already been at a low point.

From anger, thus, came the desire to respond to the offense and punish Prussia, which led France into a war that it would lose decisively. Anger can be part of the explanation for the seeming irrationality of this decision: as various studies have shown, it decreases risk perceptions, leads to more optimistic evaluations as well as to risk-seeking behavior (Hemenover and Zhang 2004; J. S. Lerner and Keltner 2001; J. S. Lerner et al. 2003; Jennifer S. Lerner and Tiedens 2006, 123). In fact, the judgments of probabilities and consequences made by angry individuals are similar to those made by happy individuals and, thus, very

different from the pessimistic outlook of individuals under the influence of fear (J. S. Lerner and Keltner 2001, 150). From the French perspective, the odds of winning a war against Prussia might therefore have looked better than they actually were.

Other consequences of anger, too, indicate that it likely had an effect on French reasoning and decision making. Anger has been associated by various studies with a feeling of certainty about what is going on, a lower depth of mental processing as well as an increased reliance on stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süsser 1994, 621; Jennifer S. Lerner and Tiedens 2006, 125–26; Tiedens and Linton 2001, 981). Angry individuals are therefore likely to take mental shortcuts and to "rely on simple cues in reacting to social stimuli" (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer 1994, 58), possibly because anger elicits quick responses meant to deal with a source of harm. The afore-mentioned sense of urgency that anger creates also plays into this as it leads to "short-term-ism" (Elster 2009, 403) through which little time is spent on the gathering of information and the thinking about long-term consequences.

Emotions like anger also help to determine how attention is directed and information processed. Depending on their emotional state, individuals tend to consider information as more persuasive that matches their own emotions. For example, angry individuals consider arguments in favor of tax increases as more convincing if these were presented as necessary to deal with angering problems (such as traffic jams) rather than saddening problems (such as the plight of special-needs children). In other words: angry individuals "turn to their emotions as a source of information" (DeSteno, Petty, et al. 2004, 52).

While much of the research on anger and its effects concerns itself with individuals, some of these insights were shown to also apply to groups of individuals and other collectives. As Mackie et al. argue, anger makes members of a group more likely to show "action tendencies like arguing with, confronting, opposing, and attacking the out-group" (Mackie,

Devos, and Smith 2000, 613), especially compared to the influence of fear. Similar to what was already mentioned about individuals, the study by Mackie et al. also illustrates that the perception of one's own group as strong increases the experience of anger and, thus, the inclination to act against another group (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000, 614).

The political implications of anger's effects on cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior in the context of political decision making have been looked at by a number of authors. On the basis of surveys, Huddy et al. analyzed the effects of anger and anxiety on public support for the Iraq War in 2002 and 2003 in the United States. As they conclude: "Anger leads to a reduced perception of the war's risks and promotes support for military intervention" (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007, 228). They furthermore reason that anger leads to a proclivity for action and lets individuals adopt opinions that are "designed to propel action by ignoring contrary information about possible risks" (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007, 229). The authors interpret this as an expression of a lower intellectual effort that is put into thinking about decisions under the influence of anger.

Of particular relevance in the context of international relations is also the link between self-perception and anger. As Lebow writes about the Aristotelian understanding of anger, it is "a luxury that can only be felt by those in a position to seek revenge" (Lebow 2008, 69). France saw itself on eye-level with Prussia, thus it experienced the anger that great powers feel "when they are denied entry into the system, recognition as a great power or treated in a manner demeaning to their understanding of their status" (Lebow 2008, 69). For the context of the events in 1870 this implies that a weaker state than France might have experienced the Prussian humiliation without an angry reaction.

These implications of anger help to illuminate the French decision to go to war. It is likely that cognition, thinking, judgment and behavior on the French side were shaped by anger. One can assume that this influence of anger manifested itself in several aspects of this

historical episode: the intensive French desire to punish Prussia and the righteous believe in the utility of war; the believe in the French capacity to decisively strike against Prussia; the optimism and urgency with which France took to arms; and the blindness for information that would have led to a reconsideration of the chances for victory in an armed conflict with Prussia. While this, obviously, is a counterfactual, it stands to reason that Franco-Prussian relations and European history might have taken a different course without these influences of anger.

From the outside, the French response to Bismarck's provocation creates the "Eindruck von Irrationalität" (impression of irrationality) (Aschmann 2005, 151; translated from German by the author), of "stupidity, and ignorance" (Howard 2001, 57), and of decisions that served only "irrational, costly and ultimately self-destructive purposes" (Wetzel 2012, 143). These harsh evaluations of the French behavior are common judgments of behavior that is driven by the desire for revenge. The "apparent uselessness of revenge and its occasional self-destructiveness" (Frijda 2007, 261) are among the hallmarks of this desire and make it seem, from the outside and in hindsight, as inherently irrational. France, furthermore, is certainly not alone in the history of international relations in that it was driven by this desire. As Lebow and Stein write:

> From Masada to the Irish Easter Rising, from Thermopylae to the resistance of the beleaguered Finns in 1940 [...] Honor, anger, and national self-respect proved more compelling motives for action than pragmatic calculations of material loss and gain would have been reasons for acquiescence or passivity. (Lebow and Stein 2007, 125)

Yet it is questionable if the desire for revenge in itself can be actually considered irrational or unpragmatic. An actor can expect meaningful gains from the desire for revenge, for example the restoration of a sense of honor, pride and justice. What may be considered

irrational are the emotions that underpin this desire for revenge (Frijda 2007, 264–65). Once the French mood was characterized by anger, the desire for revenge and the conclusion that this desire should be enacted by going to war were thus rational conclusions from the French perspective. Thus, if France is to blame for anything in this context, it is probably for falling victim to this degree of anger, not for reaching certain conclusions under this influence of anger.

Regardless of these evaluations in hindsight, the French perspective at the time was quite different and characterized by enthusiasm, certainty, a feeling of righteousness and optimism. This illustrates what Lerner and Tiedens have argued about anger: while it is usually perceived as a negative emotion in hindsight, the actual experience of anger can be positive, energizing and even joyful. The action tendencies caused by anger, after all, lead to forward reflection and plans that address the source of the anger (Jennifer S. Lerner and Tiedens 2006, 129–30). This gave the French public as well as the country's decision makers little incentive to question the assumptions they were making and the actions they were undertaking. Instead of careful considerations that take into account all available information, anger became the dominant determinant of the French incentive structure.

The exercise of power described by this case study can therefore be found in the creation of anger and the subsequent influence of this anger on the behavior of France. It changed the perceived costs and benefits associated with the available courses of action and, as a result, led French decision makers as well as the public to conclude that going to war with Prussia was a more attractive option than the alternatives, for example a mere diplomatic voicing of anger.

The target of this exercise of power – or, in the schematic terms used in this study, actor B – were the individuals that constitute the French nation as a collective actor. Both the elites as well as the wider public experienced anger, and whereas the actual decision to declare

war against Prussia was made by the former, the popular demands for an armed response were part of the reason why this decision was made. This does not imply that every last citizen of France felt this emotion. But the anger that overcame France was sufficient to create an impression among decision makers of national outrage, and to lead to decisions at the very top that made the nation as a collective actor behave in a way that was intended by Bismarck.

Actor A, consequently, has to be found on the Prussian side. But whereas France as a nation was targeted and affected by this exercise of power, it was not exercised by Prussia as a nation. The decisive actions were all undertaken by Bismarck himself and without much contribution or even knowledge of other parts of the Prussian government. Even Wilhelm I. cannot be described as an active and willing participant in Prussia's instigation of a war with France. "His conduct and his talk throughout the crisis show that he was reluctant, in his old age, to engage in another war" (Steefel 1962, 214). Going beyond this assessment, Welch concludes that "the King, too, had been a pawn in Bismarck's game" (Welch 1993, 91). In the context of this case study, actor A can therefore be found in a single person – even though the French people certainly saw Bismarck's behavior as representative for Prussia as a whole.

In summary, this case study argues that Prussia, first and foremost in the person of Otto von Bismarck, was able to influence France's first as well as second order preferences in a way that suited its own interests. By violating the French sense of honor and by creating emotions such as anger, Prussia got France to want what it wanted it to want: declaring war. This decision was made against the real national interest of France and illustrates how the manipulation of emotions can change preferences.

As in the case study on the American nuclear bombs dropped on Japan, it must be emphasized that the claim made by this case study is narrow. While it intends to show that the

Prussian exercise of power played a role in provoking the French declaration of war, it does not argue that it represents the sole cause. During the years before the outbreak of the war in 1870, stringent nationalism and mutual animosity became prominent aspects of the Franco-Prussian relationship (Carr 1991, 144–52). These attitudes were fanned by several political crises that arose out of the power politics between the two countries. Additionally, domestic interests provided incentives to decision-makers on both sides to escalate foreign policy disputes. Bismarck saw therein a chance to unite the German states, Napoleon III. a chance to compensate for repeated diplomatic failures (Wawro 2003, 22).

Against this backdrop, historians have a hard time agreeing on the cause of the war. Halperin, for example, argues that there was "eagerness for a showdown" on the French side, yet there might have been no war without the events surrounding the candidature for the Spanish throne (S. W. Halperin 1973, 83, 91). Carr (1991, 161) points out that the war was by no means inevitable, whereas Wawro argues it "might as easily have come in 1867, 1868, or 1869" as the two countries "went to the brink of war in each of those years" (Wawro 2003, 22).

Beyond the evaluations of historians, a number of IR scholars have interpreted the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in Realist terms and as a product of, first and foremost, the logic of the international system and considerations about power. Welch, for example, labels it "very clearly the product of Realist motivations" (Welch 1993, 77, 92) and proposes to interpret it through the lens of power transition theory. In the same vein, Organski and Kugler (1980) used the Franco-Prussian war to illustrate the workings and the validity of power transition theory.

It can therefore not be said with absolute certainty to what extend the Ems Dispatch actually changed preferences on the French side. War might have come without it as it was seen as necessary and inevitable on both sides - or simply because it was the result of dynamics in

the international system. At the same time, there is no dispute that the reaction it provoked in France was the immediate cause of the war.

This case study, therefore, merely argues that the Prussian exercise of power in July 1870 led to the French declaration of war – but not that it represents the sole cause of the war or that war would not have happened without it. Yet any explanation of this historical episode that does not take into account the creation and the influence of anger can hardly paint a complete picture of the events. Without paying attention to the role of anger, it is difficult to explain how Bismarck got what he wanted at the moment he wanted it – and why France went into a war that should probably have been recognized as a bad idea from the start. Anger may not have been the sole cause of the Franco-Prussian war, yet it is a variable that cannot be ignored in explaining how Bismarck got France to want what he wanted it to want.

2. The Failure to Alleviate Anger: Japan and South Korea

Another example for how anger can become an object of power can be found in the relations between Japan and South Korea during the past decades. Similar to the examples involving South Korea and the United States in the previous chapter, this case does not focus on the creation or stirring of an emotion, but rather an attempt at weakening it. Beyond that, the relationship between Japan and South Korea illustrates an aspect of how power and emotions interact that has so far not received attention in this study: that attempts at exercising power by manipulating emotions can fail. In this case, Japan has attempted for decades to placate the South Korean anger about the way in which the Japanese gov-

ernment and individual politicians have distorted, embellished or ignored the colonial history between the two countries and the atrocities that Japan committed during that era[53]. But while there were episodes of formal progress, the anger visible on the South Korean side has largely persisted and even grown.

At this point, an obvious question is whether the Japanese attempts at reconciliation with South Korea do actually represent an exercise of power. After all, one can reasonably suppose that both countries have an interest in reconciliation, and that both countries prefer a positive relationship with each other to one that is marked by negative perceptions, anger and mistrust. Under the assumption that power only describes the influence of actor A on actor B's behavior against B's will, this case would certainly not qualify as an exercise of power. But as explained in chapter III, this study assumes that power merely describes A making B behave in a way that suits A's interests, independent of whether this behavior suits the interest of B or goes against them. The attempt to change South Korea's negative perception of and emotions towards Japan is, in this context, therefore an attempt at exercising power over South Korea.

Opinion surveys shine a light on the negative attitudes in South Korea towards Japan. According to polls taken by the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies since 2015, the South Korean public generally views Japan as well as its Prime Minister as less favorable than both

[53] The Korean peninsula was under formal colonial rule by Japan from 1910 to 1945. The legacy of this era is controversial: on the one hand, the Japanese occupation brought wide-ranging reforms and industrial development to Korea. On the other hand, the Korean people, their culture and self-determination were suppressed and dissent was answered with violence. During the past two decades, the "comfort women" have been a particularly contentious issue in this context. The term refers euphemistically to tens of thousands of girls and women from Korea and other Asian countries who were forced into sexual slavery by the colonial government and the Japanese army before and during the Second World War. The issue rose to prominence in the relations between Japan and South Korea only in the 1990s after numerous of the former comfort women broke their silence, research into the issue intensified and the Japanese government had to admit the existence of an organized system of sex slavery in Imperial Japan.

the United States and China, and only marginally more positive than North Korea (The Asan Institute for Policy Studies 2018, 11, 12). Surveys conducted by the PEW Research Center as well as the Japanese think tank Genron NPO equally point to an extraordinarily negative perception of Japan in South Korea. The latter report provides some details on the underlying reasons: from the South Korean perspective, the dominant issue that divides the two countries is the lack of reflection in Japan about the past (besides an ongoing dispute about the ownership of a group of islands located between the two countries) (Stokes 2015; The Genron NPO 2017).

This is surprising in so far as that the Japanese government has repeatedly expressed regret, sorrow and apologies towards South Korea for the injustices and atrocities of the colonial era. These statements were made since the 1950s on various occasions by Prime Ministers, other high-ranking government officials, through parliamentary resolutions, and by two Emperors. In addition, the Japanese government paid or organized the payment of compensation money to South Korea and private victims on several occasions. Especially the 1990s saw what has been described as an "apology boom" (Dudden 2014, 39).

A landmark in this context was the statement issued by the cabinet of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in August 1995, five decades after the Pacific War and Japan's colonial empire came to an end. It went beyond previous declarations with its references to "profound remorse" and "heartfelt apology" and is still used as a model for Japan's official stance and a benchmark for new statements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1995; see also Clements 2018, 13; Kawashima et al. 2017; Lind 2008, 62; Rose 2005, 103–4).

Yet this so-called Murayama Statement and the events surrounding it also illustrate why negative perceptions in Korea largely persist. Alongside the government's declaration, a resolution by the Japanese Diet was supposed to express the same sentiments. But as there

was no agreement within the parliament about what blame the country should actually accept and apologize for, the outcome was a consensus statement with vague and weak phrases. Instead of an apology, the resolution only referred to "deep remorse", to name but one example from the text. It thereby put on display the absence of a "national consensus on coming to terms with the past or striving for genuine reconciliation" (He 2009, 240). The fact that half the members of the diet even abstained from voting on the resolution out of disagreement only emphasized this.

Other events not only put on display the absence of a consensus among the Japanese elites about remorse and apologies, but even called into question what had been expressed in the past. This became evident in 2001 when a dispute about the government approval of new textbooks became the focus of diplomacy in the region. At the time, as on several occasions before, nationalistic and conservative forces in Japan tried to publish school textbooks that cast a particular light on the country's colonial era, downplaying Japanese atrocities and omitting or embellishing references to victims, among them the comfort women. The government in 2001 approved the textbooks in question, against the protest of the South Korean and the Chinese governments, and after numerous official statements that were interpreted as a step away from the understanding of Japan's history expressed in the Murayama Statement. These textbooks have since been approved once more several times (Kimura 2016, 15–18; Seaton 2007, 89–91; Yang 2013, 32–34).

The same year brought into office Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. His behavior and statements repeatedly strained relations with Japan's neighbors until he left office in 2005. Most controversially, he made yearly visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo where those who fell in Japan's wars since the 19th century are commemorated. Among them are more than a thousand convicted war criminals, fourteen of which were found guilty of crimes

against peace. These visits drew criticism from South Korea and China, yet Koizumi rejected the notion that his behavior was of any diplomatic significance or that it honored the war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni. Instead, he justified his decision as a "matter of the heart" (as quoted in Uchiyama 2010, 148). And while Koizumi was the most prominent visitor at the time, he was by no means alone. Other politicians routinely did the same, for example in April 2005 when more than 80 members of the diet visited the shrine (Kajimoto 2005).

The reactions in South Korea were predictable: diplomatic expressions of anger and disappointment, summons of the Japanese ambassador, public protests, even self-mutilations of activists (du Mars and Rennie 2001; McCurry 2006; The Japan Times 2003, 2004). The response in China was not any more favorable; the governments in Beijing and Seoul even banded together in protest and cancelled a scheduled summit with Japan in 2005 (Iida 2013, 175). In opinion surveys conducted during Koizumi's time in office, about seven out of ten South Koreans expressed a negative perception of Japan and more than 80% voiced opposition to the shrine visits (The Japan Times 2005). Koizumi and his government have therefore been credited with producing the "frostiest relations and greatest public anger in East Asia for a generation" (Seaton 2007, 58–59).

None of this is to say that Japan underwent a fundamental change of its stance during the Koizumi years. In fact, the Prime Minister issued a statement on the day of his first visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001 in which he expressed remorse for Japan's aggression of the past:

> Following a mistaken national policy during a certain period in the past, Japan imposed, through its colonial rule and aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering particularly to the people of the neighboring countries in Asia. This has left a still incurable scar to many people in the region. Sincerely facing

> these deeply regrettable historical facts as they are, here I offer my feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2001)

Half a year later, during a visit to South Korea, Koizumi once again expressed remorse and laid down a wraith at a former prison and museum in Seoul which was built during the colonial era and had housed Korean independence activists (French 2001). In 2005, another four years later, he abstained from visiting the Yasukuni shrine and released a statement that went beyond his previous remarks. It spoke of "colonial rule and invasion" and "apologies from my heart", thereby echoing the wording of the Murayama Statement from a decade earlier (Onishi 2005). Yet, as if to contextualize these words, members of his cabinet as well as several dozen members of the Japanese diet were visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on the same day.

The reasons for these seemingly contradictory actions are complex. To stay with the controversy surrounding the shrine: what a visit to Yasukuni actually means is a matter of interpretation. While South Koreans perceive them as a glorification and celebration of the past by the Japanese government, Koizumi stressed on numerous occasions that his visits are private, serve exclusively the purpose of mourning, are not dedicated to the war criminals honored in the shrine, and purely a domestic matter.

Koizumi's visits were also interpreted as serving a domestic purpose to win support among conservative lawmakers for other agenda items. They have also been cast as part of an effort at reinventing Japan vis-à-vis its neighbors: as a country that does not defer to criticism from abroad anymore. The public perception of these visits equally illustrate the complexity of the issue: public opinion was largely split about the appropriateness of visits to the Yasukuni Shrine throughout these years (Cheung 2017, 81–82; Deans 2007, 276–80; Fukuoka 2013, 38; Koga 2016).

These many contradictions lie at the heart of the South Korean perception that Japan's expressions of remorse are not genuine, and that the statements of Japanese politicians cannot be trusted. Japanese officials can routinely be seen offering apologies for the past – only for them or other officials to engage in a form of "apology nullification" (Seaton 2007, 59) afterwards. This process oftentimes involves what Lind has described as "permissible lies" (Lind 2009, 143) through which politicians and even government members glorify history, for example by embellishing Japan's colonial policies, without facing any official reprimands. Since the 1990s, there has therefore been little progress in the politics of reconciliation. In fact, it seems unlikely that the apologies will ever live up to the demands that some recipients have after decades of disappointment and mistrust (Dudden 2014, 41).

> In sum, since the 1990s, Koreans have reacted with shock and outrage to words and deeds by Japanese politicians that have glorified, denied, or justified past violence. Koreans view such statements as reflections of Japan's true hostile intentions. Thus, although Koreans recognize and appreciate contrite gestures, Japan's unapologetic remembrance has eroded any positive effects and has sustained Korean distrust. (Lind 2008, 89)

Against this backdrop, the Japanese attempt to exercise power by manipulating South Korean perceptions and emotions can be judged a failure. As Dudden emphasizes, this represents an "apology failure" and not a "failure to apologize" (Dudden 2014, 33). The Japanese government did apologize numerous times and continues to do so. Yet these apologies amount only to an attempt at exercising power, not a successful exercise. They are not taken serious on the South Korean side and therefore fail to produce the intended effect: the alleviation of anger. In fact, the Japanese apology nullifications rather keep this anger alive as they continuously provide the South Korean people with evidence for the perceptions and emotions they already harbor. Even seven decades after the end of Japan's colonial rule

over the Korean peninsula, reconciliation has therefore not been achieved in any meaningful sense.

VIII. Conclusion

1. Limitations

Although this study aims to describe and illustrate in a comprehensive fashion how power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions, it comes with a number of limitations. These are, first and foremost, a result of how power is conceptualized here and the choice of case studies. As was already mentioned in the introduction, the idea of *power over* represents only a limited and inevitably incomplete understanding of what power is. The specific definition of power utilized here further limits how the concept is understood in this study. Beyond these theoretical foundations, the case studies were selected with several criteria in mind, among them a focus on interactions among states. While certain ways in which power and emotions interact in international relations have therefore been outlined, many others did not receive attention. The following section will therefore spell out several of the limitations of this study and briefly point out alternative choices that could have been made in order to describe and illustrate the interactions of power and emotions that are absent in this study.

Focus on power over

This study approaches power exclusively from the perspective of *power over*. This focus was chosen as it was seen as the most promising one for exploring how the exercise of power can rely on the manipulation of emotions. Not part of this study are therefore alternative conceptions of power. Among them are the concept of *power to*, which is most prominently embodied by the element of national power approach in IR, as well as conceptions of power such as *power with* that emphasize the cooperative, not the dominating dimension of power processes between actors. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that both

of these alternative approaches to power can be the foundation for fruitful research on the exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions.

The first one of these alternatives, the conception of power as *power to*, has the potential to illuminate the resources and skills that underlie the exercise of *power over* through emotions. The IR literature so far includes little work on these foundations of the manipulation of emotions. One of the few exceptions are Nye's writings on soft power and leadership. He describes emotional intelligence as an essential skill for the purposes of leadership, the exercise of soft power and the creation of attraction in others (Nye 2008, 69–71, 92). In other words, emotional intelligence provides the *power to* that is necessary to exercise soft power, and therefore a form of *power over*. A similar concept was developed by Kramer who speaks of political intelligence, which he contrasts from emotional intelligence, soft power and the strategic use of empathy. Individuals with political power "appreciate the power of fear and its close relation, anxiety" (Kramer 2006, 91); they intimidate to exercise power. Both emotional and political intelligence thereby describe skillsets and capacities on the basis of which emotions are manipulated to exercise power.

The vast literature on the leadership styles of American Presidents illustrates how the exercise of power can be looked at through this lens. Emotional intelligence has been described as an indispensable quality of presidents, and especially so with an eye on how they control their own emotions and the emotions of those around them. On this basis, politicians such as Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton have been described as "emotionally handicapped" (Greenstein 2009b, 219). With an eye on IR, the "defective emotional intelligence" (Greenstein 2009a, 3) of Woodrow Wilson has even been named as a reason for the failure of the Treaty of Versailles. And Nye (2016) himself

ascribed Donald Trump a deficit in terms of emotional intelligence that makes him unsuitable for office. The skills of powerful individuals to manage emotions, both those of others and their own, can therefore be interpreted as a form of *power to*.

The *power to* that is necessary to manipulate emotions for the purpose of exercising the *power over* can also be sought in materials means. Most prominently in IR, nuclear weapons have been described as a means to manipulate emotions. The prospect of mutually assured destruction during the Cold War has therefore been said to have produced not only a balance of power, but also as a balance of terror. This balance is maintained by a "vicious circle of fear" (Edwards 1986, 167) that motivates all sides in a conflict to keep their nuclear guard up and prevents escalation. In fact, fear has been described as the hallmark of the nuclear era. As Boyer argues in his study on how the nuclear bombs shaped American public thought and culture, the atomic explosions in the summer of 1945 "bisected history" and brought to America's consciousness "a new and terrible fear of unfathomable magnitude" (Boyer 1994, 105, 133). The presence of certain resources can therefore provide the *power to*, but it can also exercise a form of *power over* in its own right.

Focus on the intentional exercise of power

One of the criteria for the selection of case studies was the intentionality of the power exercise at play. This corresponds with the definition of power utilized here and its focus on intentional exercises of power. This criterium was applied to avoid the analyses of historical cases in which the exercise of power could easily be dismissed as a collateral effect or simply luck. But while this study and various other authors consider intentionality a necessary element of the *power over*, the concept can also be understood without reliance on intentionality. As Lukes argues, it imaginable that power can be exercised "without deliberatively seeking to do so, in routine or unconsidered ways" (Lukes 1986, 1). Advocates of power as a structural phenomenon, such as Foucault, even go beyond that and argue that

the exercise of power does not require any agency at all. Structural power is therefore commonly interpreted as free of intentionality.

In the IR literature, the idea that the *power over* can be exercised in unintentional ways has received attention especially where it relates to processes such as attraction and co-optation. In the writings by Manners about the normative power of the European Union, one mechanism underlying this power is contagion: the "unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other political actors" (Manners 2002, 244). The concept of soft power, too, features the unintentional exercise of power. The original writings of Nye describe a country's foreign policies as one foundation of soft power; much of the literature and rhetoric about soft power therefore focus on the right policies to exercise soft power. Yet Nye also speaks of culture and political values as soft power resources, both of which can hardly be described as products of an intentional effort to produce soft power. With this in mind, soft power and its utilization of emotions can not only be the result of intentional behavior but also of "unintended consequences and larger social forces" (Nye 2011b, 14, 84).

Focus on state-to-state interactions

As the dominant unit in IR scholarship is the state, the focus of the case studies here lies on interactions among states. Yet it is not only states that exercise power over the behavior of other states by manipulating their emotions. Non-state actors can equally exercise this power or be affected by it. In fact, some non-state actors excel in the manipulation of emotions in order to change others' behavior. To name but one example, organizations such as the international animal rights advocacy group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) strive to create disgust and anger through campaigns that depict the industrial treatment and inhumane suffering of animals. The goal: to effect changes in popular attitudes and government legislation via the manipulation of emotions.

The targeting of emotions by non-state actors also plays an integral role in one of the dominant themes of contemporary Western security politics: radical Islamic terrorism. The perpetrators usually have few financial and materials means available; their attacks do not pose a significant threat to the existence of Western societies and their functioning; and they cause death and destruction on a scale that pales in consideration to other sources of harm, for example unhealthy lifestyles. Instead, they aim to exert power on a more subliminal level by creating an atmosphere of insecurity and fear:

> The only strategic impact of the attacks is their psychological effect. They do not affect the west's military capabilities; they even strengthen them, by putting an end to military budget cuts. They have a marginal economic effect, and only jeopardise our democratic institutions to the extent that we ourselves call them into question through the everlasting debate on the conflict between security and the rule of law. The fear is that our own societies will implode and there will be a civil war between Muslims and the "others". (Roy 2017)

The manipulation of emotions allows non-state actors even to exercise power over the behavior of great powers. One example is the way in which Somali insurgents in 1993 and 1994 were able to cause the withdrawal of American troops from the UN peacekeeping mission in the country. Aware that a change in public opinion could diminish the American resolve to stay (Blechman and Wittes 1999, 5), they exploited a botched military raid in Mogadishu to create images for the world media of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of the city. The public's attitudes in the United States about the supposedly humanitarian mission of its soldiers did indeed change and led to widespread calls for the withdrawal of American troops. The result was pressure on President Clinton and, ultimately, the decision to pull out of Somalia in 1994 (Rutherford 2008, 161–68).

This reaction was "driven by media images and the emotions they can generate" (Logan 1996, 173), and primarily by shock, anger and frustration. This effect lingered for years and has been referred to as the "Mogadishu factor". It has been named as one of the reasons for why the international community did not intervene when atrocities were unfolding in places like Rwanda and Srebrenica (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 135). This illustrates how power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions by non-state actors – and potentially to the extent that a rudimentarily equipped group of insurgents is able to manipulate the behavior of a superpower like the United States. It stands to reason that many non-state actors even have incentives to attempt manipulating the emotions of those they want to exercise power over: where military might and economic weight are not available to exercise power, manipulating emotions may be an alternative.

Of relevance for international affairs is furthermore the power that states exercise over their own populations by manipulating emotions. While this process might not in itself influence international affairs, it can shore up support for specific foreign policies or demonstrate certain attitudes towards the outside world. Examples are abounding: the promotion of fear in the United States and Great Britain by the respective governments during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Cardaras 2013; Northcott 2012); the stirring of resentment at home towards Japan by the South Korean and the Chinese government (He 2007; Wiegand and Choi 2017; Zhao 1998); and the efforts of governments to create alarmism about the impending consequences of climate change (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009, 358).

Focus on powerful states

This study limits the scope of its case studies not only to interactions among nation states. It also uses only particular states as examples. What unites all case studies is that they focus on extraordinarily powerful states that exercise power over less powerful states. The case studies on how the United States was able to change the behavior of Japan, West Germany

and South Korea exemplify this as they take the behavior of a superpower as their respective starting point. The remaining case studies on Prussia's and Japan's exercises of power are equally about states that count (or counted at the time when the events in question took place) among the heavyweights in international relations, even though they may not be comparable to the extraordinary position of the United States.

This focus on powerful states is somewhat unintuitive in the context of a study. The perception of these nations as powerful is rooted in material factors such as economic activity or military capacity. This study, in contrast to that, deals with a largely immaterial phenomenon. It would therefore be an obvious choice to focus on states that, based on the idea that power is based on material factors, are generally not perceived as powerful yet manage to exercise power through the manipulation of emotions. This would have had the potential to isolate the exercise of power through the manipulation of emotions from other factors that could explain how power was exercised, for example material means. Independent of that, a particularly interesting starting point for case studies would be interactions in which a less powerful state manages to exercise power by manipulating the emotions of a more powerful state.

Yet this study puts its focus on powerful states in order to achieve its goal: to bring emotions back into the mainstream IR discourse. The discipline deals, first and foremost, with powerful states and their interactions. Case studies that illustrate how less powerful states exercise power would have inevitably come with the implication that the argument made here may apply to states with little power – but that it cannot tell us much about powerful states. After all, there are already sufficient explanations of how these powerful states exercise power. The choice to look at powerful states in the case studies was therefore made to engage with the discipline's mainstream and its conception of power, and to illustrate

that a focus on power and emotions can provide insights even where lots of work has already been done.

None of this is to imply that case studies on countries with little power would not be worthwhile. As the previous section already illustrated for non-state actors, a focus on power and emotions can provide insights into various prominent topics in IR. This is the case for terrorism and insurgencies; and this is probably true for understanding the role and behavior of middle powers and small states. Some texts on soft power and public diplomacy haven already taken this approach, even though they usually do not speak explicitly about emotions and power. To pick two examples: countries like Norway and Canada have been described as middle powers that have and exercise power not only on the basis of their material means, but also because they assert themselves as stewards of "attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking" (Nye 2004, 9), thereby cultivating an international reputation and creating goodwill (Henrikson 2005).

Focus on negative emotions

The case studies presented in this study all focus on emotions that are commonly interpreted as negative or unpleasant: shock in the case of the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan; fear in the case of the American relations with West Germany and South Korea; and anger in the case of the German provocations towards France and the legacy of Japan's colonial empire in South Korea. These examples, obviously, do not cover the whole spectrum of emotions and, in particular, exclude emotions generally perceived to be positive or pleasant[54]. This is not meant to imply that power cannot be exercised through the manipulation

[54] To categorize emotions based on whether they are of a positive or negative nature is in fact common in the literature and not merely a simplification that we see in everyday language (Verweij et al. 2015, 3).

of emotions in positive ways. In fact, much of the existing research that implies a link between power and emotions has focused on positive examples of the latter.

Arguably the most prominent example in IR is that of soft power. The principal author of the concept, Joseph Nye, repeatedly refers in his writings to the link between the exercise of soft power and the manipulation of emotions. As he argues, soft power can "inspire followers through the careful management of emotion" and "create an emotional attraction for followers" (Nye 2008, 55, 92). Among the skills necessary to exercise soft power is therefore emotional intelligence (Nye 2008, 69–70). By definition, the emotions manipulated in this context have to be of a positive nature in order to create attraction, and thereby to allow for "leading by example and attracting others to do what you want" (Nye 2004, 5).

The idea that positive emotions are of relevance in international relations and the exercise of power is also visible in works on friendship between states (Berenskoetter 2014; Eznack and Koschut 2014), on the constitution of empathy, solidarity and community in the aftermath of disasters (Hutchison 2010, 2016, 183–210), on the expression of amity within security communities (Koschut 2014) as well as of sympathy by one state towards another state in times of tragedy (Hall 2015, 80–109). Where these positive emotions appear in the IR literature, they oftentimes go hand in hand with a conception of power that is different from the *power over*, at least if it is understood as representing domination and conflictual relations. Rather, the afore-mentioned examples point towards Arendt's understanding of power as "the ability to act in concert" (Arendt 1972, 143) or Allen's (1998) concept of "power with" that can imply empowerment, legitimacy and solidarity.

Focus on agency-driven power

Early on in this study, power was defined as a process that involves two actors. Explicitly excluded were structural forms of power which exercise power without any clear form of

agency or intentionality. But as explained in the context of the debate on the faces of power, this is by no means an inevitability. Authors like Michel Foucault have conceptualized power as a structural phenomenon and a fourth face of power has been described on this foundation. In the chapter on power it has also been outlined that structural power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions, and that this process is captured by concepts such as that of emotional regimes. Yet this dimension of how power and emotions interact has been largely excluded from this study. This represents another limitation of the argument made here.

This omission deserves special attention. As was described on the previous pages, it is relatively easy to see how the interplay of power and emotions could be explored with an eye on the *power to*, on unintentional exercises of power, exercises of power by and over actors other than nation states, and through the manipulation of positive emotions. It is much less intuitive to imagine how structural power is exercised in world politics through the manipulation of emotions and how emotional regimes shape events on the international stage. For this reason, it is worth to briefly describe one potential example for structural power and an emotional regime in some detail.

The example in question is the emotional regime that regulates Western - and possibly all modern - attitudes towards warfare. The workings of this regime become visible once contemporary attitudes are compared to the attitudes that drove Europe into the First World War during the early 20th century. Whereas warfare was once seen as a "glorious, heroic, holy, thrilling, manly, or cleansing" activity, it became a "repulsive, uncivilized, futile, stupid, wasteful, and cruel" (Pinker 2012, 247; see also Linklater 2011, 21; Mueller 1989, 264; Stalfort 2013, 117) endeavor. The transformation of this emotional regime re-defined which emotions the thought of warfare is associated with and what attitude towards warfare counts as normal.

While this transformation of the dominant emotional regime has not driven violence from the international system, it has been linked to the decade-long absence of major warfare, a global increase in human security and the spread of human right norms.

To characterize this emotional regime, the concept of romantic militarism can be utilized. The term was coined by Rosenblum who defined it as an attitude towards war as "as *the* way to enforce justice and as *the* occasion for self-expression" (Rosenblum 1982, 249; emphasis in original). Romantic militarism is therefore different from ordinary militarism, which concerns itself with the emphasis of the militaristic over the civilian, as well as from the love of war, which finds excitement and comfort in armed conflict. Rather, it describes "an imaginative invention and a psychological stance" (Rosenblum 1982, 249). Romantic militarism does therefore not equal a tendency for or glorification of aggression and warmongering; it rather exists in "heroic dreams" (Rosenblum 1987, 9) and "romanticizations of soldiering and war" in contrast to the "frustrations with ordinary civilian life" (Rosenblum 1998, 248).

As must be emphasized, romanticism is not an emotion in itself. Just as was the case for shock and honor in the previous case studies, so does romanticism rather refer to a larger concept that involves a number of emotions and cannot function without them. According to the dictionary definition, romanticism describes an attitude "marked by the imaginative or emotional appeal of what is heroic, adventurous, remote, mysterious, or idealized" (Merriam-Webster 2018). A romantic attitude, for example towards militarism, is therefore inherently emotional and characterized by positive emotions. And one place where this romantic militarism and the emotional regime that went hand in hand with it were particularly strong was Europe. As an advisor to US President Woodrow Wilson wrote from Germany in Spring 1914 about the situation on the continent: "The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark mad" (as quoted in Link 1956, 315).

This attitude was a product of structural forces and, in particular, socialization, as was maybe best visible in the German Empire. Education put heavy emphasis on the indoctrination of nationalist attitudes, the subordination of the individual and an idealization of combat. The military itself was an integral part of public life in the German Empire through various organizations and festivals. Veteran associations promoted embellished memories of wars fought in the past and idolized those who fought them. Numerous popular books, and many of those aimed at young readers, depicted war as an opportunity to live up to the nation's historic promise, unite the people of all classes, reach for greatness and achieve victory. War was not feared for the mass slaughter that it would be; it was awaited as a necessary as well as inevitable proving ground on which individuals as well as the nation as a whole would undergo rejuvenation and achieve progress (Donson 2004; Hewitson 2004, 85–111; Koch 2005, 90–92; Leonhard 2014, 76–78).

Historians refer to the mood during the early days of the war as "the spirit of 1914". When Russia mobilized its troops at the end of July 1914, the mood in the urban centers of the German Empire had "already taken on the air of a public festival" (Chickering 2004, 13). Among the reasons: war became increasingly seen as inevitable and as an opportunity for Germany to finally stand up against the threats it faced from its European neighbors. The wide-spread enthusiasm was furthermore based on the belief that going to war would initiate a period of national elevation and renewal. This spirit moved the masses, it built collective enthusiasm on the idea of romantic militarism, and it captured individuals though this shared experience[55].

[55] At the same time, the existence of this romantic militarism should not be interpreted as blind fervor, as historians emphasize. For example, the idea that European nations rode into the First World War on an unequivocal wave of war enthusiasm has been called into question. On the one hand, there is plenty of evidence for some "naive, carnivalesque enthusiasm" and the idea of war as "glorious, chivalrous, and heroic" (Verhey 2000, 231) in the streets of Germany in 1914. On the other hand, there are also indications of ambiguity, anxiety, confusion and many other emotions,

While the emotional regime of romantic militarism is certainly not restricted to the German Empire, nor to the eve of World War I, this attitude towards warfare is usually linked to that society and that conflict. For one, because it thereby culminated in the most destructive conflict the world had seen to date; and secondly, because the year 1914 is seen as a turning point for the prevalence and influence of romantic militarism. To pick but one example, this is visible in how Howard describes the period and depicts that year as a crossroads:

> It is true, and it is important to bear in mind in examining the problems of that period, that before 1914 war was almost universally considered an acceptable, perhaps an inevitable and for many people desirable way of settling international differences, and that the war generally foreseen was expected to be, if not exactly *frisch und fröhlich*, then certainly brief: no longer, certainly, than the war of 1870 that was consciously or unconsciously taken by that generation as a model. (Howard 1983, 9; emphasis in original)

This illustrates that warfare did not have the overwhelmingly negative connotation that it has in large parts of the world today. To the contrary: until the Great War, and especially right before it, war was seen as a means of personal development and societal progress. Ultimately, this romantic militarism was confronted with reality, and this clash was nowhere as harsh as in the all-encompassing slaughter of the First World War. As Verhey argues for the case of Germany: "This romantic vision of war did not survive the first experience with the real war, the first sight of death" (Verhey 2000, 105).

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oftentimes depending on factors such as social class, location, age and gender. Apart from that, there was clearly awareness of the unique quality that a war among Europe's great powers and with the help of modern technology would have (Chickering 2007, 204; Hewitson 2004, 94–95; Hirschfeld 2011; Leonhard 2014, 76–78; Verhey 2000, 232).

The emotional regime that permitted the expression of romantic militarism thus came to an end with the First World War. The period between 1914 and 1918 is commonly described as a turning point for this attitude. It "put an end not just to romantic militarism in the Western mainstream but to the idea that war was in any way desirable or inevitable" (Pinker 2012, 246). In the words of Luard, the First World War "transformed traditional attitudes towards war" (Luard 1986, 365); and as Brodie put it, afterwards a "basic historical change had taken place in the attitudes of European (and American) peoples towards war" (Brodie 1973, 30). Expressions of the idea that war was of intrinsic value for individual as well as societal progress, and that there was a romantic quality to it, thus became "extremely rare" (Mueller 1991, 2).

War therefore lost its romantic, admirable and appealing qualities and, instead, became "Rather Embarrassing" (Mueller 1989, 18, see also 220). Where it was once acceptable to harbor positive feelings towards warfare and to voice these, the new emotional regime made this less and less tolerable. As the new emotional regime established itself, those who went to war increasingly "found it necessary to proclaim that war had been 'forced' on them" (Luard 1986, 361). In fact, "affirmations of peaceful intent now became obligatory" (Luard 1986, 366). The expression of positive emotions towards warfare fell out of fashion and became outright unacceptable in large parts of the world. Whereas the decision to go to war was once made for unabashedly egoistic reasons, it now requires more complex justifications that usually refer to only the best of intentions as well as the unfortunate necessity and unavoidability of war.

In Mueller's account, this idea was propelled to prominence during the First World War by a number of catalytic factors. Among them are the rise of an anti-war movement, the experience of a relatively peaceful century prior to the war, and the British and American am-

bition to ensure a lasting peace after 1918. This multitude of actors and processes emphasizes an important characteristic of Mueller's narrative: the absence of an actor who is intentionally exercising power through this phenomenon. What Foucault writes about systems of disciplinary power therefore applies here, too: "no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them" (Foucault 1978, 95). Mueller points in a similar direction when he labels the changing attitudes towards warfare as "phenomena that cannot easily be measured, treated with crisp precision or probed with deductive panache" and that have an "inherent and rather unpleasant mushiness" (Mueller 1991, 3), just like every expression of structural power.

This example thereby illustrates how the structural exercise of power through the influencing of emotions could be explored through a case study. The current setup of this study is not able to take structural power of this kind into account as it assumes that power is exercised by one actor over another actor. In the case of romantic militarism, it is clear that power is exercised over individuals and collectives – yet it is not possible to point towards any entity that could be described as an actor exercising power. What this example furthermore illustrates is that structural exercises of power through the influencing of emotions, for example in the form of emotional regimes, potentially influence world politics to a degree far higher than any actor-driven, non-structural exercises of power.

2. Contribution

The starting point of this study was the observation that the "emotional turn" in IR has so far barely been linked to one of the discipline's central concepts: power. As the literature reviews shows, the expanding and broadening work on emotions in international politics has barely taken into account how power and emotions interact. The other way around, the IR literature on power has traditionally paid little attention to emotions. While the idea that

power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions is an implicit assumption that many authors make, it is rarely acknowledged and has so far received little to no explicit attention. A bridge between the growing work on emotions and the established work on power, and between one of the discipline's recent trends and its traditional mainstream, has therefore been missing.

The first contribution of this study to the IR literature is therefore that it represents a step towards the building of such a bridge. It does so, first and foremost, by focusing and elaborating on one possible link between power and emotions: the idea that power can be exercised through the manipulation of emotions. This is by no means the only way in which the link between power and emotions can be approached, yet it is a crucial one. As the case studies show, the manipulation of emotions played a significant or even decisive role at numerous points in world history. But while scholars, philosophers, generals and politicians throughout the ages wrote about it, the modern IR literature has little to say about the link between power and emotions. Against this backdrop, the contribution of this study is "to bring emotions back in", first and foremost into the IR discourse on power.

This study does so by providing a theoretical framework for thinking about power and emotions and how they relate in international relations. One pillar of this framework rests on the literature on power from the field of political theory. It utilizes the conception of power as *power over* and the idea of power mechanisms to define what power is understood as in the context of this study, and where a focus on emotions has the potential to go beyond the existing IR literature on power. The second pillar of this framework is rooted in the discipline of psychology, and in particular in the field's appraisal approach towards emotions, the concept of emotion regulation and intergroup emotion theory.

Through this framework, this study goes beyond the links between emotions and power that have so far been established in IR. It connects emotions and their role in international

politics with an established, clear and comprehensive understanding of power. Where the existing IR literature on emotions speaks about power, it usually does so without much reflection on what power is and what forms it can take. References to power are usually made in passing, as if the term would represent a unified concept in within the discipline. And where power comes into focus in the discipline's literature on emotions, this is usually done in a one-dimensional fashion, for example with an exclusive focus on soft power. By rooting its approach to power in more fundamental considerations about the concept and introducing the idea of power mechanisms, this study expands on this limited understanding of the term.

The other way around, this framework also allows for a more thorough examination of emotions. Whereas most IR literature treats emotions in a superficial manner, seemingly with the assumption that there is an intuitive consensus about what emotions are and how they work, this study takes emotions serious as a psychological phenomenon. As Pashakhanlou has argued for the discipline's foundational writings on Realism, references to emotions such as fear rarely go beyond "generic statements" (Pashakhanlou 2017, 117). And although the literature on soft power makes frequent references to emotional phenomena such as attraction, "the psychology behind it is missing" (Hall 2010, 206). In contrast to that, the framework established in this study explores what emotions are, how they work and can be manipulated, and what effects they have on behavior. In addition, this framework outlines how emotions matter not only on the level of the individual, but also for groups and collectives, and thus for the most relevant actors in international relations.

The first contribution of this study to the IR literature is therefore that it brings together power and emotions – and that it does so in a way that goes beyond the implicit or superficial references to emotions in the literature on power, and vice versa. By doing so, this

study picks up where authors such as Hutchison and Bleiker left off when they recommended that an examination of power and emotions would be valuable to link the IR literature on emotions with the discipline's established concepts. As they wrote, this process would require the building of bridges to find common ground:

> Examining the links between emotions and power would entail compromises and consequences on both sides. Emotions scholars would need to engage more seriously with the debates on the nature of power, including those linked to social identity, nationalism, alliances, regimes, or institutions. More conventional scholars must, in return, start considering the far-reaching implications that accompany the knowledge that emotions are, indeed, everywhere. (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 509)

This study – hopefully – presents a first step in this direction. It engages "more seriously" with the concept of power than has so far been the case in the IR work on emotions; and it takes into account the "far-reaching implications" that emotions can have for our understanding of how power is exercised. The five case studies in this study illustrate the analytical value of this perspective on power and emotions. Yet the utility of this framework is not limited to the approach taken in these case studies. After all, and as the previous section on the limitations of this study has outlined, they establish the link between power and emotions in a somewhat narrow fashion, for example because they look only at the interactions of nation states. It is therefore easy to imagine how the foundations provided here could be used for further analysis, for example of the power that non-state actors exercise through the manipulation of emotions.

A second contribution of this study is to the debate between rationalist and constructivist approaches in IR. As Fearon and Wendt have outlined, a central point of contention within this debate is the question whether actors and their preferences should be taken as given –

or whether their constitution can and should be examined. Rationalist advocate the former approach and focus on the explanation of actors' behavior. Constructivists follow the latter logic and examine how actors came to be, how they acquired the qualities and preferences they have, and how their social environment contributed to these processes, for example through norms. That is to say, rationalists focus on explaining behavior whereas constructivists focus on explaining preferences (Fearon and Wendt 2013, 62–65)[56].

This study follows the constructivist logic on display in this debate and focuses on the constitution of preferences. This is evident in the approach to power that was chosen here. It takes the preferences of actor A as its starting point and describes the manipulation of B's preferences. This manipulation unfolds through power mechanisms, several of which are introduced here with an eye on how they affect the first and second order preferences of B. The case studies equally focus on historical episodes in which actor A was able to manipulate the emotions of actor B, and subsequently B's preferences and behavior. On this foundation, the second contribution of this study lies in how it further illuminates the formation preferences in international relations through its emphasis on emotions.

Within the discipline as a whole, in which we still see a "hegemony of rationalist approaches" (Crawford 2000, 122), this strengthens the argument that assumptions about given preferences should be critically examined. Under the assumption that emotions are an inescapable fact of all human and social life, and in a discipline that evolves around power relations, it suggests itself to examine how the interplay of emotions and power shapes preferences and behavior. Arguably, rationalist approaches have problems doing so and thereby run in danger of missing out on a relevant aspect of social relations. In other

[56] At the same time, Fearon and Wendt argue that these differences and their relevance are oftentimes overstated. Both sides bring something to the study of international affairs and can easily come together, for example by first analyzing preferences and then actions (Fearon and Wendt 2013, 64–65).

words, this study provides further support for incorporating constructivist perspectives into the study of international relations. This does not have to happen to the exclusion of rationalist approaches as the two can complement each other, yet it does suggest the need for a critical attitude towards the rationalist assumptions about preferences.

In line with that, this study lends further support to those who call into question the assumption about emotions that have become a hallmark of rationalism. It seems difficult to sustain the idea that emotions can only explain deviations from rational behavior – or, in other words, irrational behavior – with an eye on the case studies presented here. Consider the example of Japan's surrender at the end of the Second World War. The decision can hardly be explained without emotions such as shock, yet one would not label the decision makers in Tokyo as irrational. This calls into question whether rationality and emotions should be seen as mutually exclusive, as is oftentimes the case. Various authors have already made this point in IR, for example Mercer when he wrote that "emotion is integral to preferences" (Mercer 2010, 13), or Bleiker and Hutchison when they argued that there might be "different forms of rationalities, from the prevailing instrumental versions to more intuitive and emotional ones" (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008, 118).

3. Closing Thoughts

As the preceding chapters were hopefully able to show, there is purpose and utility to linking power and emotions in the study of international relations. Bringing these two concepts together is of value both for theorizing as well as for analyzing international relations, both from an academic perspective as well as for the public discourse. But whereas the various case studies were able to show how historical events from decades ago can be understood on this foundation, it is worth and important to emphasize that power and emotions also come together in contemporary politics – and maybe more so than ever before.

The rise of Donald Trump to power and into the White House has come to symbolize this. It has been argued that emotionality is becoming a "significant contributor to the national climate" (Stearns 2018) and that the 2016 election turned the country into "The United States of Emotion" (Yurkevich 2017). Donald Trump's name has been described as the most emotional word of that year and argued that probably no other candidate for President brought this level of emotionality to the election (Stayner 2016). Beyond these general observations, it has been proposed that Trump's success rests on emotions, and in particular on anger (Wahl-Jorgensen 2017) and fear (Ball 2016), and on his ability to mirror the frustration and threat perceptions of his supporters (Korostelina 2017, 74–75). In the words of Hochschild, he was an "emotions candidate" who "focuses on eliciting and praising emotional responses from his fans", and more so than any other candidate for the White House in decades (Hochschild 2016, 221).

Of course, power and emotions come together not only in the United States and not only in election campaigns. The influx of refugees in European countries during the past years equally illustrates how the two concepts interact. In particular, the way in which the media frames these issues and thereby produces powerful images and narratives, as well as corresponding emotions, has come into the focus of research. As has been shown for reporting in publications from various countries, among the dominant frames are two that clearly relate to specific emotions: the depiction of refugees as a potential threat and unwanted invaders – and the depiction of refugees as passive and tragic victims in need of support (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017; Parker 2015). Especially the first one of these two frames has been utilized by political actors across Western countries in order to answer, spark and utilize popular fears, and to promote nationalist as well as isolationist agendas (Anderson-Nathe and Gharabaghi 2017; Postelnicescu 2016).

The manipulation of emotions also continues to feature in interactions between states and remains an instrument of foreign policy. Among the most prominent examples of the recent past have been propaganda campaigns, both on social media and through traditional channels such as television, linked to the Russian government. As analysts of these efforts argue, they aim at the manipulation of emotions in other countries, the creation of mistrust, fear and anger, and the stoking of societal and political divisions. While usually covert and diffuse, these activities have specific goals, for example the discreditation of particular politicians or ideas, as became visible in Russia's meddling in America's Presidential election in 2016. Subsequently, these campaigns have been interpreted as a novel form of political warfare. They aim at manipulating whole societies and will only become more powerful through technologies advances in fields such as big data and artificial intelligence (Polyakova and Boyer 2018; Sydell 2017).

Against this backdrop, it is easy to conclude, as many commentators do, that contemporary politics is driven by emotions to an exceptional degree. Other voices argue that this view is mistaken and that emotions merely seem more influential than at other times. One explanation for this perception: in the face of unexpected political outcomes that defy the established wisdom, such as the election of Donald Trump or the British decision to leave the European Union in 2016, emotions are emphasized (Jenkins 2018). But regardless of which side of the debate one stands on, it is hard to deny that recent events have emphasized the role that emotions play in politics – and the way in which emotions are manipulated for the purpose of exercising power.

Here, the public discourse mirrors the academic discourse. Both pay more attention to emotions in politics today than has been the case in the past. And as this study hopefully was able to show, both would do well to pay attention not only to emotions and their effects, but also to the power relations that produce and manipulate these emotions. The starting

point for doing so is the insight that emotions are not merely naturalistic and intrinsic phenomena in individuals. They are also the product of social relations. And if we accept the idea that social relations and power relations cannot be separated, as was most prominently suggested by Foucault, or merely assume that social relations oftentimes feature power relations, the link between power and emotions becomes easy to see. This does not mean that all emotions have social origins and are the product of power processes, though this is certainly a position one can take; but it indicates that emotions should not be seen in isolation from social and power relations.

The most straightforward implication of this insight is a critical approach towards emotions. Where emotions are visible, one can ask what power processes may be behind these emotions, or simply whose interests these emotions might serve. In some areas, this is already happening: social media platforms are critically examined with an eye on the emotional distraction they provide and capitalize on (Gilroy-Ware 2017). It has been pointed out that the manipulation of emotions is an integral feature of free markets (Akerlof and Shiller 2015). The conception of emotions as commodities has even been labeled as one of the dominant features of modern capitalism (Illouz 2018). This questioning attitude is also visible in analyses of political affairs, and in particular with an eye on political advertisement and election campaigns. Yet the question about the power relations behind emotions is not asked with the same frequency and vigor when analyzing international relations.

The other way around, linking power and emotions also leads to the question of how emotions can be most effectively manipulated for the purpose of exercising power on the international stage. This does not necessarily have to take the form of perfidious manipulation or propaganda. It can also serve purposes such as the creation of unity, for example within security alliances, the promotion of friendship and reconciliation – or, in more general terms, the exercise of soft power.

Regardless of what perspective one takes when looking at power and emotions in international relations, the underlying conclusion of this study is that the interplay of both matters in ways that have received little attention so far. Emotions were barely considered by mainstream IR scholarship until very recently. And where they did receive attention, they were usually treated without consideration of how they relate to the very core of politics: the exercise of power. As this study was hopefully able to show, emotions can play an integral role in power processes, can be utilized and targeted for the purpose of exercising power, and can be a venue in which politics take place. These insights are by no means revolutionary, but they seldom feature in contemporary IR and the public discourse on global affairs. And against this backdrop, the goal of this study was to bring emotions back in[57].

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Abstract (in Korean)

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School, Department and Major: 서울대학교, 국제대학원, 국제학과

국제관계에 있어서 감정과 권력 간 관계에 대한 연구

국제관계학에서 감정에 대한 관심은 지난 약 20 년간 꾸준히 높아져 왔다. 감정에 대한 존재론적 의문과 방법론적 문제, 또한 특정 감정의 영향력에 대한 논의는 다수 이루어진 반면, 국제관계학에서 주요 개념으로 다뤄지는 권력과 감정 간의 관계는 충분한 검토가 이루어지지 않았다. 이는 감정이 자연발생적으로 생성되지 않는다는 점을 고려할 때 의문이 발생하는 부분이다. 감정은 사회적 상호작용의 산물이자, 권력행사의 목적을 위해 조종될 수 있다.

이에 본고는 국제관계학에서의 권력행사에 감정조종이 어떠한 역할을 하는지에 대해 탐색한다. 본 연구는 국제관계학에서 권력에 대한 기존 담론을 감정에 관한 기존연구와 이론적으로 연결짓고, 국제관계학에서 권력과 감정을 연결하기 위한 분석틀을 제시하며, 역사적으로 감정조종을 통해 권력행사가 어떻게 이루어졌는지 국가사례를 통한 설명을 제시하는 것을 목표로 한다.

전반부는 이론적 내용을 다루고 있으며 총 세 부분으로 구성되어 있다. 첫째, 권력은 한 행위자가 의도적으로 다른 행위자로 하여금 자신의 의도에 맞는 행위를 하도록 하는 것으로 정의된다. 이러한 과정은 다양한 형태를 띠며, 일련의 권력 기제를 동원한다. 둘째, 감정은 인간의 인지, 사고, 판단, 행위에 영향을 미치는 행위의 경향성으로 정의된다. 감정은 조종될 수 있으며 개인이 아닌 사회적 정체성에 바탕을 둘 경우 사회적 양상을 띨 수 있다. 따라서 권력은 감정의 유발, 자극, 경감을 통해 개인 혹은 개인으로 이루어진 집단에 행사될 수 있다. 국제관계학의 맥락에서

상당수의 구성원들이 공유된 사회적 정체성을 토대로 감정을 경험하고 이러한 감정이 행위에 영향을 미친다면, 국가와 같은 집단적 행위자도 감정을 갖는다고 볼 수 있다.

후반부는 총 여섯 가지의 사례 분석을 통해 역사적으로 감정조정을 이용하여 어떻게 한 국가가 다른 국가에 권력행사를 했는가를 검토한다. 첫번째 사례로는 1945 년 두 차례에 걸친 미국의 일본 원폭 투하를 통해 충격이라는 감정과 의도적 유발을 살펴본다. 이후 세 가지 사례를 점검하여 방기의 공포(fear of abandonment)를 중심으로 미국이 냉전시대를 걸쳐 동맹국들에 권력행사를 한 방법을 검토한다. 1950-1960 년대에 서독의 핵개발 동기를 좌절시키기 위해 방기의 공포를 자극하였으며, 닉슨 시대에 남한에서의 미군 철수 반대를 극복하기 위해 방기의 공포를 경감시켰고, 1970 년대 남한의 핵개발을 중단시키기 위해 앞서 언급된 두 가지의 접근법을 동시에 사용하였다. 마지막 두 가지 사례 분석을 통해서 분노의 조종을 설명한다. 먼저 전쟁 발발을 위해 1870 년 프랑스 정부와 대중의 분노를 자극한 프러시아 사례를 살펴본다. 다음으로 일본이 지난 몇 십년간 과거 식민지배 역사에 대한 일본인의 처리방법과 태도에 대한 남한의 분노 경감 실패 사례이다.

결론에서는 권력, 감정, 그리고 사례연구 선정방법에 대한 한계점을 점검하고 국제관계학에서 본고가 갖는 함의를 제시한다. 또한, 현대 정치에서 권력과 감정의 상호작용에 대한 추가적인 분석과 해당 연결고리에 대한 이론적 논의의 필요성을 제안한다.

Keywords: 국제관계, 권력, 파워, 감정

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